

**NOMINATION OF DONALD RUMSFELD
TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
**NOMINATION OF DONALD RUMSFELD TO BE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

NOVEMBER 12-13, 1975

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1975

61-000



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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1975

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room 1114 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John C. Stennis (chairman).

Present: Senators Stennis [presiding], Symington, Jackson, Cannon, Byrd of Virginia, Nunn, Culver, Hart of Colorado, Leahy, Tower, Goldwater, Scott of Virginia, Taft, and Bartlett.

Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff director; W. Clark McFadden II, counsel; John T. Ticer, chief clerk; Phyllis A. Bacon, assistant chief clerk; Charles J. Conneely, Charles H. Cromwell, Hyman Fine, George H. Foster, Jr., John A. Goldsmith, Edward B. Kenney, Don L. Lynch, Robert Q. Old, James C. Smith, Larry K. Smith, and Francis J. Sullivan, professional staff members; Roberta Ujakovich, research assistant; Doris E. Connor, Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, clerical assistants; David A. Raymond, assistant to Senator Symington; Charles Stevenson, assistant to Senator Culver; Edward Miller, assistant to Senator Hart; Doug Racine, assistant to Senator Leahy; Bill Lind, assistant to Senator Taft, and Fred Ruth, assistant to Senator Bartlett.

The CHAIRMAN. Our committee will please come to order ladies and gentlemen. We are glad to have our visitors and I know they are going to set a good example here for our committee. Quite seriously, we are glad to have all of you here but the price you have to pay is that everyone will have to be quiet so that everyone can hear and know what is going on.

Members of the committee, I called these hearings this morning at 9:30 because the best information I could get was that we were going to take up the Department of Defense Appropriation bill on the floor of the Senate today. I thought we would meet early and take advantage of a little extra time. However the plans had to be changed regarding the bill. I am delighted that we have such attendance. I am sure we will have virtually full attendance of all those who can possibly come.

I would propose to you some questions myself as a member of the committee—but I want to get to the other members as fast as we can. Also I have a very brief opening statement, where I call on the nominee, Mr. Rumsfeld, to make any statement he wishes and then answer questions of the membership for the record.

(1)



We are glad to have the news media here, gentlemen, the photographers especially. You are one of my great favorites, as you know. I just never did think that it comported with the serious proceedings of the Senate to have you gentlemen here. You cannot avoid interrupting by the nature of your work. But I want to be fair with you. Let us have 3 minutes now in which to get your extra pictures of Senator Percy from Illinois, Mr. Rumsfeld, and anyone else that you wish and then if you would quitely retire. I appreciate your attitude about it.

Our committee will please come to order. This morning we welcome Mr. Donald Rumsfeld who has been nominated to be Secretary of Defense and the nomination referred to this committee.

Briefly, Mr. Rumsfeld is now Assistant to the President and has been in public service since 1962, serving as a Member of the House of Representatives from that date until 1969. Since that time he has served in positions as Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, Counselor to the President, Director of the Cost of Living Council, and subsequently, as the U.S. Ambassador to the NATO Organization where he served until his present appointment in September 1974. The record should, therefore, reflect that Mr. Rumsfeld has an impressive record of public service both in the Congress and in these high-level, executive branch positions.

Mr. Rumsfeld has been before our committee before, having been here in 1967 as a witness, urging consideration of the Volunteer Army concept. Also, I want to remind him that everybody knows that he comes into this position at a very critical time. Everything is being reconsidered, it seems, worldwide, and there are crucial problems that confront us in our Defense Department which are perhaps about as many as we have ever had without a war. And these problems have increased because of inflation, business conditions, prospective shortage in energy, and so forth.

Without objection, I will include the rest of my brief opening remarks in the record.

[The statement referred to follows:]

Lastly, the Chair would emphasize that by law the Secretary of Defense "has authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense." Your biggest problem may be to retain and attract the necessary numbers of competent people who can effectively manage this vast effort which expends well over 300 billion per year.

Mr. Secretary, we welcome you here, and the committee will be glad to receive any opening remarks you wish to make before responding to questions by the committee members.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, we have with us Senator Charles H. Percy and Senator Adlai E. Stevenson II from the State of Illinois, the home State of the nominee.

But first I want to recognize and say that we are glad to have with us Mrs. Rumsfeld and the children, too. I would like to say as the chairman of the committee and as a member, I would like to meet them later, and I'm sure other members of the committee would.

Now, I will go back to the Senators from Illinois. Gentlemen, we are glad to have you here, and if you wish to vouch for Mr. Rumsfeld, we will give you a chance now. So if you will come to the table with him, please, Senator Percy, I will call on you first.



**STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES H. PERCY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS**

Senator PERCY. Senator Stennis, I am very honored indeed to be here with my distinguished colleague, Adlai Stevenson.

Now, I think it was very symbolic and correct that you would mention Mrs. Rumsfeld and the children very early before us. Don Rumsfeld and Mrs. Rumsfeld have been personal friends and we have seen their children grow up for years. They live 1½ blocks from us in Washington, and in my own village at home. He was my Congressman, and I think that all wives are the unsung heroes of public officials, and that goes for Senators and Congressmen and members of the administration. When the car comes in and picks up Mr. Rumsfeld, when he is working in the White House, at 6 or 6:30 a.m. and brings him home at 10, 10:30, or 11 p.m., the price is paid by the wife and the children. I wish that the public better understood the price that is paid by the families.

But one thing I can say about Mr. Rumsfeld above all else, he is a marvelous husband and father; and despite his tremendous load of responsibilities, somehow he has found a way to stay very, very close to his family, a tremendous tribute to him.

He is no stranger to the members of this committee and other Members of the Senate and the House. For over a decade he has been a well-known Member of Congress and a public official, and we do welcome him, I know, today as a former colleague and prominent member of the administration. Don Rumsfeld is one of those rare public officials who has had extensive experience both as a legislator and administrator, and certainly in this job above all jobs, the Secretary of Defense requires tremendous administrative competence and ability, but also an intimate knowledge of the workings of the Congress and the interrelationship between departments.

Within the last day I have talked with three of the most prominent former Secretaries of Defense because of the critical nature of our times, to get their views, ideas, and expectations in preparing my comments today on the interrelationship between departments and the knowledge of the White House and the knowledge of the Congress, and that was the thing that they emphasized to me, that this was paramount at this particular time in our history. Don Rumsfeld has a history as a problem solver, and we are in a sense problem solvers. But we can go back to the Congress and find two separate perspectives, as a Member of the House, and as a top-level administrator in two administrations now. A multitude of problems have come across his desk, and the swift and decisive way which he has gone about solving those problems is a matter of record. Now, we can look carefully and criticize, but I think it will stand up very well indeed.

This job requires a man of eminent energy, and in all my experience I do not know anyone that has more energy, more drive or more enthusiasm and tremendous competence coupled with it. He has displayed remarkable ability in every undertaking that he has experienced. His experience and his entire expertise makes him one



of the most capable administrators today in the Federal Government. I have known him throughout his public career. He is a man of high intelligence, sound judgment who, in my opinion, will be a distinguished addition to the cabinet. He was a three-term Congressman from suburban Chicago, he displayed outstanding leadership ability in his career, and his constituents are among the leaders of industry, banking, finance, law, and professions of that type. And he has to this day established a standard for representation in the congressional district of that is the epitome that anyone succeeding him would long to achieve. During his tenure in the House he gained the respect and admiration of his colleagues because of his firm grasp and understanding of public issues, and also his sense of fairness and his sense of justice.

As Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, which certainly was a problem area that could have brought down any man, he carried out that job with distinction. He was Director of the Cost of Living Council, placed between the forces, opposing forces of labor, management, and the consumer, and he carried that out with great distinction.

And as Counselor to the President he further enhanced his reputation by showing outstanding administrative ability. He was a strong spokesman for the administration in those challenging posts.

Other members who have had and held top posts in the Defense Department have pointed out to me that in his job as the U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the respect that he gained among all of our European counterparts over there, the administrative ability he showed and the invaluable experience in defense and security matters he gained again was another major steppingstone in preparing him for this particular assignment given to him by the President. He served for the past year as staff coordinator in the White House. He has been one of President Ford's most intimate advisers in the administration on complex issues of domestic and foreign policy, and certainly we all know that he has enjoyed an intimate relationship of friendship and of confidence with the President of the United States.

For 6 years he was my Congressman for the old 13th Congressional District of Illinois. I have worked closely with him as a member of the Illinois congressional delegation. He came to the Senate in 1967 and from his various posts, in the executive branch I believe that he will serve as Secretary of Defense with the same distinction that he has brought to other public positions. I believe both our allies and our adversaries will realize that the Defense Department is under the direction of a public official of extraordinary talent and ability.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator, very much.

Senator Stevenson, we are glad to have you here, Senator, you may proceed.

The photographers may stay until after Mr. Rumsfeld has started into his testimony.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ADLAI E. STEVENSON III, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS**

Senator STEVENSON. Mr. Chairman, it is a particular pleasure for me to join my colleague, Senator Percy, in introducing our friend and fellow Illinoisian, Donald Rumsfeld, to this committee.



This distinguished committee must, of course, judge in the first instance the qualifications of Donald Rumsfeld to be Secretary of Defense, and measure those qualifications against the undefined standards of that office.

Mr. Chairman, I do not know what the test is, but I suspect that it has something to do with the vitality, judgment, and all of those skills and attributes of character required and demonstrated in the course of human experiences. Mr. Rumsfeld's military experience might not qualify him to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was a former midshipman at Princeton University and an able aviator. But this is a civilian post. It is and must remain such a post. It is a position in the President's Cabinet, and Donald Rumsfeld has proved himself an extraordinarily capable public servant across an extraordinary spectrum of public experience in the House of Representatives, at the Office of Economic Opportunity, at the Cost of Living Council, and in the White House, and at NATO where the intricacies of defense policy were his daily fare.

And that experience he brings, in my judgment, Mr. Chairman, qualities of character and skills which fit him for high civilian office in the Government of the United States. This nomination deserves, and I am confident will receive, your most respectful consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, gentlemen. Thank you again very much. You gentlemen may stay at the table if you wish.

Mr. Rumsfeld, as I indicated in my opening statement and brief remarks, we will be glad to have a statement from you now, and then you will be subjected to questions.

STATEMENT OF DONALD RUMSFELD TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. RUMSFELD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee.

I am very pleased to appear before this committee today, and also would want to express my thanks to the two Senators from Illinois, Senator Percy and Senator Stevenson, for their presence and their very generous comments.

From my experience and service in the Congress I am certainly sensitive to the contribution that this committee and its members have made to our national defense.

I well understand that the position of the Secretary of Defense is a very vital one, and I want to assure the members of this committee that, if confirmed, I will approach those responsibilities with a full awareness of the weight that I would be undertaking.

I am equally aware and respectful of the leadership that has been demonstrated by those who have served in this office, from Secretary Forrestal through Secretary Laird to the fine service of Jim Schlesinger. I assure you, Mr. Chairman, your committee and, indeed, the Congress, that as those who before me have been nominated as Secretary of Defense, I am totally dedicated to a strong defense posture for the United States of America. And I pledge to devote my full energy to that task.

Certainly service in the post is the only way to become intimately familiar with the details of the Department. However, my involve-



ment in Defense matters as a Member of Congress, as Ambassador to NATO, and as Assistant to the President has at least acquainted me with some of the national security issues for which I would share responsibility as Secretary of Defense, and I believe, and trust that it reflects the record of commitment to the security of this country.

Mr. Chairman, I have supplied a biographical sketch, but by way of summary I might just make a few remarks. I was born in Chicago in 1932, attended public schools in Illinois except during World War II when my father served in the Navy, at which point I lived in North Carolina, Washington State, Oregon, and California. Returning to Illinois after the war, I completed my education there and attended Princeton on a scholarship—the last 3 years a naval ROTC scholarship—graduated with AB Degree in 1954 and went into the service of the United States Navy, stationed in New Jersey, Texas, Virginia, Florida as a pilot and then a flight instructor, and ultimately an instructor of flight instructors. I continued in the Reserves and served at NAS Anacostia, NAS Grosse Ile, and NAS Glenview, Ill.

After leaving the Navy I served as an assistant to two Congressmen, was in the investment banking business with A. G. Becker, and was elected to the 88th Congress in 1962 and reelected in 1964, 1966, and 1968. In Congress I served on the Joint Economic Committee with Senator Symington; on the House Committee on Science and Astronautics; the Manned Space Flight Subcommittee and a Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development; and on the Government Operations Committee and its Subcommittees on Military Operations and Foreign Operations and Government Information.

I resigned from Congress in 1969 to go into the executive branch, and as has been indicated, I served as Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, Director of the Cost of Living Council, and as Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, where I was the United States' Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee, and the Nuclear Planning Group. For the past 13½ months I have been Assistant to the President of the United States.

As a long-time reservist, Mr. Chairman, I know we cannot afford to rely on Active Duty Forces. And certainly the National Guard and Reserve units are an increasingly indispensable ingredient in our total force posture. I would intend to work with the military departments to increase the readiness of the Guard and the Reserve units.

Further, I recognize that defense is expensive and I intend, if confirmed, to do my best to manage the Department as efficiently as possible and to recommend to the Congress and to the President as lean but as combat-ready a force and accompanying budgets as is possible. However, I must say that the forces and the budgets must meet the national defense needs, and while defense is costly, an inadequate defense posture would in the long run be far more costly indeed.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the President, of course, is deeply committed to a strong defense posture. He has assured me that I will have from him a full and fair hearing on defense and national security issues. I want you and the members of the committee to know that it is my



7

full intention to be open and frank with the Congress in discussing issues and defense needs, and I know from my own service in Congress how indispensable it is that this be a collaborative endeavor. The defense of this country has been and must be a bipartisan and shared responsibility, and I assure you that I will do my utmost to keep it that way.

Mr. Chairman, I have submitted my financial information to the committee and I will be happy to have it entered into the record. I leave that entirely to your discretion.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen of the committee, just a few preliminary matters here. First, I will put in the record the nomination of Mr. Rumsfeld and the biographical sketch as sent over by the White House. It has already been covered in part.

[The nomination reference and report and biographical sketch of Donald Rumsfeld follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
November 4, 1975.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Donald Rumsfeld, of Illinois, to be Secretary of Defense, vice James R. Schlesinger.

NOVEMBER 13, 1975.

Reported by Mr. Stennis, with the recommendation that the nomination be *confirmed*.

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON DONALD RUMSFELD

Donald Rumsfeld was appointed Assistant to the President by President Ford in September, 1974. In this capacity, he serves as a member of the Cabinet, Director of the White House Office of Operations, and Coordinator of the White House Staff. Previously, he headed President Ford's transition team in August of 1974.

Mr. Rumsfeld was born on July 9, 1932, in Chicago, Illinois. He received a B.A. in Politics from Princeton University in 1954. He served in the U.S. Navy as a naval aviator from 1954-1957.

Mr. Rumsfeld became active in government in 1958 when he worked as Administrative Assistant to Congressman Dave Dennison of Ohio. In 1959, he became a Staff Assistant to then Congressman Robert Griffin of Michigan. From 1960 to 1962, he was with the Chicago investment banking firm of A. G. Becker and Company.

In 1962, he was elected to the United States House of Representatives from the Thirteenth District of Illinois to serve in the Eighty-Eighth Congress. He was re-elected in 1964, 1966, and 1968. In the Congress, he served on the Joint Economic Committee, the Committee on Science and Aeronautics, and the Government Operations Committee, and the Subcommittees on Military and Foreign Operations. He was also a co-founder of the Japanese-American Inter-Parliamentary Council.

In 1969, he resigned his seat in the House to join the Cabinet as an Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity. In December of 1970, he was named Counselor to the President and in October 1971, he was appointed Director of the Cost of Living Council.

Mr. Rumsfeld became United States Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in February 1973. He served as the United States' Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee, and the Nuclear Planning Group. In this capacity, he represented the United States on a wide range of military and diplomatic matters.

Mr. Rumsfeld has received honorary degrees in law from Park College, Lake Forest College, and Illinois College, as well as the Opportunities Industrial



Center's Executive Government Award and the Distinguished Eagle Scout Award.

Mr. Rumsfeld was married to the former Joyce Pierson of Wilmette, Illinois, in 1954. They have two daughters, Valerie (19) and Marcy (15), and a son, Nicholas (8).

The CHAIRMAN. With reference to the so-called conflicts-of-interest matters that we have before our committee, I will ask Mr. Braswell, our chief counsel and staff director, who always goes through these matters personally for us, if he has gone over all of this with Mr. Rumsfeld, and if so, is he satisfied that there is no basis here for any violation of the committee's rules, and conflict of interest as we have tried to determine it?

Mr. Braswell, you speak for the record, please.

Mr. BRASWELL. I have, Mr. Chairman. We have a letter to the committee from Mr. Rumsfeld indicating he holds no securities in defense companies doing business with the Department of Defense. His only holdings are in mutual funds.

The record should also reflect that he is a contingent beneficiary of a trust. This creates no problems since he is not a trustee and he has no current interest in the matter.

The record should also reflect that should he become the principal beneficiary, the same results will apply as currently applies to the normal holdings.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a family trust, is it not?

Mr. BRASWELL. Yes; completely so.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have no control over that now?

Mr. RUMSFELD. None whatsoever. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you do not know the contents now, as I understand it?

Mr. RUMSFELD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, gentlemen of the committee, we have—

Mr. RUMSFELD. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. If I might interrupt, I do have a good idea of the contents that were in it at the point where I was a trustee. My father passed away September of last year. I was a trustee. On arriving at the White House I adjusted that so that I would not be a trustee and would no longer be aware of the contents. And my understanding is that—it is not a large trust, and the majority of the assets in it are in real estate.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have filed in writing here that as long as you are a Federal officeholder, I believe, that you will not—

Mr. RUMSFELD. That they would not inform me.

The CHAIRMAN. Or confer with you about it; is that correct?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes, sir. And in the event I should become a beneficiary in any way then, I, of course, will inform the committee and arrange it the way my assets are arranged.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, based on all of the precedents of this committee that I know anything about, Mr. Rumsfeld overmeets the requirements of the committee and I see nothing in this at all where there would be any possible basis of complaint for a conflict of interest. I still cling to the idea that there are a few things that you have to just put out before the public and the whole world. Ordinarily everything is open to every member of the committee or any member of the Congress as far as I am concerned. But we do have a custom here of keeping a committee's semipersonal file on these matters, so that is what the



Chair would propose to do in this case, as in all others. Unless there is objection this is the way we will handle it.

Now, Mr. Rumsfeld, the Senate Democratic caucus a couple of years ago passed a resolution that says the caucus has adopted the policy with respect to every nomination which requires every nominee be asked: "Do we have your commitment to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?" Would you respond to that request?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes, sir. Certainly, as I indicated in my remarks, my full intention would be to cooperate fully with the Congress of the United States, and to appear before committees. And to see, in addition, that the appropriate Department witnesses are available to appear. I cannot at the moment conceive of a situation where I would not be able to appear, but I think, with that general statement, I have been responsive to your question.

The CHAIRMAN. So far as your part is concerned, you would be willing to respond?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that correct?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, gentlemen. Even though it cuts into a member some, I think the 10-minute rule or something very close to the 10-minute rule works out better and is fair, so the Chair will follow that rule.

Mr. Rumsfeld, I have not had a chance to know you very well. We just have not been thrown together very much and our affairs have not crossed too much. I had an hour and a half talk with you in the office the other day and I was very much impressed with your intelligence, the thrust of your mind, and the way you went into a problem. I want to bring up on the very threshold of this hearing something that I am not worried about now, but I think we have to keep it before us all of the time, and that is this question of civilian control of our Government, civilian control at the top. And that includes civilian control over the military. I have nothing but a satisfied feeling that our military leadership and all—so far as I know—the leadership fully conform to that Constitutional principle. In fact, I think the Chiefs of Staff of the four services and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff represent, to my mind, the strongest group that we have had since I have been on the committee.

But nevertheless, I want to keep before the public the idea of this supremacy of civilian control over all of the departments of government. Do you want to comment on that from your viewpoint?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, I share your belief in the constitutional principle of this civilian control, and also share your high regard for the men and women who serve in the U.S. armed services and would, in addition to fulfilling my belief in civilian control, I would want to say that I think it is important that civilian leadership consult fully and draw from the military the valuable competence and experience that they have to contribute to the defense of our country.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. So if you are confirmed it would be your purpose then to carry out fully whatever the burden might be of the responsibilities of being the overall Secretary of the military services?



Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That means when you come here to give us your opinion on policies, principles, and facts, that after your own investigation, you are going to be giving us conclusions that you have formed yourself. I mean, Donald Rumsfeld has formed rather than what some military official or other official has pushed you to do or say. What about that?

Mr. RUMSFELD. There is no question about that. I will undoubtedly provide my considered judgments where I have them. And in the instances where I may not at a given moment, I will so state. And where I can contribute to the discussion by describing the views of others, I might very well do that as well. But I certainly will give you my judgments as I develop them.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think that is what we want. I know that is what I want. I want your hard-boiled, hard-knuckle opinion on these things, on the important ones after you have had a brush with the facts yourself, and we can transmit that in a way to others of the membership of the Senate. The same results apply, I think, generally to the House. It is a very important matter to me, and I want someone who I can believe has given us his hard, factual conclusions, and that will be your place.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And at your expense of disagreeing with others, right?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. We may not do much as a matter of judgment with your conclusions, but we want to get your conclusions. That is the thing that I want to emphasize here now.

You were one of the original sponsors of the volunteer forces concept and I was not. I remember that.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I remember that.

The CHAIRMAN. But I have supported it fully.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not a skeptic, but I believe we have made some progress.

Now, I want you to take a personal responsibility there; You have worked with this thing, with the help of the Secretary of the Army, of course, the Chief of Staff and all of the rest of the military and civilians. I think it is very critical, and frankly, I think it has not yet been fully proven, although it has made some headway. Will you give that your personal attention to some degree and form conclusions about it, and then frankly advise this committee?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I certainly will, Mr. Chairman. I might say that my position back in the mid-1960's was that it was worth a try.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. RUMSFELD. And I fully recognize the importance of the United States having the necessary military manpower. My preference then was, and it remains today, that to the extent that this can be done without the use of a fully actuated selective service system and the use of compulsion, that is my preference. However, I would add that to the extent that it cannot be done, that is to say to the extent that we are not able to achieve the necessary military manpower for this country's needs, voluntarily, then, of course, as I indicated in my



testimony before this committee close to 10 years ago, I would certainly stand ready to see the Selective Service System brought into play. But I do feel an obligation to give my personal attention to this, and to try to see if we as a society can make it work. And I assure you of that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Now, this may sound like a small matter but it is not small to me. It was reported to me, and I hope that it is totally not true, that some of our men in the service are now being provided with food stamps. Now, my objection there is not that they get the value whatever value it is, but we have got to have our men in the military uniform independent, and independent as far as possible of other sources of Government income. Will you look into that matter and give us a report back on the food stamps matter? I was told this but I have not any proof of it. It may be even that some of your commanding officers have assisted in filling out the forms. I think it just has a bad influence with the Services as a whole, and that is my point.

Do you want to comment on that and specifically will you look into it?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Well, I certainly will look into it. I must say, in the event that it is occurring, I was not aware of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I do not have personal knowledge on it. I would share your concern about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. RUMSFELD. And I am not in a position to say whether any of the various proposals pending in the Congress would alter that in the event that it is, in fact, occurring.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Just look into it, that's my only request.

Now, Gentlemen, I have used up my time. Senator Tower, I will call on you please, sir. We have adopted in your absence, before you could get here, the 10-minute rule.

All right, Senator Tower.

Senator Tower. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being late.

The CHAIRMAN. That's all right.

Senator Tower. We had a confirmation vote in the Banking Committee of which I am the ranking member.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. We are glad to have you.

Senator Tower. Mr. Rumsfeld, a great deal has been said about the attitudes toward détente. There is, of course, as I am sure you have detected over the country, some uneasiness with détente, some feeling that it may be that we are having the wool pulled over our eyes and that a certain euphoria has perhaps set in as a result of détente. I would like to know how you view this whole matter of détente, what it is and what it is not, and what its implications are for the United States in terms of our maintaining an adequate level of preparedness, maintaining a force level at least comparative to that of the Soviet Union.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator, that, of course, is the subject that could take books to properly comment on. I will be happy to comment on it briefly.

My sense of it is that the United States believes very deeply in certain things. We believe in freedom, we believe in an individual's



right to read a book of his choosing, to speak, to assemble for religious purposes, own property, and, there are other societies on this globe that have a very, very different view.

The word "détente," of course, means different things to many people. With specific respect to the relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union, for example, it strikes me that any discussion of détente might break down into three pieces.

One would be the substance of that relationship in its many facets, two, the tactics of those relationships as they evolve, and three, as you suggested in your question, the perception.

I think with respect to the substance it is useful, given the very fundamental differences between our societies, for our country to attempt to see if, for whatever reason, there might be areas where our interests would converge at a given point in history, and, to the extent that they do converge, that is, I think, helpful and good, and lowers the level of confrontation and the danger in the world.

To the extent that they do not converge, as they have not in instances in the past, and I am sure will not in instances in the future, I think that is not a reason to be dissuaded, but it certainly is not a reason to agree with something that is, in fact, not in our interest.

There are reports with respect to the second part of the differences as to tactics, and pace and tempo. They may relate either to the first point, involving the substance of those relationships, or they may relate to the third point, involving perception. But one of the things, and my final point would be, one of the things that does concern me is the fact that when you have a relatively prolonged period of relative peace between the superpowers in this world, and when you engage in a series of relationships attempting to see if our interests do converge, there is no question that in our country and in other countries, many people can misinterpret what, in fact, the circumstances are. That is to say, some can be lulled into erroneously thinking that the Soviet Union and the United States are really very different, they are just different systems. That would be dangerous, because there are fundamental differences.

Some can also be lulled into the feeling that because we have been successful in avoiding confrontation it means that vigilance is not necessary. There can also develop a perception that because the relationships have been seen as improving in some respects, and there have been instances where we have found areas of agreement, that that means that the defense capabilities of our country are not necessary any longer. That also would be an error.

One of the tasks that free people have, not just in our country but certainly in Western Europe, is to go through this period, continue to seek ways to find areas where our interests converge, but recognize that, in my judgment at least, the reason for what success there has been is the fact of our capabilities. It is our defense capabilities and the deterrent effect of those capabilities that has contributed substantially to what improvement and relationships we have seen in the past years.

Senator Tower. And in arriving at a strategic arms limitations agreements, or in the process of trying to arrive at them, the input of the Secretary of Defense is, of course, enormously important. And your view, do you believe that we should never accept any agreement that might put the United States at a potential military disadvantage just for the sake of maintaining some kind of a climate of détente in which



we maintain a free flow of communication with the Soviet Union? Do you believe that we should not under any circumstances put the United States in the position that she might be at a potential military disadvantage to the Soviet Union?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I certainly do. I think that there is no question but that the fundamental interests of the defense establishment must, in fact, be the security of the United States.

I would add this. It strikes me that if a scientist is seeking a cure for cancer, and he goes down one road and finds a deadend, it does not mean he is a failure and he should stop. It means that he should very likely seek other avenues. And in our relationships, in this instance with the Soviet Union, certainly we should engage in discussions, certainly we should vigorously try to find those areas where our interests might converge. But the fact that they might not should not be something that should surprise us because, in fact, they might not, with respect to a given subject at a given time, and that should not be considered as a failure. It should be considered as a fact. It should lead not to any frustration or even excessive disappointment. Rather it should lead us to seek other ways. Again, as you suggest, assuring that in that quest we give very careful weighting and concern for the security interests of the United States of America.

Senator TOWER. In your view, have the fundamental and historic goals and objectives of the Soviet Union undergone any significant change?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I do not classify myself as a true expert on the Soviet Union or the life of that country. My sense is that they have a system that is fundamentally different from ours. We believe in certain God-given rights, and I will not repeat what I said earlier. They have very different views. And my sense of it is that given the fundamental differences between our systems, and given the military capability that they have, anyone looking at those capabilities could not conclude that they could not be used. We must do as we have been doing during successive administrations and successive Congresses, and that is to assure that we have the necessary defense and the deterrent capabilities.

Senator TOWER. Mr. Rumsfeld, one concluding question. Do you believe that the American presence in Western Europe should be maintained, at least at present levels?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Absolutely. It strikes me that given the negotiations that are taking place, the mutual balance and force reduction negotiations that are taking place, it would be exceedingly unwise for this country, or any of our allies, to take unilateral steps to reduce our capability in Western Europe. The capability is there for a reason. It is for the defense of Western Europe and the entire NATO treaty guideline area. It is there to deter an attack, which it has been successful in doing. We are engaged in discussions to try to find out whether it is possible at this point to achieve a stable situation at lower levels of force. It would be I think a wonderful thing if that could be achieved from the standpoint of our country and the European countries, and certainly the stability in that area.

At what point it might be achieved, or to what extent it might be achieved, remains to be seen, and we should not do anything which



would undermine the seriousness of those discussions which, indeed a unilateral reduction would.

Senator TOWER. Mr. Rumsfeld, I want to commend you on the splendid job that you did as the Ambassador to NATO, and I think the experience and the insight which you gained is a strong commendation for your qualifications for this position, along with the other splendid qualifications which you possess, and I shall certainly happily, and conscientiously support your confirmation.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Thank you very much, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

In just a second, Senator Symington, I am going to call on you. I really had about a half a minute left of my time. May I ask a quick question?

Senator SYMINGTON. Sure.

The CHAIRMAN. I have always in these important nominations asked this question for years and I want to ask it of you. You see what a big interest there is in this position, there is a lot of power in this office and a lot of responsibilities. I judge you are not coming in with any expectation of staying just a short time and then moving on? Frankly, I have said in the record for many offices that if it is just a venture to prepare for business, or a political venture or anything else, then it is the wrong place to step into these important assignments. Do you agree with that?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I agree completely. I assure you that I will serve in this post at the pleasure of the President, obviously, and devote my full energy and talents to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you always serve at the pleasure of the President, but you have no other plan or motive in mind, do you?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Absolutely not.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. I imagined that that would be your answer. And I think, of course, you are telling the truth.

I would ask for Senator Thurmond, who could not be here this morning, and he is one of our best attendees, that certain questions be put in the record at this point for response by Mr. Rumsfeld.

[The questions with answers follows:]

QUESTIONS BY SENATOR THURMOND FOR SECRETARY DESIGNEE RUMSFELD

Mr. Rumsfeld, I wish to associate myself with the remarks of our distinguished chairman reference your outstanding record of public service, both inside the Congress and within the Executive Department. It would be my view that your experience as Ambassador to NATO would be most helpful in assuming the important responsibilities of Secretary of Defense. Certainly I shall make every effort to cooperate with you and I am sure other members of this Committee will do likewise as you assume the role of Chief Advisor to the President on Defense matters, and head of the Department of Defense.

Mr. Rumsfeld, I would like to propound a few questions, although I recognize it is too early for you to address many of the specific issues which will come under your jurisdiction.

Question 1. First, I would like to have your views on what you see as this Nation's foreign policy and national security goals.

Answer. The basic U.S. national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free and healthy nation. U.S. foreign policies derive from and are in pursuit of that objective. U.S. foreign policy goals are to foster an international environment in which U.S. physical security will not be jeopardized, and in which our political and spiritual principles can thrive and our economic needs be met. The freedom and independence of other nations which generally share or aspire to our values, and maximum U.S. ability to engage in international trade and commerce, are important elements of that environment. U.S. foreign policies



seek through political, cultural, and economic discourse to affect the behavior of other governments in ways which will enhance our own welfare and promote these conditions.

It is, of course, in our interest not only to enhance our relationships with friendly nations but also to reduce the risks of conflict with others. U.S. defense policy relates to foreign policy objectives directly: It should provide a rational range of military capabilities to deter the use, or threat of use, of all kinds of force against ourselves, our allies, and other nations which would seriously affect our own welfare; and respond, should deterrence fail, with military force sufficient to protect our basic interests.

I intend to review these issues in greater detail in the Department's response to the requirements of the 1975 Defense Authorization Act for the Secretary of Defense to furnish Congress an annual report on the relationship between U.S. foreign policy and our military force structure.

Question 2. How would you go about determining the military muscle needed to achieve these goals?

Answer. In addition to setting foreign policy and national security, it is necessary to assess realistically the threat to the nation from other nations or blocs of nations. In determining the levels and composition of the capability we need to achieve our goals and to defend against the threat, I would consult within the Department of Defense, civilian and military officials, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as others, including the Congress, in developing Department recommendations to the President. Our allies should also be consulted as to our joint needs. Through such interchanges of views, I would hope that, as a nation, we would be able to reach sound conclusions on our needs, and, together with our allies, sustain the bonds of collective security.

Finally, as the Department principally charged with providing security for this country, the requirements must reflect a clear awareness of the capabilities of potential adversaries, and avoid causing instabilities which could result from a misreading of intentions.

Question 3. Do you plan to take an active role immediately in connection with the critical arms control negotiations now underway with the Soviet Union?

Answer. I intend to participate in the process of developing the U.S. positions on issues in arms control negotiations, after confirmation.

Question 4. In this connection, how would your views differ from those espoused by Dr. Schlesinger?

Answer. To the best of my knowledge, Dr. Schlesinger and I agree on the objectives of U.S. policy and on the necessity to find and capitalize on areas of agreement and mutual interest with the USSR. We also share the view that the U.S. cannot expect to achieve a stable military balance at lower levels of armament if we start from a position of inferiority.

A sound defense posture is an essential incentive to the Soviet Union in arms control negotiations.

Question 5. What are your views on the Total Force concept?

Answer. I support the Total Force Policy, which involves actions designed to strengthen the capability of reserve forces to augment active forces upon mobilization. I understand that a recently completed study of the Total Force resulted in programs designed to improve readiness and integration of reserve with active forces. I intend to maintain the momentum in this direction.

Question 6 (first half). What are your views on current military personnel levels in NATO?

Answer. The present level of U.S. commitment to the Alliance, along with the forces of our Allies, gives us the basis for maintaining a conventional balance in Europe. However, maintaining the quality of NATO forces, both our and Allied, requires constant effort.

With regard to the possibility of future U.S. troop reductions in Europe, the United States and our NATO Allies are presently engaged in the discussions and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. If an acceptable agreement can be reached, and that is our hope, that would be the appropriate time to adjust NATO capabilities to Warsaw Pact capabilities.

Question 6 (second half). Do you feel that the United States needs to enunciate a new policy in the Asia-Pacific area, and, if so, what form should this policy take?

Answer. A complete answer to this question would require a comprehensive examination and determination. However, in my view, the United States should



continue on the present policy course that has been established by the President. Our actions in Asia are being closely watched by the USSR, the PRC, Japan, and Korea as well as the other powers in the region. It is desirable that we continue to take actions which indicate to our friends and potential adversaries alike our resolve to remain a serious power in Asia.

From a Defense standpoint, Northeast Asia, and our deployments there to assure the security of Japan and Korea, remains central to our Pacific strategy. Elsewhere in the region, other bilateral and collective security commitments remain in force. As the evolving equilibrium is established, we do not foreclose the possibility of policy innovations as new situations develop. Nonetheless, there is a need for continuity—rather than rapid change—in order to pursue a goal of peace and stability throughout the region.

Question 7. Mr. Rumsfeld, what are your views on the current high level of foreign military sales to our friends abroad?

Answer. In both the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Military Sales Act, the Congress recognizes that the United States and other free and independent countries continue to have valid requirements for effective and mutually beneficial defense relationships to maintain and foster the environment of international peace and security.

This legislation also recognizes that, because of the growing cost and complexity of defense equipment, it is increasingly difficult for any country—and particularly a developing country—to fill all of its legitimate defense requirements from its own design and production base.

All sales are carefully reviewed by the Defense Department and State Department and there are provisions for Congressional overview. The total level of Foreign Military Sales has risen over the past five years from \$222 million in 1970 to \$9.5 billion in 1975, and the vast majority (90%) are for cash. One reason for the increase in sales agreements is that we have cut back our grant aid program from some \$5 billion in the 1950s to less than \$500 million now as improved economic capabilities have enabled our friends to purchase what they need. For example, the F-16 sale to four of our NATO allies in Europe accounts for \$2.1 billion of the 1975 figure.

Foreign Military sales are not only the transfer of guns, tanks, aircraft, and ships of war. About 40/45% of total purchase agreements are for weapons and ammunition, the remaining 55/60% consisting of such things as support equipment, construction, spare parts, training, and other services.

I believe that we must be judicious in deciding what we sell to whom, but dollar figures do not tell the whole story. The \$10 billion level of sales today is comparable to the \$5 billion in grant aid in 1952. Costs have escalated and equipment has become more complex and costly.

Question 8. Mr. Rumsfeld, in what context do you view the policy of detente with the Soviet Union?

Answer. I believe our relations with the Soviet Union should continue to be guided by our parallel policies of deterrence and detente.

There seems to be no doubt that we both understand that, with the nuclear capability we each possess, it is in our respective interests to try to reduce confrontation. But there is also no doubt that, for the foreseeable future, the extent of U.S.-Soviet cooperation will be limited by the continuation of the fundamental differences in internal values and in international aspirations which distinguish the two nations. And, when important interests are at stake, as in the arms control area, progress toward a more cooperative relationship may be slow.

We should neither give up when progress seems to move slowly, nor negotiate inadequate arrangements under pressure of time. We are and must remain strong enough to engage in such negotiations in ways which serve and promote our national security. That is a long, slow, complex process.

It might be useful to point out that the word detente seems to mean different things to different people. For that reason it is useful to indicate what I mean and what I do not mean when I use the word. As I see it, the word detente is the word, in current use, to describe the approach to foreign relations being used by the United States toward some other nations that have the following characteristics:

1. A political system so different from our own that mutual confidence is lacking;
2. A military capability great enough to endanger the United States or its Allies and friends; and
3. A pattern of actions over the years demonstrating a willingness to use force, or the threat of force, to advance their interests at the expense of others.



Toward such nations, our approach, that is to say a policy of detente, should include the following elements:

1. Enough military strength to deter adventuresomeness or aggression;
2. Enough confidence in our own political and spiritual convictions to let others know that we adhere to the principles of liberty and justice and do not condone abuses of political and human rights; and
3. Enough wisdom to seek out agreements that diminish the danger of a war that might destroy hundreds of millions of people, and that may, over time, contribute to a more stable relationship. It goes without saying that in negotiations with such nations we must be on guard.

Detente, therefore, is a method of working toward our aims to avoid war, secure the safety and independence of the United States and our friends, and preserve the principles of political decency—the rights of all men to liberty, equality, and justice. As such, it is an approach, but not a guarantee.

This is what I mean by the word detente. It is an approach, intended in our best interests, to dealing with certain nations. If handled badly, it could do us harm. If handled well, it could serve us well. Therefore, questions such as "is detente good or bad for us?" or "do we benefit from it more or less than others?" are questions that run not to the approach of detente, as I see it, but to the execution. The test is in the execution.

In short, detente should not be viewed as a substitute for strength and solidarity, but rather as an approach that is available to us because of that strength.

Question 9. Mr. Rumsfeld, there have been suggestions that the Defense Department will have to take as much as \$7 billion in reductions in FY 1977 if the President is to achieve his \$28 billion spending cut proposal. Do you feel our national security can be assured in the face of such a large reduction?

Answer. The President feels that the anticipated growth in federal budget outlays should be restrained by \$28 billion. I am advised that specific allocation among individual agencies is being worked on but has not yet been completed. The President has made it abundantly clear that he stands for a defense posture "second to none", and I, of course, share that view. I am confident that the budget submitted for DOD in FY 1977 will ensure our national security.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Rumsfeld, I have had the privilege of serving with you before; and I will vote for your confirmation in the hope that you will be the first of but one of the Secretaries that I have known, and I have known them all, who is independent in your thinking with respect to the problems that develop in the Pentagon.

Now, when you come before this committee you come before a very friendly committee. It has been my experience after some 31 years in Government that you have four kinds of Senators and Congressmen.

Right after World War I a group of people came into the Congress and the Senate who voted for all of the guns before any butter. And the resistance that developed over the years, especially incident to the no-win war procedures, resulted in another group coming up who voted for all of the butter instead of any of the guns. The voting records are all there.

And then you have another group who could be the most dangerous of all, based on my concept of true national security, who say well, we will vote for all of the butter and all of the guns and we are sure to come back with a heavy majority, because nothing could ever happen to the U.S. dollar.

In that connection I recently was talking with a member of this committee who I believe is the fiscal and monetary expert of the Senate, if you could pick one man, and I told him that I heard that the retired military pay between now and the year 2000 would add up to



\$300 billion. He said no, that was too high. And I said, I had heard it from a pretty good source. So, I then asked the chief of staff of this committee, Mr. Braswell, to get me up some figures of what the retired pay would be. And I do not in any way criticize it at this point. I am just presenting this side to those who think we have to make some choices.

The memorandum from Mr. Braswell shows if you take a 6-percent annual increase in pay and a 4-percent annual increase in the consumer price index, the accumulated retirement pay figure was not \$150 billion, it was not \$300 billion, it was \$470 billion.

We are now purchasing submarines rapidly approaching \$2 billion apiece, and we are now moving to purchase airplanes rapidly approaching \$100 million apiece.

And my question to you then would be, in your position as civilian head of the Department of Defense, do you plan to consider a sound economy and a sound dollar equally important to any weapons systems, from a standpoint of true national security? And if you do, will you give that consideration in your decisions?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator Symington, I am happy to respond to that.

I think I would have to begin, however, by saying that certainly a fundamental service or responsibility of Government is to help to provide for the security of the American people, and to assure their freedom. There is no question but that inflation and the cycles of unemployment that this country has gone through have been difficult and damaging to many human beings. There is also no question, as you suggest, but that we cannot go down both roads continuously. Choices must be made, priorities must be established.

I think that honorable, reasonable people can differ as to how those priorities ought to be established. But I am certainly in full agreement that priorities in our society have to be established, if we are going to avoid some of the problems that other nations on this globe have faced by failing to face up to the importance of priorities.

I too have heard those figures on retirement costs between now and the end of the century. There is no question but that that is something that the executive branch and the legislative branch must address, and it is a sizable figure.

Senator SYMINGTON. What does disturb me is the relative lack of change in the structure, and to some extent, function in the overall military picture, to take appropriate account of the tremendous impact on any concept of security of the new nuclear force.

In a biography of De Gaulle by an Australian named Crozier, it states that President Eisenhower, who was a true military expert, said to De Gaulle in 1959, "Why do you emphasize the nuclear picture to the extent that you are doing, when you know you could never equal the Soviet Union?"

And De Gaulle replied that, "In the metagon age, I do not have to equal anybody, all I have to do is have enough," and this is in quotes. You only have to kill a man once, you do not have to kill him 10 times.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the memorandum that I got from Mr. Braswell be inserted at this point in the record, and I would ask that the quotation from the book in question of this dialog between



President Eisenhower and President de Gaulle be inserted in full in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. All right, Senator. Certainly.
[The material referred to follows:]

[Part V: The Fifth Republic Chapter 2: The Atlantic Directorate Affair, p. 533.]

"Why do you doubt that the United States would identify its fate with Europe's?" asked Eisenhower.

And de Gaulle reminded him that during the First World War, American help came only after three years of almost mortal trials; and in the second, only after France had been crushed. Nor was this at all strange. That was why France, although faithful to the alliance, was against integration in NATO. As for harmonising—"if one dares to apply this celestial word to that infernal subject"—the use of French and American bombs, this could be done in the framework of direct cooperation between the three atomic powers which he had proposed.

But surely, the American president objected, given the prohibitive cost of such armaments, France would not be able, by a long way, to reach the Soviet level? In reply de Gaulle gave him the doctrine of the French deterrent in its simplest and purest form: "You know very well that on the scale of megatons, a few rounds of bombs would destroy any country. For our deterrent to be effective, all we need is enough to kill the enemy once, even if he has the means to kill us ten times over."

[From, DeGaulle, by Brian Crozier]

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C., October 24, 1975.

Re memorandum for Senator Symington
From: Ed Braswell.

This is a followup to our phone conversation yesterday afternoon concerning the cost of the military retirement system. The cumulative cost of the military retirement system from FY 1976 to FY 2000 will be about \$470 billion, if one assumes a 6% annual increase in pay and 4% annual increase in the Consumer Price Index.

Under the above assumptions, the annual cost of the retirement system in FY 1985 would be \$13.9 billion, in FY 1990 \$19.7 billion, in FY 1995 \$26.9 billion, and FY 2000 \$36.1 billion.

Of course, the total cumulative cost of the retirement system is dependent on what assumptions are made on pay and price increases. If one assumes that there are no future basic pay or retirement pay increases, then the total cumulative cost of the military retirement system for FY 1976-2000 would be \$217 billion. This, in effect, would assume no inflation between FY 1976-2000.

Some facts on the military retirement system:

Currently there are over 1 million military retirees, with an estimated 1.8 million by FY 2000.

Unfunded liability of retirement system is about \$150 billion, which means that this amount would have to be invested at 3.5% interest into the future to cover the current obligations of the system.

Retired pay was less than 1% of the Defense budget outlays in FY 1954, 2.4% in FY 1964 and will be over 7% in FY 1976.

Retired pay has increased \$5.7 billion from FY 1964 (\$1.2 billion) of FY 1976 (\$6.9 billion)—an almost sixfold increase in 13 fiscal years.

I hope this will be of some help.

Senator SYMINGTON. What worries me is that I cannot see any appropriate recognition of the developments of nuclear force in the military. For example, and you have the superb record as an aviator in World War II, and you know the aviation business from the standpoint of a combat pilot, or a pilot instructor—when one plane can deliver more in one mission than both sides delivered against each other in an



entire 4½ years of World War II, then I think we should begin to recognize the qualitative aspect of what is going on today, as against maintaining an unnecessarily large conventional posture. Otherwise, I do not see how the economy of the United States can live. And that is borne out by the fact, and I am confident, having served with you on the Joint Economic Committee, that you would agree that our system, as we know it, cannot continue indefinitely with a \$70 billion, \$80 billion, \$90 billion annual deficit.

A well-known banker in New York said to me recently that if the truth were known the Federal Government is in far worse financial condition than the city of New York. The only difference is that down here we have the printing presses.

I would appreciate your comments because of my great respect for your record and your capacity, having served with you before.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Well, thank you, Senator.

I would look forward to reading the citations that you have inserted in the record. I agree that in this area it is important to take into account qualities as well as quantities.

I would add, however, that it is important to take it into account on both sides, and I obviously do not have an immediate answer to the broad question you have posed.

I think that it may be that we will find that as we continue, and certainly there have been tremendous technological changes, that there may very well be some fundamentals that will not change a great deal.

Second, during this period where there has been an acceleration in the velocity of events, we have seen a period of relative stability between the superpowers, and one of the things that has contributed to that has been the strategies and the concepts that have underlaid our approach to defense during this period. Stability is not frivolously achieved, certainly. There are things that can be done that can upset that stability, and it may very well be that one of the characteristics of the problem you are posing is that those strategies and underlying concepts will evolve slowly rather than rapidly, and it may well be that is desirable from the standpoint of stability.

I will look forward to reading those citations.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, gentlemen. I thank you very much, and I am sorry, but your time is up.

Do you have just one more question?

Senator SYMINGTON. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Goldwater.

Senator GOLDWATER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have known Mr. Rumsfeld for a long time and, in fact, it was my pleasure to have campaigned for him when he first ran for the House.

You have served in a number of jobs, and you have done them all well. But I suggest that this one is going to be the biggest challenge that you have ever faced, because in my 45 years of experience with Defense, we never had a better Secretary of Defense than Jim Schlesinger. So you have a real challenge in front of you.

Let me ask you this question: Last week the Senate Appropriations Committee approved a budget for fiscal year 1976 of \$90.8 billion, which was about a half a billion higher than the House, but about \$7.1 billion less than requested. Secretary Schlesinger had indicated the



House figure was far too low, and had requested that about \$2.6 billion be restored by the Senate.

However, that did not happen. What are your views on the adequacy of the Department of Defense budget amount, as it is now shaping up?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Recognizing that I have not been a participant in this budget process, I have been able to review the President's thoughts on this as well as Secretary Schlesinger's and to review the letter which Secretary Schlesinger sent to Senator McClellan with specific reference to the figures you are mentioning. And insofar as I have an informed view, it would certainly correspond with the thoughts that Secretary Schlesinger put forward to Senator McClellan, and that the items he was concerned about involving something in the neighborhood of \$2.5 billion, as I recall, are needed by the Department.

And I am really not in a position to go beyond that.

Senator GOLDWATER. Thank you. In spite of what we hear, we are spending a smaller percentage of the total budget year after year on defense, and in spite of what we hear we are now spending on defense the lowest percentage of the gross national product that we have ever spent. In fact, Washington spent more on his budget than we are spending today as a percentage of the total gross national product.

With all of this in mind, the fact that we are spending less each year on defense, do you believe the defense budget should increase annually in real buying power, rather than increasing only to accommodate inflation and pay raises?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I am familiar with the statistics that have been put forward that comment on defense expenditures as a percentage of the Federal budget, and defense expenditures as a percentage of gross national product, both in isolation and in relationship to the Soviet Union's comparable statistics.

It seems to me that they are interesting and they are useful in a discussion of the subject. But the bedrock on which U.S. budgets should be built has to be our capabilities relative to potentially opposing capabilities. It is for the latter reason that I would certainly agree that, given the trends we have seen in terms of the interest on the part of the Soviet Union with respect to various capabilities, the U.S. Government should, in fact, provide real increases in the defense budget. And this is true not only because of the phraseology that I used, and that you used, it is true not only because, as you point out, of inflation, but also, as you suggest, the mix of our total defense budget that now goes toward pay as a result of our attempt to see that people who are involved in our Armed Forces receive something more closely approximating a competitive pay level with those who are not serving in the Armed Forces.

Senator GOLDWATER. In other words, there is not much we can do in Congress about the pay portion of the defense budget, which is a large part of the defense budget, unless we want to start cutting the pay of the troops? And that is something that I do not think any of us want to do.

Now, let us get into détente. Are there dangers to the United States in pursuing détente with the Soviet Union; and if so, what worries you the most, and what policies do you propose to avoid these dangers?



Mr. RUMSFELD. There is no question in my mind but that there are dangers, and the world is simply not a perfectly pleasant place.

As I indicated earlier, given those dangers, in some respect because of them, and in some respects in spite of them, it is important for the United States to seek to find ways where, in our interests, and certainly at no jeopardy to our security, we can find areas of agreement with the Soviet Union.

The danger that I see is not that a given President or administration or Government of the United States of America would engage in some sort of a relationship which is harmful to the security of the United States. I think the more fundamental danger is the one that I touched on earlier, that in the process, we could erroneously relax our vigilance. Détente is not a state or a circumstance or something that is fixed it is a relaxation of tension; and to have a relaxation of tension, there is the admission that there is tension.

The danger is that it is misinterpreted by some people. We have had relative stability in our relationship, and they see photographs of world leaders talking and dealing with each other. There is a danger that some can assume that that then means that vigilance is not necessary. In my judgment, the very success that has been achieved so far is a result of that vigilance, not in spite of it.

Senator GOLDWATER. The press has reported that Secretary Schlesinger's views of the advantages and disadvantages of détente to the United States differ from those of Secretary Kissinger. Have you had personal conversations with either Secretary Kissinger or Secretary Schlesinger on this subject, and if so, what can you report in that regard?

Mr. RUMSFELD. The answer is yes, I have had discussions with both over a period of years. I think both have commented on that subject. They certainly are considerably better authorities on it than I am, as to their personal views, and to what distinctions there might be.

I know of no major policy differences between them. My sense is that as with, I suppose, any two people, we are none of us the same. We approach things in somewhat different ways; we have different backgrounds and perspectives, different ways of saying things, and differences of view from time to time. But in a broad way, my sense of those two individuals' views is that there are not fundamental differences.

Senator GOLDWATER. Well, to many people, and this is a growing feeling in this country, Secretary Kissinger is, pardon the term, hellbent on achieving détente with Russia regardless of the fact that our military is not increasing in power enough to assure that we can maintain the conditions of détente which he is suggesting. Do you agree with Kissinger's position on détente, that we have to have it?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Well, I do not know that I would want to agree with the press characterization of his position. It strikes me that Secretary Kissinger, as Secretary Schlesinger and, indeed, as the President of the United States, comes to this subject with a background from the national security side, the two Secretaries from the standpoint of their academic pursuits, and the President from a long experience on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee in the House. That is a healthy way to approach many of these questions. It is a realistic way to approach these questions.



I do not know that I would agree with the logical extreme of the implication in the characterization of Secretary Kissinger that the report you cite would suggest, that he is hellbent on agreeing. I think it is natural in the give and take within a group of people on a subject such as this that there will be some differences of view. I think it is particularly natural that the individual who is charged with the responsibility for negotiating becomes sensitive to the tactics of negotiation, and it is also perfectly proper and understandable that a Secretary of Defense would have to keep foremost in his mind the security of the United States and contribute that perspective to any dialog for the President to make his final judgments.

Senator GOLDWATER. Just one final comment and my 10 minutes will be up. But I have more.

Secretary Schlesinger provided the country with the only authoritative voice that would argue with the Secretary of State's position on détente. I would sincerely hope, knowing you as I do, and knowing you to be very firm in your convictions, and having a suspicion, not knowing it, that you would support the Schlesinger positions, that if that is true you will continue to provide a voice in the cabinet so that the American people can have the benefit of opposing views on détente, versus a weakened military structure.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator, I can quite agree with you that it is critically important to a President to be absolutely certain that he does, in fact, have differing views, and that he is aware of the different perspectives and arguments, and the perceptions as well as any substantive differences that may exist.

I also, of course, want to assure you that I will do my utmost to see that they are presented in a thoughtful and sensible way.

Senator GOLDWATER. Mr. Chairman, that is all I have right now. I would like to make a comment that you know is a pet subject of mine. Some of the gentlemen on your side have been here for the whole hearing, and some of them have recently come in. I think it is a wise idea to reward those early attendees with an earlier effort to question.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator. Gentlemen, the Chair has been put somewhat on the spot to this extent: I have tried to loosely follow the rules on the 10 minutes, and loosely follow the idea that a man who comes here and sits out the hearing, when you get to him he is entitled to be heard. We have two very valuable and esteemed members of our committee who have just come in. Do you have a special showing that you want to make, either one of you?

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, no. We will defer. Both, Senator Cannon and myself, are in the fifth week of a conference involving 25 Senators on our side, and 7 House Members on the House side on energy, and we came directly from the conference. But it does not matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let us give these valuable members 5 minutes apiece and see what happens.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I will ease your pain a little bit and take half of my time and then yield the other half to Senator Jackson.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. That is nice. We will work out something here.



All right, Senator Jackson.

Senator Jackson?

Senator JACKSON. No; go ahead, Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Well, I will just ask two questions and we will share the time.

Mr. Rumsfeld, I also share a very high view of your capabilities, but I also was a very, very strong supporter of Secretary Schlesinger in both his abilities and his articulation of the theory behind the defense budget.

With that said, I think that a lot of people are concerned about your views on SALT II and whether there will be a real expression of those views. I am also concerned about another grave danger to our defense budget and our Defense Department, and that is the makeup of the budget. Senator Goldwater has already talked about the problem of pay and how much it is consuming. But the facts are that we started this year's defense budget and the people from the Pentagon came over and privately told me that 52 to 53 percent of the defense dollar was manpower, that that was as the President submitted the budget. Well, the facts are now that 60 percent of the defense budget is manpower, based on the reductions that have taken place.

And when you couple this situation with the fact that the Soviet Union is spending 30 cents out of every defense dollar on manpower, we are spending 60 cents out of every dollar on manpower, they have 4 million men under arms, we have 2 million men under arms. We see this trend going on and on, then it leads me to a conclusion that I hate to come to, but I would like to let you express your opinion on this. It looks like to me we have three or four things that can happen.

First of all, either there has got to be a substantial real increase in the defense budget, and by real increase I mean above pay and above inflation. Or, there has got to be a dramatic breakthrough in diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union which would cause them to decelerate their defense budget. Or, there has got to be a radical change either in the number of men we have, or in the pay.

Now, if none of those things, or some combination thereof does not happen, it seems to me that inevitably we face the substantial possibility of having a defense posture second to the Soviet Union. I would like your views on that.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator, I share your concern about the trends that we have seen, and I agree with your assessment of what the options are. I think it is useful, however, to point out something, and that is that when the United States of America made the judgment that it wanted to forego compulsion as the method of achieving the necessary military manpower, what it in effect was saying, among other things, was that previously we had been taking only some and not all, and then in addition to taking only some, we had been paying those individuals substantially less than what the individuals who were not taken were earning in the civilian manpower market. In effect, they were being taxed additionally for their service to the country.

One of the effects, inevitably, of going to a goal of an all volunteer force is that the pay must go up, but it seems to me that that is a proper thing for our country to do. And in exchange for that we have gained some things; that is to say, we have stopped taxing those individuals who have served, and we have stopped unnecessarily using compulsion



as the method of achieving military manpower when it was not necessary and, therefore, not desirable in a free society.

I think that the defense budget should take that into account, and it would be exceedingly unfortunate, and certainly dangerous if rather than doing that we allowed that progression of the percent of the defense budget for pay to go up to, as you suggest, something in the neighborhood of 60 percent to continue, because there is no question but that something else suffers, and that something else is the weapon capability of our country, and inevitably the deterrent.

Senator NUNN. It is already happening. It is not like it is going to happen, it is already happening, and it is a grave danger, as I see it. And with the fiscal year 1977 announced program of the President to cut \$28 billion from governmental expenditures, which is a good goal that I share, my next question is how much of that is going to be out of the defense budget. I would also ask whether you yourself have been involved in the negotiations between OMB and the former Secretary of Defense, Schlesinger, as to what percent can be taken out of the defense budget?

Mr. RUMSFELD. The answer is I have not, to this point, and would not be until the conclusion of the confirmation process. I can assure you that I would very definitely be involved in it at that point. Let me modify one thing you said. The President's proposal involved not a \$28 billion cut from spending, but what it is is a recommendation on his part to restrain the anticipated growth in the Federal spending which is anticipated to be something in the neighborhood of \$53 billion in fiscal year 1977 to a level of \$28 billion less than the \$53 billion growth. So there will still be growth in the Federal budget. It will not be a \$28 billion reduction from congressional actions this year.

Senator NUNN. Well, in the final analysis though, what is happening though is that the growth in the defense budget is inflation, and it is manpower costs, and if you look at what is happening, R. & D. and procurements since the Vietnam war in 1964, and if you take into account inflation, we are buying an awful lot less in research and development and procurement right now than we were before the Vietnam war, and at any time before that, and we are not telling the American people those facts.

It is not being made known to them. We talk about a voluntary force in a vacuum as if the only thing is a numbers game. The American people, when they made the choice, if they did, through Congress to go to a volunteer force, they were not given the other implications of that choice and they still have not been given the other implications. And I think that it is time that someone in the administration and in the Congress starts laying out the facts.

Mr. Chairman, I will yield to Senator Jackson.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Could I add one comment on that? Your comments are certainly valid, and this is one particular aspect of the defense budget that I think, as we move into the period ahead, we have to take into account. That \$360 billion or \$370 plus billion budget, as you are well aware, the vast portion of the Defense Department budget is classified as the so-called "controllables" as opposed to the "uncontrollables," the latter being expenditures that would require additional legislative authority to restrain. It seems to me that certainly the Congress and the administration will have to work to see that we shape a



budget that, in fact, fits our national needs, not simply going along with one that is the easiest to shape, because certain things are "controllable" and certain things are supposedly not.

That is not how priorities ought to be established, in my judgment, and I certainly concur with your concern about the problem in the budget generally.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I am sorry, but your time has run over.

Senator NUNN. I yield, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, gentlemen. You have used all of the time.

The Chair is inclined to think that we should recognize Senator Taft who has been here since the committee convened.

Senator Taft?

Senator TAFT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

Mr. Rumsfeld, I welcome you here. We served in the House together for several years, and I enjoyed it very much and admired your views at the time, including your support for the Volunteer Army. The problems that have been described by my colleagues today certainly give me some pause. But I agreed with the view at that time, and I still think it is a concept that I hope you will continue to work with.

Moving from that area to a few more specific areas, I realize that you may feel that you would want to give us answers to these later after you are in office, if you cannot give them now or give us some views on them now; but I hope that you will within a reasonably short period feel that you can really give the committee the benefit of your thinking on these.

First of all, it has been suggested that there might have been some disagreement between your predecessor and Secretary Kissinger on the importance of the Soviet Backfire bomber in terms of the SALT talks. Is it not correct that the Backfire has thus far been deployed exclusively with Soviet Naval Aviation, and do you have an opinion as to whether it should be counted as a strategic weapons system?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator Jackson was kind enough to pose some questions to me in writing, one of which related to the subject of Backfire.* I have visited with a number of people since visiting with Senator Jackson on it, and would be happy to make a remark or two about it.

I would preface it, as you suggest, by saying that SALT is, of course, a subject of such enormous complexity that after a period of extended negotiations there is certain history to words and phrases, and not having been intimately involved in those negotiations, I obviously would want to wait until I had an opportunity to consult internally within the Department of Defense before making conclusive judgments.

I am not in a position to confirm or not confirm your suggestions concerning Secretary Kissinger and Secretary Schlesinger's views on that particular subject at this point. However, my understanding is that there is a broad agreement that the Backfire bomber does have an intercontinental capability that is of sufficient range to strike the United States from Soviet bases.

*See p. 27.



There are various views with respect to intentions. But I am referring to the capability.

Senator TAFT. Thank you.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I would like to go on just a minute.

Senator TAFT. All right. Please.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I think that clearly anyone from the standpoint of the United States would have a preference to include the Backfire in the SALT agreement. However, in considering possible Defense Department recommendations to the President, I think it is proper for one to consider all of the elements of such a package taken together. At the minimum the Backfire must be dealt with, and its handling in any total package should, in my judgment, be designed so as not to present an added risk to the security of the United States.

Before conclusively deciding how this specific issue can best be handled, I would, however, want to talk to a good many people in the Department of Defense.

Senator TAFT. How about the Cruise missile? Do you consider that it ought to be included in the SALT talk discussions?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Out of courtesy, I should probably supply Senator Jackson with the responses that he requested of me, which I have not yet done.

Senator JACKSON. Would the Senator yield right now?

Senator TAFT. Be happy to.

Senator JACKSON. Do you have the written responses to the interrogatories?

Mr. RUMSFELD. They are coming up right now.

Senator JACKSON. All right. I would like to see them. Excuse me. [The material referred to follows:]

RESPONSES BY DONALD RUMSFELD TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR HENRY JACKSON

NOTE.—Because SALT is a subject of enormous complexity, because I have not been in a position to consult in any depth within the Department of Defense, and because I have not been personally involved in those ongoing negotiations, I must preface my responses to your questions by indicating that I am obviously not at this time in a position to express conclusive judgments. If confirmed as Secretary of Defense, and as I become involved fully in the issues and the negotiating background, I will be in a better position to contribute to the continuing development of DOD positions on these matters.

Question 1. "President Ford confirmed on Sunday what a number of government studies had already established: that the new Soviet Backfire bomber has intercontinental capability. Will you recommend to the President that the Backfire be included within the Soviet ceiling of 2400 intercontinental strategic delivery vehicles."

Answer. My understanding is that there is across the board agreement that the Backfire bomber does have an intercontinental capability that is of sufficient range to strike the U.S. from Soviet bases. Clearly, one's preference would be to include the Backfire in the 2400 aggregate ceiling. However, considering possible Department recommendations to the President with respect to a total SALT package, all of the elements must be assessed in relation to one another. At a minimum, the Backfire must be dealt with, and its handling in a total package should be designed so as not to present an added risk to the security of the United States. Before conclusively deciding how this specific issue can best be handled, I would of course want to consult fully with the Department.

Question 2. "Neither the text of the Vladivostok SALT guidelines nor the record of negotiations requires that the United States accept limitations on its cruise missile deployments. As you know, we presently have cruise missiles under development. Do you see any reason to modify the Vladivostok guidelines as the Soviets desire so as to limit our right to deploy cruise missiles?"



Answer. It is my understanding that the Aide Memoire does not include cruise missiles, according to the U.S. understanding. Cruise missiles are difficult to deal with in SALT. They have tactical and strategic application, as well as several methods of delivery (land, air or sea) and the option of nuclear or conventional warheads. The question of whether it would be in the U.S. interest to adjust the present position on cruise missiles from that set forth in the Vladivostok Agreement must, as with the Backfire, be considered not only from the standpoint of that particular system, but also in the context of the total package. Only in this way can one hope to avoid added risk to the security of the United States.

Question 3. "Studies conducted with the government have come to the conclusion that there is no way to verify compliance with a range limitation on cruise missiles. This country has always maintained that we will not enter into agreements with the Soviets that cannot be verified. In view of our inability to verify cruise missile limitations, will you recommend to the President that we not accede to the Soviet demand to modify the Vladivostok guidelines on cruise missiles and thereby enter into an unverifiable agreement?"

Answer. Verification is one of the most complex and technical aspects of SALT. It is my understanding that cruise missiles are considered to be exceedingly difficult to verify. Therefore, any consideration of cruise missiles from the standpoint of a DOD position must, of necessity, fully take into account that problem. However, cruise missiles are a factor in the overall strategic equation. In view of these facts, I would want to study it carefully and consult fully within the DOD on any proposals for resolution of the cruise missile issue.

Question 4. "When the Congress approved the SALT I Interim Agreement it advised the President that a SALT II agreement should 'not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the levels provided for the Soviet Union.' The history of the debate in the Senate on that resolution made it clear that we were asking for equality in *numbers of weapons* and in *throw weight*. In advising the President, would you take seriously this Congressional action; and, specifically, would you press for an agreement that would reduce the Soviet advantage in throw weight which is already three times that of the United States?"

Answer. Yes. I would of course take seriously any Congressional action, and in this instance the Vladivostok Agreement did of course provide for numerical equality. With respect to throw weight, I agree fully that it is an important element in the equation, and that the United States should work to reduce the Soviet advantage. This should be addressed in each step forward toward a comprehensive agreement with the Soviets if we are to enhance strategic stability between the two sides. In addition, we must continue with the necessary unilateral steps in our defense programs to maintain the balance and our security.

Mr. RUMSFELD. With respect to the Cruise missiles, Senator Taft, this also was a question that was posed. It is my understanding that the aid memoiré does not include Cruise missiles, according to the United States' understanding. There is general agreement that Cruise missiles are difficult to deal with in SALT. They certainly have potential for tactical as well as strategic application.

There are obviously several methods of delivery, by land, air, and sea, and of course, there is the option for both nuclear and conventional warheads.

The question of whether it would be in the U.S. interest to adjust to the present position on Cruise missiles from that set forth in the Vladivostok Agreement must, as is the case with Backfire, be considered not only from the standpoint of that particular system, but also in the context of the total package. And only by looking at the total package can one hope to avoid any added risks to the security of the United States of America, which obviously has to be the goal in such negotiations.

Senator TAFT. Mr. Rumsfeld, I have expressed a strong belief that the United States should give active consideration to supplying not



only diplomatic support but also possible military support if requested in the form of defensive weapons, and weapons technology, to the People's Republic of China to enable that country to feel more secure against possible Soviet military adventurism. Do you have any thoughts on that possibility? Do you not agree that it would be a major foreign policy disaster for the United States if China felt so threatened by the Soviet Union as to make a new alliance with Russia to forestall that threat?

Mr. RUMSFELD. That is not a subject that I have involved myself with sufficiently that I could give a comment at this time, Senator.

Senator TAFT. Could you comment on the possible affects on the balance of power in the Middle East if Israel were to be supplied with the Pershing missile?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Well, a balance at any time has to include many pieces. However, with respect to the Pershing missile, my understanding is that the National Security Council and the President are reviewing requests that may have come in. And if I am not mistaken, the President very recently has expressed strong reservations about the possibility of the Pershing with respect to them.

Senator TAFT. There has been some evidence in terms of both statements in the press and rumblings from the Department of Defense that the Marine Corps role may be changed substantially. This might be well and good. I have talked to General Haynes, and I am familiar with the work of his committee. I am convinced, however, that part of the impetus behind this could be another of the perennial attempts by some to absorb the Marine Corps, or at least diminish its size and mission. What would be your attitude toward such an attempt?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Well, I am not familiar with such an attempt, and would certainly want to discuss that with the individuals in the Department of Defense, both on the civilian side and certainly on the military side.

Not being familiar with what proposal you are suggesting, it would be very difficult to comment on it.

Senator TAFT. One of my great concerns is our comparative inattention in terms of military aid to what may be one of our most important friends in the South Asian area, Pakistan. Pakistan is finding itself in an increasingly difficult situation as it is menaced not only by India but also by a radical government in Afghanistan; yet I note in the security assistance program no aid is planned for Pakistan other than a small training sum, under \$1 million.

Do you have any feeling about that with regard to the military assistance program?

Mr. RUMSFELD. It is not a subject I have been involved in.

Senator TAFT. Do you expect Mr. William Clements to stay on as the Deputy Secretary of Defense?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I would certain assume so. I have not addressed any personnel questions during this period.

Senator TAFT. Mr. Chairman, I think I have taken my 10 minutes time.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Your time is just up. Thank you, Senator, very much.

Gentlemen, about this afternoon, can you be here this afternoon?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes, sir.



The CHAIRMAN. I have a report from the Senate that there is a matter coming up on amendments and debate this afternoon, and there is a vote expected at 12 o'clock or near there, too, on the trade bill from the Finance Committee. Now, I would think that there are important questions here and we want everybody to have a full chance. I think, if we come back this afternoon, we would not be interrupted by so many votes. It would suit me all right to come back if we can finish up here now.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the pleasure of the committee? Do you have any special suggestions? We can come back this afternoon or in the morning if it interferes with others. You can think it over.

Now, without objection, these two gentlemen here—

Senator JACKSON. We defer to the Senator. Senator Culver, go ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to take 5 minutes apiece so that you can get back to the conference, or would you rather wait?

Senator JACKSON. We will wait.

Senator GOLDWATER. What time do you want to come back this afternoon?

The CHAIRMAN. 2:30 p.m.

Senator CULVER. I want to observe that it is perfectly appropriate in view of the conference to let the other Senators go, but I will not be able, for whatever it is worth, to be here this afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if you need to get back to the conference, I would accept the courtesy. It is all right.

Senator JACKSON. We will defer. Go ahead. Just have the two of you go ahead. Go ahead, John.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator CULVER. There is plenty of time this morning, Mr. Chairman, if they want to go ahead and get back to the conference.

Senator JACKSON. We have a Senate floor vote at 12. Go ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. They want more than 5 minutes.

Senator SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, if nobody on that side wants the time—

The CHAIRMAN. I knew you would be ready.

Senator CULVER. I recognize you for 10 minutes.

Senator CULVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Rumsfeld, in your judgment is the United States militarily strong today?

Mr. RUMSFELD. There is no question but that we are.

Senator CULVER. I am sorry, I cannot hear.

Mr. RUMSFELD. There is no question but that the United States is militarily strong.

Senator CULVER. Are we strong enough to deter a nuclear attack upon us?

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me? Some of you gentlemen will have to keep the microphone toward the witness. It must be a little weak.

Senator GOLDWATER. I do not think it is working.

The CHAIRMAN. Put another one over there, if you will.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Is this working now?

Senator GOLDWATER. No. It is not working.



The CHAIRMAN. Someone on the staff go around there and adjust them, please, or help him with it.

All right, proceed.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Clearly the United States has at this point a substantial defense capability and a credible deterrent. What concerns me and what concerns others is not that we have not thus far had an effective deterrent, an adequate deterrent which, indeed, we have, but the prospects for the future.

Senator CULVER. In your judgment, are we stronger in America militarily or economically today?

Mr. RUMSFELD. That is a question, of course, that could best be answered by philosophers.

Senator CULVER. Oh, I think they go to the question of the appropriate definition of what constitutes national security, do you not?

Mr. RUMSFELD. The important thing from the standpoint of the country is that we be strong enough that there be essential equivalence. From the standpoint of economic health, a single human being who is unemployed is facing a very, very difficult situation.

Senator CULVER. I am talking about in a macro sense, the strength of this society. Do you feel that, relatively speaking, we are stronger as a Nation militarily or economically in the world?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I would be happy to discuss either individually. It is the comparing of the two that strikes me as mixing apples and oranges a bit.

Senator CULVER. I think one of the difficulties that does concern many of us is that there has been a failure to appreciate an appropriate definition of national security which, of course, has to include necessarily the welfare of our people, the strength of our economic system and the confidence of our people in our political institutions. All of those things are as essential in a strong national defense as military hardware. And if we have distortions in one area at the expense of the others, then there is a question of whether, in fact, we have a balance of credible deterrent in the fullest sense of the word, which I think is a legitimate concern.

Do you believe that America has to be No. 1 in all military capabilities, or is it understandable and acceptable, for example, that the United States has superiority in aircraft carriers, and long-range strategic bombers, while the U.S.S.R. may have a larger land army, and larger though less advanced missiles?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I have studied the views that were put forward to your committee earlier this year in the Department of Defense's posture statement, and I find myself in agreement with the comments set forth there concerning essential equivalence.

I think that it is not useful to take, in isolation, a given weapons system. When one looks at the question of strategic equivalence, one must look at its broad component parts, the strategic balance, the maritime balance, and certainly the balance in Western Europe.

Senator CULVER. So in short, you do not think that it is essential that we be number one in all military capabilities?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Inevitably in that mix there are going to be areas at a given moment where the United States might be ahead or behind.

Senator CULVER. You do not find that a threatening factor in terms of our overall strategic posture?



Mr. RUMSFELD. I think the overall question is the one that is fundamental.

Senator CULVER. Do you believe in the bargaining chip theory, that we build some weapons in order to negotiate them away?

Mr. RUMSFELD. That is a question as to past motives on the part of people. There is no question but that in a negotiation the relative capabilities become exceedingly important.

Senator CULVER. What I am getting at is would you pledge as the Secretary of Defense to propose only those programs for which there is a clear military requirement, as distinguished from a political value or possible political value?

Mr. RUMSFELD. The way you have phrased it, I would certainly agree that the answer is yes, that when one is making proposals from the standpoint of the Department of Defense, there needs to be an underlying justification from a military standpoint for those proposals.

It strikes me, however, that trying to draw a perfectly stiff separation between what you call political and military considerations in the course of negotiations is difficult.

Senator CULVER. Well, are you pledged to assure—

Mr. RUMSFELD. And that is not what the real world is like.

Senator CULVER. Are you pledged to assure this committee on this occasion that you are not going to recommend and ask the country to support weapon systems in the defense budget for which in your judgment there is not a clear military requirement?

Mr. RUMSFELD. There is no question but that proposals I would put forward as Secretary of Defense would have what I consider to be a military requirement. That is not to say that as events unfold, and given the best of all worlds, that in a subsequent negotiation with somebody one element of that, as a result of the circumstances, might prove not to have been needed because it would, in fact, be something that would fit within the parameters of that negotiation.

Senator CULVER. And Mr. Rumsfeld—

Mr. RUMSFELD. So you follow the distinction?

Senator CULVER. Well, we will let the record show it.

Do you share the view previously expressed by Secretary Laird and Secretary Richardson that the United States should not develop weapons which can be construed as having a first-strike potential, such as those with increased yield and accuracy to give them a hard-target kill capability?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I think certainly in a broad sense I would agree with that. There appears to be no prospect of a first strike capability on either side, and that is not to say that your capabilities might not require a weapons system, or a development that might be subject to some ambiguity as to purpose. I would question whether Secretary Laird and Secretary Richardson suggested that they would rule out anything where there was an ambiguity. I would go back to my earlier comment that it must be based on sound military justification not something we are really trying to do.

Senator CULVER. As you know, there has been a great deal of debate concerning our nuclear policy, and whether or not there has, in fact, been significant departures from your traditional posture in this area. Now, the Defense Department recently admitted that its so-



called limited nuclear exchange involving strategic attack only on missile and bomber bases could result in up to 22 million American deaths. Previous estimates by Secretary Schlesinger were as low as 800,000.

In view of these facts, does it really make any sense, in your judgment, to develop weapons whose main justification is for use in such limited wars?

Mr. RUMSFELD. When one discusses that, it is useful to go back and reflect on the broader comments that have been made concerning the nuclear retargeting and adjustments that have taken place in recent months and years in the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I hate to interrupt but your time is up. You may finish the statement.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I personally subscribe to the approach that has been put forward. I think that it does enhance the deterrent.

Senator CULVER. Whose approach is that, Secretary Richardson's or Secretary Laird's, or Secretary Schlesinger's?

Mr. RUMSFELD. This is something that was under study during Secretary Laird and Secretary Richardson's time in office. It has been subsequently announced during Secretary Schlesinger's time in office, and it involves the subject of nuclear retargeting and providing options between massive destruction and very limited conventional conflict. And I do subscribe to it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you gentlemen. Thank you very much.

The Chair will now call in order those gentlemen who have been here, and Senator Hart is next. Senator Hart, 10 minutes, please.

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, I will be more than happy to yield to Senator Cannon.

Senator CANNON. No.

Senator HART. OK.

Mr. Rumsfeld, there is a great deal of discussion these days, as there always is in Washington, about reducing Government spending, Federal spending, and the size of the deficit. But I have noticed that many people who talk the strongest about the fact that the Government spends too much money vote consistently for all of the appropriations that the Defense Department wants.

Do you believe as a philosophical and financial principle that the Defense Department should be subject to the same kinds of rigid budget scrutiny and belt tightening that I think this Government is going to have to undergo in the next few years?

Mr. RUMSFELD. First I would certainly agree that the country has to establish priorities, and that this process of discussion within the Congress, as it has been in the executive and legislative branches, is essentially healthy.

I would secondly agree that the American people and this committee certainly have a right to expect and insist that the Department of Defense and the defense establishment be operated and conduct its business in an efficient and economical way. As I indicated earlier, that in establishing priorities I believe, and I think others recognize, one of the most fundamental things that Government does for its people is to provide security, that is to say, to assure their freedom. Absent that, there are not many other things in the Federal budget that are



going to be very important. One has to look at opposing capabilities in developing defense budgets. This is not to say that the problem of inflation is not important. It is not to say that other demands in the budget are not important. It is to say that the one I am describing is fundamental.

Senator HART. Recognizing the fact that the administration has requested and the Congress approved expenditures for our defense and security, which lock us into positions in many respects for years to come and that, in fact, the 1977 budget process is probably so far along that a Secretary such as yourself could have very little impact on it, let me ask you a question about decisions which we will be making in the next year that will have an impact on future weapons systems and deployment and bases around the world and so on.

Could you tell us how you see our overseas bases and basing at these forward point policies, say, in the next 10 years. Do you see any fundamental changes in our posture around the world?

Mr. RUMSFELD. In having lived through the last 10 years, anyone who suggested that there would not be changes in the world in the next 10 years obviously would be getting way out on a limb. We have to assume that there will be changes in the next 10 years.

With respect to what our policy ought to be on basing over that period of time, is something that would require considerable discussion and study within the Department before I would feel comfortable commenting on it.

I would say this, from the standpoint of Western Europe, a subject where I have had obviously a higher degree of involvement, given the mutual and balanced force reduction talks that are taking place, there is at least a prospect that the Warsaw Pact countries and the NATO nations will be able to achieve an equal, or preferably higher degree of stability in that part of the world at lower force levels, and that would be a wonderful thing. The discussions have been serious. I have no reason to believe they might not, at some point, be successful.

But, what the pace will be, I couldn't say. I would think certainly within that time frame.

Senator HART. Well, Mr. Rumsfeld, based on your experience in NATO, what modifications would you make in the NATO structure, and particularly in force deployments, disposition of nuclear weapons and so on?

Mr. RUMSFELD. The subject is one that I have spent a good deal of time on over a couple of years. I have not, within the most recent year. There are obviously aspects of it that are classified. I did study the recommendations that were put forward by the Department in the February posture statement. Many of them involved pieces of that puzzle that I had been working on as an Ambassador to NATO, and I find myself in very strong agreement with the comments of Secretary Schlesinger. I think there is certainly an opportunity to improve standardization, commonality, interchangeability. There are obviously opportunities with respect to others of the items that you have mentioned.

We should recognize that for the most part, as we deal with our allies in NATO, it does require consultation, and it does take some time. But, to the extent that the United States can develop a position within our own Government, provide some leadership, make good sense and be reasonably right, my sense of it is that our NATO allies have,



over a period of time, found their way to moving in the correct direction, and they have made some strides in recent years.

Senator HART. What would be your attitude about our role in NATO if Communist influence substantially increased in the southern flank, and in Spain and Portugal?

Mr. RUMSFELD. A different way to phrase that question might be what would be the role of any country with respect to NATO experiencing a degree of Communist involvement in their governments. There is no question but that the purpose of NATO is the defense of Western Europe, and the defense of Western Europe is not a defense against itself, but rather a defense from the East. It strikes me that the comments that have been made by senior officials of our Government in recent years, as the question you are posing has been raised, are statements that I agree with. There is a high degree of incompatibility between an involvement in NATO and a government that has a degree of Communist representation.

Senator HART. Does that mean we withdraw, or we push them out?

Mr. RUMSFELD. It is not useful to talk in terms of unilateral action when one is thinking of NATO or discussing NATO. That is a question where we would contribute our views within NATO, we would talk to our allies, and consult and attempt to see that that very valuable alliance continues. Needless to say, it requires our involvement, and I cannot conceive of a situation in the period immediately ahead where the circumstances of the world, or the circumstances of Western Europe would be such that it would be in our interest or in a majority of our allies' interest to modify that alliance. It is a very valuable institution.

Senator HART. Another area, Mr. Rumsfeld, if we strongly believe or perceived that your predecessor had pursued a policy in the Defense Department which would leave open an option of first use of nuclear weapons in a tactical or strategic situation in defending Western Europe, would you favor that policy or a use of it?

The CHAIRMAN. Gentleman, excuse me. You have an additional minute.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Should I respond?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Go ahead and answer.

Mr. RUMSFELD. It is useful in responding to that question to draw the distinction which I did earlier between first to strike and first use. No administration, since the advent of nuclear weapons, no U.S. administration has ruled out the possible first use of nuclear weapons. In a situation, for example, in a European environment, one can set forth a circumstance where the conventional capability was insufficient to deter or to defend against a massive assault across the Warsaw Pact line, and where it might be desirable for the United States and NATO not to have ruled out a first use of nuclear weapons. That is part of the NATO doctrine. That it clearly enhances the deterrent across the spectrum with respect to Western Europe. The NATO policy is not something I would want to modify in that regard.

Senator HART. Is my time up, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have one question that is short?

Senator HART. Some of us are interested in whether there is a big power race getting underway in the Indian Ocean. Do you have any particular feeling about whether we should discuss that issue with the



Soviet Union before we proceed on the assumption that such a race is inevitable?

Mr. RUMSFELD. That is not a subject that I have been personally dealing with. I have followed the debate in the press, and I have followed the various amendments that have been offered. I do not know what the legislative status is.

But, beyond being generally familiar with what the situation is, I do not think I could add anything.

Senator HART. This would be something you would be willing to talk to this committee and other Members of the Congress about as Secretary?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I certainly would be willing to talk to this committee about any of the subjects that fall within the jurisdiction of the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Speak a little louder, please.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Is it falling down again?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes, sir. I will speak louder.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, gentlemen, I think the time is up and he has answered your question.

Senator Leahy.

Senator LEAHY. As I indicated before, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your doing this, and I assume that Senator Cannon and Senator Jackson have no objections.

I might mention as known to those who have been here on some occasions, my senior colleague from Arizona, Mr. Goldwater, and I sometimes disagree. But I do agree very much with the statement this morning regarding Secretary Schlesinger. I have always felt that Jim Schlesinger was an excellent Secretary of Defense, and it is absolutely no reflection on you, Mr. Rumsfeld, but I for one hate to see him go.

I do also, though, give you high credit for answering with a straight face Senator Stennis' question of whether in advancing to Secretary of Defense it indicates any kind of a political intent on your part.

But, on a more serious level, we have discussed nuclear war here, and the question of first strike and the ability there. I would like to ask you about the concept of a limited nuclear war, something that we have heard a great deal about, especially within the last few months. Do you believe in the concept of a limited nuclear war?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I believe, as I indicated, in the views that have been set forth by the U.S. Government in the last year or two, that it is desirable for a President of the United States to have a range of options: that is to say, options between no response and a massive destruction. That does enhance the deterrent. That is a sound concept, and it has been exceedingly well articulated by Secretary Schlesinger.

Senator LEAHY. But do you feel that it is actually possible to have a limited nuclear war? I understand your answer on having the various options, and I think that we all understand the option, that we do not want to have to go, to have to go immediately from a conventional to an all-out strategic nuclear war. But do you yourself believe that a limited nuclear war is possible?

Mr. RUMSFELD. In other words, the question is do I think it is within the realm of possibility that in the event there were a conflict, and the United States wished to avoid the massive destruction option, which it



would, that it might be called upon to select one of those options in between, do I think that is within the realm of possibility?

Senator LEAHY. Yes.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I think it has to be considered within the realm of possibility, or one would not adopt the nuclear retargeting strategy that the U.S. Government has adopted.

Senator LEAHY. Do you feel that we could contain a limited nuclear war?

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me, could what?

Senator LEAHY. Could we contain a limited nuclear war? In other words, could you give me a scenario on how you think such a war might end, without us going into a strategic nuclear war?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I have not had an opportunity to discuss this with the officials within the Department of Defense during the period since my nomination.

I would say this. There is no question that one of the goals, regardless of the level a conflict might evolve to, would be to reestablish deterrent. That responds to your question in a sense. From the NATO standpoint, where I have been involved, there is no question but that one of the elements in any scenario that might be developed, is to attempt to reestablish deterrents.

Senator LEAHY. Well, when you speak of NATO, there have been many public figures given in the press on the number of nuclear weapons in the NATO countries, and it ranges anywhere up to 7,500, somewhere in there. Is it necessary to keep all of these weapons?

Mr. RUMSFELD. There are a variety of questions that arise with respect to theater nuclear forces in Western Europe, and they are not separable in many respects. That is to say, many of them are related.

Senator LEAHY. Perhaps I could bring it down a little bit closer for you. We have weapons, again using the comments that have been made in the public press, ranging everywhere from nuclear artillery shells to missile firing submarine sitting within the range of Western Europe.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I was referring to theater—

Senator LEAHY. Yes, but well, we do have those weapons. And Secretary Schlesinger made a comment that in the event of the consideration of the use of nuclear weapons in Western Europe that he might prefer to use these strategic nuclear weapons, firing say from a submarine or something like that. The point that I am bringing up is, in a limited nuclear war is there anybody on the other side who is going to sit there with a little checkboard or whatever and say well, this is a tactical nuclear weapon and this is a tactical nuclear war and, therefore, we do not trigger it up into the further strategic nuclear warfare?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I am not in a position to answer as to somebody sitting on the other side.

Senator LEAHY. But we at least consider their reactions, don't we?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Absolutely. One does in that one of the aspects would be to see that we attempt to establish deterrents at lower levels of conflict.

In answer to your previous question, the questions involving, and I am a little bit at a disadvantage here having not dealt with this for the past year, I am not quite sure what is classified and what is



not, and I realize that this is an open meeting and therefore, I will be careful in my words—

Senator LEAHY. Well, assuming—

Mr. RUMSFELD. There are issues involving numbers of tactical nuclear weapons. There are issues involving security. There are issues involving the possible modernization of those weapons. There are issues involving the degree of classification of information about them. As Ambassador to NATO, I was involved in those questions. I know Secretary Schlesinger has interested himself personally in those questions. I know that they are of great interest to our allies in NATO and that the Secretary has, on occasion, discussed various of those problems with them. Certainly, if confirmed I would interest myself in those questions equally.

Senator LEAHY. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, I may have to follow up with some written questions—

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator.

Senator LEAHY [continuing].—To be more specific on this, and then we can decide whether it should or should not be classified. I have a real concern about the number of nuclear weapons we have there. We have varying degrees of security, as you said, and the questions are of them falling into unfriendly hands, if there was a conventional war, the problem of being overrun, what happens if a terrorist group gets them, and so forth, and I suppose you share the same concerns.

One last question. What do you see as a general range of the defense budgets for the next 5 years? I have heard something about fiscal year 1980 we may be up to \$150 billion or \$148 billion for defense spending. Do you see it that way?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I have reviewed the projections that have been put forward, and I am not in a position at this stage to challenge those projections. There are so many variables, rates of inflation that we have experienced, the question as to the trends vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, what the economy, what technological changes might occur. It would not be useful for me to second-guess those projections, a product of all those people; and having not had an opportunity to visit with them about this.

Senator LEAHY. You will review them, however?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Oh, indeed I will.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, we certainly thank you.

Senator LEAHY. I will have other questions to submit for the record.*

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Without objection, the Senator will be permitted and in fact invited to submit brief questions. And whether or not the questions and answers are classified or not will be determined. And we will dispose of it accordingly.

According to my recollection, this brings us now to Senator Jackson.

Senator TOWER. Mr. Chairman, I think Senator Scott is next.

The CHAIRMAN. I announced that I would just have to take them as they came in, and Senator Jackson and Senator Cannon were here ahead of Senator Scott; is that correct?

Senator JACKSON. I think Senator Scott was here ahead of us.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me. Excuse me. Well, that changes the situation. I am sorry, Senator Scott. I was told by staff who was keeping up with it that you followed them. Thank you. Glad to recognize you.

*See questions with answers, p. 70.



Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me add my welcome, Mr. Rumsfeld, to your presence. I do not believe our mikes are working, so I will try to speak up a little louder now.

You have been recommended to replace Secretary Schlesinger and I wonder just what are the principal differences in your views and that of the man that you are being nominated to replace?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator, as Ambassador to NATO, I worked with Secretary Schlesinger after he became Secretary and I respect him, admire his ability, and value his friendship. I know of no major policy differences.

Senator Scott. You have no major changes that you contemplate within the Department of Defense that is contrary to those that were the policies of Secretary Schlesinger?

Mr. RUMSFELD. That is the import of my response.

Senator Scott. Now, what, if any, misuses do you see in the American policy of détente with the Soviet Union?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Would you repeat that question?

Senator Scott. What, if any, misuses do you see in the American policy of détente with the Soviet Union? Do you see any difficulties, is détente working in the best interest of the U.S. Government? What changes would you contemplate in this overall policy of détente?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I see. I commented at some length on this subject. I would summarize my response by saying that détente, to me, is not a state or a circumstance. It is a process and, as we view it, it means the relaxation of tension, or an effort to relax tensions. One does not have a relaxation of tension unless there is tension and indeed there is.

Senator Scott. I understand that before I did come in that you did talk at length about that.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes, sir.

Senator Scott. But do you have any, just to narrow it a bit, do you have any concern about the way détente is working? Is it really a one-way street, or do you consider it in the mutual interest of our country and Russia?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Well, obviously, certainly a relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union must not be a one-way street.

Senator Scott. Well, has it been working against the interests of our own country, in your opinion?

Mr. RUMSFELD. In my view, it is our interests to vigorously seek out areas where conceivably the United States and the Soviet Union might agree. That is to say, our interests might coincide.

Senator Scott. But I am asking your opinion, and you have been at the White House, and you have been Ambassador to NATO; in your opinion, has this been working in the best interests of the U.S. Government? You have been close to this.

Mr. RUMSFELD. When one says this, I think—

Senator Scott. Now, I would say to you that in your answer, I have already indicated a friendship toward your nomination, but if your answer is in any way evasive, I will consider changing my mind on voting for your confirmation. So I would like your opinion.

Has détente, in your opinion, been working in the best interests of the U.S. Government? If you can answer that directly, I would appreciate it.



Mr. RUMSFELD. Sure. There is no question but that it has been in our interests to seek areas where our interests converge. What concerns me about the period we have gone through is what—and again, maybe the best thing to do in view of your last comment, is to go ahead and be more fulsome in my comments, rather than to try to avoid some of the things that we talked about earlier.

The danger I see, and it is a real one, it is twofold. The fact that the Soviet Union has a system and beliefs that are fundamentally different from ours.

Senator SCOTT. Now, Mr. Rumsfeld, I have asked you a very simple question. In your opinion, has détente been working in the best interests of the Government of the United States. Now, I think you can answer this without all of this beating around the bush.

In your opinion, you could even give me a "Yes" or "No" answer if you saw fit.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Well, I will be happy to answer it, but I would prefer to answer it this way, and then I will be happy to answer an additional question.

But, the first part, substantatively, yes.

Senator SCOTT. Thank you.

Mr. RUMSFELD. In terms—

The CHAIRMAN. He should be allowed to make an explanation I think, Senator.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I would like to answer the second part. one cannot just look at a specific agreement, that is to say, Is the ABM agreement in our interest or not in our interest. One has to look at the broader concept. The danger I see is that throughout these discussions and negotiations, given insistence on the part of the United States that it not be a one-way street, the danger is that the American people and the people in other free countries will assume that there are not fundamental differences between our systems, will assume that, in fact, because there has been relative stability, there need not be vigilance, and will assume, therefore, there is not a need for defense capability. In fact, the only reason that you are able to sit down and have discussions as to whether or not you can find an area of agreement, for example, with respect to SALT or MBFR, is because of that capability.

Senator SCOTT. All right, that's enough I think, Mr. Chairman.

Can you be your own man at the Department of Defense regardless of the Secretary of State?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Absolutely.

Senator SCOTT. You can work with him as a coequal?

Mr. RUMSFELD. There is no question but that the President, in visiting with me about this assignment as recently as yesterday, has indicated that is exactly the situation, that with respect to the matters of interest to the Department of Defense, he will, in fact, expect me to, and I shall fully represent the Department and my views in the councils of government.

Senator SCOTT. Now, Mr. Rumsfeld, a few minutes ago somebody brought up the question of noncontrollables. This may have been in your own testimony. Now, I do not look on that as a fiction, but somewhat of an excuse for not making changes. Are you willing to search for cuts that can be made in the Department of Defense that would not jeopardize our security, perhaps personnel related costs, so that



we could still have the adequate hardware that we need, that we would have the necessary funds for research and development. Are you willing to make a search?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Absolutely. The context of the phrase uncontrollables came up with respect to nondefense expenditures in the earlier part of this discussion. But, I fully agree that the Department, any Secretary must very aggressively try to find such areas.

Senator SCOTT. As I understand the phrase "noncontrollables," it means that without changing the law and yet—

Mr. RUMSFELD. That's correct.

Senator SCOTT. Yet, we in the Congress are constantly confronted with extending the law, or making changes. And would you be willing to make recommendations to the Congress of your thoughts as to how we might change, so that we would have the necessary funds for defense?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Absolutely. And I believe that the question as to whether or not they fit into the earlier descriptions of controllable or uncontrollable is irrelevant. One has to come forward with a budget that makes sense.

Senator SCOTT. Now, one example of this, I understand that 10 years ago that only about 3 percent of the defense outlay went for military retirement. Today, roughly 7 percent goes for military retirement, and we have an unfunded liability of roughly \$150 billion in this field. Are you willing to check this matter out and to see if something can be done to be fair to the military personnel, but still not put an undue burden on the Government and limit our ability to wage war?

Mr. RUMSFELD. There is a wide variety of views as to what that mortgage is between now and the end of the century. I quite agree with you that it is an area that requires the attention of the committee and certainly my attention.

Senator SCOTT. Well, I have been told that there are now 1 million retirees on the rolls, and by the year 2000, and we are only talking about 25 years from now, there will be more than 2 million, more than double that within a very short period of time. It seems a legitimate reason for concern.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. Thank you very much.

Gentlemen, according to my recollection now it is Senator Jackson.

Senator JACKSON. I will divide my 10 minutes with Senator Cannon. I will go 5 and then we can alternate back and forth and divide our 20 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. OK. Proceed.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Rumsfeld, I believe the chairman and others have asked about your commitment to serve, and I want to nail that down very carefully. Do I understand that you will serve through the balance of this administration, that you will not quit for another political position, assuming the President does not take steps to remove you, of course?

Mr. RUMSFELD. As I indicated, I recognize the importance of the leadership within a department of this size, and there is no question that I would serve at the pleasure of the President.

Senator JACKSON. We understand that. That is not my question.



Mr. RUMSFELD. I have no intention——

Senator JACKSON. I said, assuming the President does not remove you would you stay through this period and turn down another position between now and the end of the administration now in office. We all understand about serving at the pleasure of the President. My question is a very clear one.

Mr. RUMSFELD. You know, absent of the President asking me to leave that office and do something else, my full intention would be to do it.

Senator JACKSON. But, if he——

The CHAIRMAN. Let's have quiet, please, gentlemen.

Senator JACKSON. If the President asked you to take another position, what is your plan? This is what the newspaper discussion is all about.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Let me respond this way, Senator——

Senator JACKSON. All right.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I think personally there was an impression possibly that some people came away with an impression that was unfortunate from his press conference, where he was asked the question as to whether he would exclude certain people from consideration, and he said, "no, I would not exclude them." The impression was left that, therefore, they were included.

It is my clear understanding that that is not the case, that he was not including, he was just simply saying he was not excluding people. Now, I recognize the importance of this Department. My full energies and efforts will be devoted to doing this, and I cannot say whether the President might or might not do. But, when one serves at the pleasure of the President, he serves at the pleasure of the President. I can assure you that I would not be seeking anything else. I would not be considering anything other than doing this job.

Senator JACKSON. Would you accept something else? That is the question?

Mr. RUMSFELD. That is a very embarrassing question, because it would be incredibly presumptuous for me to be rejecting something that is not being proposed.

Senator TOWER. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Would you yield to the Senator?

Senator JACKSON. Not out of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. On his time.

Senator TOWER. Historically, it is understood that if a President of the United States asks someone who is serving in one job to serve in another job, then if he is not willing to serve in that other job, he is supposed to submit his walking papers. Now, I think it is unfair to pursue the line of questioning beyond this.

Senator JACKSON. Well, I think a legitimate question is——

Senator TOWER. What if he asked him to be the Secretary of HUD, or something like that?

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator CULVER. You know the answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute, please. Just a minute. I thought the Senator from Texas wanted to ask a question and, of course, the time belongs to the Senator from Washington. But any member can make



a point, if he thinks a question is out of order, and I do not mean to discourage that.

All right, Senator Jackson, let's proceed.

Senator JACKSON. I have great respect for Mr. Rumsfeld, and I just want to nail this down so that we understand one another here. Mr. Rumsfeld, the Senate understands that the two nominations came at a time of great movement within the administration. I think it is a legitimate question to know whether someone is going to be in an office for just a few months. Mr. Rumsfeld, let me point out something. This Office, the Secretary of Defense—as well as the Secretary of State—traditionally in both political parties has been handled, I think, in the interests of a bipartisan foreign policy in which politics are out of bounds. Democratic Presidents picked Republicans for Secretary of Defense over a period of time, dating back to Marshall, Lovett, Wilson, McElroy, Gates, and McNamara. There is a tradition of nonpartisanship in the Defense post here that I am concerned about. I am talking about both political parties. I think the public really wants to know how you stand on this issue, because it is raised now and it is raised also in the CIA nomination. I know you are a sincere man, and I think it is important that we have an understanding on this.

For example, it has been a tradition—

Mr. RUMSFELD. Sir?

Senator JACKSON. I will let you respond. It has been a tradition that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense do not go out on the stump and make political speeches.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Of that you can be certain.

Senator JACKSON. Well, I am glad to hear that.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I would certainly subscribe—

Senator JACKSON. I am very pleased.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Absolutely, I would certainly subscribe to the traditional lack of involvement of those two Departments, Defense and State, in partisan politics.

Senator JACKSON. We have always, in this committee, gone into the question of how long the nominee for Secretary of Defense would serve, you recall, Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. I asked that question myself.

Senator JACKSON. Over and over again, we have asked the witnesses that question, because someone who just goes in for a few months in the Department of Defense, and then is running for a high political office, will be subject to partisan temptations—

Mr. RUMSFELD. Well, let me set that straight. I am not running for anything. My intention is to go into that Department and—

Senator JACKSON. I am also referring to your being drafted, or called—

Mr. RUMSFELD. To serve and to serve as effectively as I know how for as long as the President wants me to.

Senator JACKSON. But, you are not rejecting the possibility if the President asks you to be the Vice President, for example, that you would leave for that Office?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator, I think that would be really presumptuous as can be for me to stand up and take myself out of consideration for something that I am not in consideration for. I mean, that just—



Senator JACKSON. Finally, let me ask you this: Were you involved in any way with the dismissal of Mr. Schlesinger? It has been rumored in the press, and I want to be very fair with you.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Well, it is a fair question. And I have indicated to the President that it struck me that that conceivably could come up, and while I don't normally discuss my relationship with the President publicly, I told him I felt in this instance I should.

The President indicated to me that he had it in his mind to make some personal changes. At that point where it was suggested that I might be involved in one of them or more, I suggested to him that I should take myself out of my responsibility as his coordinator in the White House with respect to that subject. That is to say, he needed someone dealing with that for him who was separable from it, and that, in fact, was accomplished.

The long and the short of it is that I know Jim Schlesinger, I have admired him, I think he was a good Secretary of Defense, and I did not have anything to do with his departure. Indeed, when asked by the President my views on what he was thinking, I gave him a view that was different from that which actually occurred.

Senator JACKSON. When were you first contacted by him?

Mr. RUMSFELD. By whom?

Senator JACKSON. By the President about the possibility of a change in Defense?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I believe it was on a Saturday. On Saturday.

Senator JACKSON. The day before the dismissal?

Mr. RUMSFELD. No, a week before, I believe. It was at that point that I tried to extricate myself, it was a Saturday afternoon.

Senator JACKSON. I yield the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator. You have a minute left.

Senator JACKSON. Well, you are entitled to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cannon.

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Goldwater and Senator Nunn both have raised with you earlier the balance in spending between the personnel and defense hardware. The thrust of my question is centered around which of the two possible alternatives would you feel we should take if we continue to cut back the percent of our GNP that we allocate to the defense? Would it appear that either we would have to reduce our Active Military Forces, or we will face a further and potentially serious erosion in our investment spending for research and development for new weapons? How do you feel about that issue, if you were confronted with that possibility?

Mr. RUMSFELD. It seems to me that all would agree there is no question that but that priorities would have to be established. I begin, however, with a conviction that the different things that one weighs against others have different weights. It strikes me that the stability in the world that is provided by our Defense Establishment is fundamental to the freedom of the people on this globe. So I look at the question of the construction of a defense budget not solely from the question of what percentage of the GNP, or what percentage of Federal spending, or what relation it has to the domestic spending, but I look at it from the standpoint of what are the relative capabil-



ities, and are we, in fact, able to achieve and maintain essential equivalence, because absent that we are asking for serious trouble.

Senator CANNON. On another subject, when you were Ambassador to NATO, I am sure it was called to your attention many times that the NATO countries spend a lower percentage of their GNP on defense of their countries.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Some do.

Senator CANNON. The majority of them.

Mr. RUMSFELD. [Witness nodded in the affirmative.]

Senator CANNON. Now, what is your viewpoint on this apparent difference in priority and do you think NATO should spend as high a percentage as we do on a relative basis for defense spending?

Mr. RUMSFELD. The situation varies from country to country. There are about five different calculations that I have seen as to what the U.S. actual expenditures in connection with NATO are, and they vary by many multiples, one from another.

But, I personally have been pleased to see some of the NATO countries actually increasing in real terms their contribution to the defense of NATO. I recognize that two in the last couple of years have reduced their contribution to NATO in real terms. The important thing is that collectively, we have a credible deterrent, and that internally, within the 15 countries, we keep working to see that there is reasonable equity. It is very hard to come up with perfect equity as to who ought to do what, and at what point in their circumstances. But, I think that we have been moving toward equity.

If one looks at, for example, the U.S. force levels in Europe, we see a general downward trend, and now they have leveled, as they should, during the mutual and balanced force reduction talks. If one looks at the total manpower supplied by our NATO allies today, it is something in the neighborhood of 90 percent of the total.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me just one moment, please.

Mr. RUMSFELD. That is an important piece of real estate.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a vote on now, and it is on the trade bill, trade protection bill, so-called, and if it is agreeable to the committee, we will reassemble at 2:30. And among those that have been here this morning, the Chair would again recognize first Senator Byrd and we will finish this now, if it is possible, with Senator Cannon.

Senator CANNON. I can complete my 10 minutes now.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Those who wish to leave, please do so quietly.

Senator CULVER. Mr. Chairman, is there any possibility that we could go to 12:30?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have a vote on.

Senator CULVER. Well, if we wanted to vote and come back? Some of us cannot be here this afternoon, that is the problem.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be glad to try to accommodate you, Senator. All right, let's proceed.

Senator CANNON. Mr. Rumsfeld, do you have any specific recommendations as to what we might do to get the NATO countries to carry more of the burden of their own defense?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Well, I do, and was involved in some of the efforts, and know that Secretary Schlesinger has been working very aggres-



sively, and Ambassador Bruce with our NATO allies in that connection. There are a variety of things we can do, and certainly one element of it has been the balance-of-payments question, which the Federal Republic of Germany, of course, has contributed to, and another element of it has been an attempt to achieve greater standardization, interoperability and commonality among weapons systems. Another element is to attempt, through rationalization, to achieve a more sensible allocation of responsibility in a way that increases rather than reduces our security and our capability.

Part of it also is the perception of the threat. There is no question that in all three countries, during the period of relative stability, our public as well as the public of Western Europe, make judgments as between priorities, as you were asking earlier, which can end up in their allocating a less than necessary portion of their resources to defense.

The answer to your question, in the last analysis, is that we have to work on it, we have to work with them so that our collective security is sufficient.

Senator CANNON. In giving me your answer, you referred to the issue of standardization, and you also discussed that with Senator Hart earlier. Now, I agree that standardization is a desirable objective for us, if we are ever to fight with NATO countries, in other words, alongside of them.

On the other hand, our U.S. forces also have worldwide potential theaters of operation which impose quite different requirements.

Mr. RUMSFELD. True.

Senator CANNON. And may make standardization with NATO undesirable in some cases. Do you have an opinion on that point?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Like anything else that is basically good, you could drive it to an illogical conclusion. There is no question but that certain of our weapon systems have applicability in Europe, and when one talks about standardization, one must think of standardization among NATO countries in Europe.

On the other hand, we do have interests elsewhere in the world, and some of those capabilities are not necessarily interchangeable. So, I do not think one is going to say that we should go for 100 percent standardization.

And on the other hand, I don't think that we would ever get there anyway. It is an incredibly difficult thing to achieve.

Senator CANNON. Have you seen what you consider to be substantial progress on the issue of standardization while you were with NATO?

Mr. RUMSFELD. No, sir. I have seen progress, but substantial progress, no. I think since the beginning of the alliance, indeed since the beginning of our Armed Forces, we have lacked standardization and still lack standardization within our own Armed Forces to the degree that probably would be desirable. It takes effort, work, and the actual achievement is not achieved in a gross way. It is achieved with respect to specific items, and at a given point in time. There is tremendous competition between services, between nations, and between suppliers, all of which resist the best efforts.

Senator CANNON. On another subject, in relation to management concepts, the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee for fiscal year 1976 recommends abolishing the Office of the Assistant Secretary



of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation, which is the old Systems Analysis Office that was established under Secretary McNamara. Have you had a chance to study that question and recommend or form an opinion on it?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I have not.

Senator CANNON. Mr. Chairman, I think we probably will have to recess for the vote.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. All right. Let's suspend now.

Senator Culver, if you can come back a few minutes at 2:30, I would recognize you first under the circumstances.

Senator CULVER. I will not be able to do that, sir. If I could just go vote and come right back for a few minutes here?

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Let's accommodate you, Senator. Could you wait a few minutes?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes, sir. I am at your disposal.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Frankly, I may be cut off from coming back, but you gentlemen can proceed if you want to further for a few minutes.

All right, we thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. You have had 3 hours on the stand, and I think you have earned a little rest here. But if you could just accommodate Senator Culver, and then we will resume at 2:30 p.m.

All right, the committee will take a recess until the call of the Chair.
[Short recess.]

Senator CULVER. The hearing will resume.

Mr. Rumsfeld, I would like to follow up on a number of questions this morning. One with regard to the line of inquiry that Senator Leahy and Senator Hart were pursuing on the first-strike, first-use issue.

I am just trying to seek a little bit more clarification of your views. Do you agree with Secretary Schlesinger's comment that in the event of the consideration of the use of nuclear weapons in Western Europe, he might prefer to use strategic nuclear weapons, such as one or two Trident missiles instead of tactical nuclear weapons? Is it important in your view to maintain a distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons in the case of first use, as distinguished from first strike?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Well, No. 1, I am not familiar with that aspect of his views, and I have not seen that particular statement.

Before answering the second part of your question as to the distinction between the two, I would want to know what his logic was, and in that I am not familiar with it, and I cannot respond.

I would add this one point. There is a degree of utility in some ambiguity in this area from the standpoint of deterrents.

Senator CULVER. Do you distinguish between the dangers and ambiguity concerning the policy option of using a strategic nuclear weapon by way of a first—

Mr. RUMSFELD. No. My response was in the broad sense, not in the specific.

Senator CULVER. Then you do feel that it is important to maintain a distinction between tactical first-use and strategic nuclear weapons?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I would want to know the context that he was talking about, and I am not familiar with it.



Senator CULVER. I respect your reservation in this area, but what he was talking about was the European scenario that you made reference to earlier in the event of an attack where the Western European defenses were, and it was felt to be necessary to have the option of tactical nuclear first-use available. He did not rule out the option of responding by nuclear first use in lobbing a strategic missile of a nuclear character off a Polaris submarine as part of that particular scenario.

Now, this, very understandably, has raised some very disturbing implications in considering the break that we attempt to maintain between first strike and first use, and the important distinctions in terms of the destabilizing consequences to the nuclear balance and the nuclear threat.

Mr. RUMSFELD. This is something that I would want to consider. It is not a problem that I have addressed previously.

Senator CULVER. Now, Mr. Rumsfeld, following up Senator Scott's line of questions, on March 4, 1974, when you were Ambassador to NATO, you made the following statement to the House Armed Services Committee, and I quote: "If our goal is to improve relationships with the Soviet Union by the various negotiations, the only way you can describe what has been going on is by success. One should say Hosanna, Hosanna, we have wanted peace and we have had it, and we wanted adequate deterrent and we have had it."

Do you still believe our past negotiations with the Soviet Union must be so highly praised; and second, do you still believe that we have an adequate deterrent?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I do believe we have an adequate deterrent. It is clear that we have had relative stability with the Soviet Union. That is to say, that for one reason or another we have not had a major confrontation in the sense of an outbreak of war.

Senator CULVER. Would you still be as euphoric in assessing the balance sheet of détente as you were on that occasion?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I think——

Senator CULVER. Would you be that euphoric today in its assessment?

Mr. RUMSFELD [continuing]. My problem with answering the questions about détente is that they——

Senator CULVER. Are you a little bit more reserved about saying Hosanna, Hosanna, as you did on that occasion?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I did not use that today.

Senator CULVER. No, I noticed that, and that is what I am trying to probe.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes. My problem is that in thinking about the subject of détente and our relationship with the Soviet Union there are so many factors that go into those relationships, not the least of which is deterrents. I do not subscribe to the view that there is some sort of situation as the result of past relationships that one could suggest that, therefore, our defense is less necessary today. I do not believe that. I believe it is absolutely necessary, I believe it is, in fact, what has created the environment whereby we could talk with the Soviet Union. One can look and make different value judgments about different things that have occurred. But, I happen to believe that yes, the ABM treaty is a useful thing, I think it is useful to be engaged in mutual and balanced force reduction talks. I think it would



be a fine thing for our country and Western Europe if, in fact, we could achieve a greater security at a lower level of forces. That would be good.

Now, whether we will have that, I do not know.

Senator CULVER. Mr. Rumsfeld, one of the problems that this committee has in properly evaluating the level and the character of defense budgets requests that comes from your Department, or your hoped Department, is to carefully define and relate the roles and missions of various forces and weapons systems, so that we can see the relationship clearly between the force structure being requested and the foreign policy commitments that they are designed to implement.

Now, I wonder what your views were in terms of the degree of coordination that you are going to seek by bringing together a greater degree of integration on this subject so we can have a more rational debate and more precisely assure ourselves as to the character of our foreign policy, its goals, its objectives, and its relationship to the military requests to implement it.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Well, after this matter was raised by several members of the committee, I refreshed myself on the proposal to attempt to achieve a greater harmony between the two, and at least, as a mechanism for the discussion of the harmony or the lack of harmony between the two. Certainly I can assure you that I would be willing to cooperate with that. It is a fascinating subject, it is an important subject, it is incredibly a complicated subject, and I question whether it is going to lend itself to a formula that will—

Senator CULVER. One of the difficulties—

Mr. RUMSFELD [continuing]. Shape the road ahead. But it is important.

Senator CULVER. In the absence of that kind of communication and coordination between the two bureaucracies, I think it clearly leaves the Defense Department in the difficult position of making requests based on what they perceive to be our global role as opposed to having the Defense Department budget respond to a carefully considered determination of what the precise foreign policy is that we are, in fact, attempting to implement. And the ambiguity that exists in that area, I think, makes it very difficult for you or somebody in your position to come to a responsible determination of the nature of the request.

Now, Mr. Rumsfeld, the U.S. foreign military sales have been at about \$10 billion for each of the past 2 years. Other nations are getting the latest and the best equipment, sometimes even before our own troops. I recently made a visit to a base facility in this country, not too long ago, where we were not even training with certain kinds of equipment that was being sent to the Middle East.

Now, a recent study for Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements noted that the Army Department is spending more money, and I emphasize more money, for the acquisition of weapons for foreign armies than for the U.S. Army. The same total called overall Secretary of Defense policy and procedure guidelines for foreign military sales as "fragmented and incomplete, if not inconsistent."

Now, to some extent, our defense industry, in my judgment, is becoming dependent on those foreign sales, and our production lines may soon be hostage to them. Will you see to it that there is a clear



policy on foreign military sales, that our own forces have first priority, that we get full reimbursement for weapons we sell, that we avoid any dangerous transfers of advanced technology, and that we adjust our own force planning to take account of growing capabilities of those who buy from us?

Mr. RUMSFELD. That is a very big order, as you, of course, well know, Senator. I certainly agree that inventory draw-downs should occur only in unusual situations.

I certainly agree that where appropriate there should be reimbursement. There are, of course, statutes that provide for a range of arrangements with respect to the transfer of various types of equipment, and certainly the law should be complied with.

The question of technology transfer is always an important one and has to be a part of the question. There is no question that as the capabilities of the armed services of the allies improve that that should, in fact, contribute to and be an element in force planning for the United States.

On the first part of your question, however, that is the toughest. As I recall, it was something to the effect would I guarantee that we would develop a national policy. I will be happy to guarantee that I am interested in this subject, and that I suspect that there is a good deal of truth in the import of your question; that is to say that the national policy is not well understood nationally and that—

Senator CULVER. Well, can you give us some assurance that it will be understood in your own Department?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I will certainly contribute my best effort to see not only that our Department, but others in Government develop an approach to this.

Senator CULVER. Well, there have been, Mr. Rumsfeld, 100 Members of Congress as recently as the last 10 days who have called upon Secretary of State Kissinger to initiate an international arms control conference on foreign military sales to try to get some rational control over this pathological race to sell more and more arms all over the world with all of the attendant consequences that are implicit to it. And I certainly hope, in view of the fact that we supply one-half of that arms trade now, that we can get something like that underway, ideally with the Soviet Union, but even in the absence of the Soviet Union's participation, I think it is important to the issue of NATO and our general alliance.

Now, finally, Mr. Rumsfeld, following up on this issue of standardization, which I think you are aware that Senator Nunn and I, as well as others who have spoken to the question, and Senator Cannon, are very interested in what is admittedly an enormously complex subject. But the fact remains that there have been estimates that of the \$90 billion that we spend collectively on the NATO defense element, that an estimated \$10 to \$11 billion of that is wasted every year because of a lack of standardization. I think if the American public were privy to the degree of waste and inefficiency, the military museum character of our European military situation now, that support for NATO would fundamentally decline.

Now, as you know, General Goodpasture estimated that NATO would be 30 to 40 percent stronger in terms of its combat readiness if we had greater degrees of standardization. Will you support efforts



toward standardization, including using existing legal authority to waive the Buy American Act?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I have not looked at what the legal provisions are for a waiver of that statute. I can certainly assure you that it is a subject that I have spent already a good deal of time on. There is no question but that it merits the attention of a nominee for this post.

I would again, however—well, I would like to make two comments. One, I would not agree with your characterization of a museum character of NATO. I think we have a credible capability collectively there. That is not to say that as you suggested it cannot be improved substantially. There is no question but that it can.

Senator CULVER. Well, you know—

Mr. RUMSFELD. But, finally, it is, and I have to underline this, an incredibly difficult problem.

Senator CULVER. But, back to the museum character of the NATO alliance. We have 29 different antitank weapons, 8 different main battle tanks. In recent NATO war games, we lacked even communications, interoperability, even to the point that in recent NATO exercises, reportedly 50 percent of the patrol boat kills were NATO allies, putting it to other NATO allies.

Mr. RUMSFELD. There are problems, but also—

Senator CULVER. And it is quite a serious problem. And I think the balloon goes up. And you talk about the nuclear threshold, if your conventional deterrent is destroying itself at that rate, how can you have a rational deterrent against your enemy, and if aircraft cannot land and refuel, how can anybody say that that is not a problem?

Mr. RUMSFELD. It is a serious problem, I quite agree.

Senator CULVER. And it may be a nice command in peacetime, but you would hope to God that you would not ever get assignment in the military in the time of actual conflict.

Now, I think as a matter of fact, we have not given a serious effort to this problem in Europe or in the United States that it justifies, and I think now that our conventional deterrent is so much more important, relative to the nuclear balance, that it is absolutely imperative that we be creative, that we be aggressive, that we be determined about this, if for no other reason than we are going to have to sustain public support for conventional deterrent. And if you tell the American people about all of the money that we have spent on this since World War II in building a conventional deterrent, and then you start giving them the chapter and verse as to how ludicrous it is today, then you are going to have a lot more worries than the reduction of the U.S. forces from NATO.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I have made almost exactly those remarks to the North Atlantic Council on behalf of the United States, and fully agree with you.

Senator CULVER. And I think that you—

Mr. RUMSFELD. That the pressures on budgets throughout the NATO alliance, as well as just commonsense, says that we have got to find ways to make greater progress, considerably greater progress.

Senator CULVER. One of these would be to use your courage to use or wave the Buy America Act that you will have as Secretary, and I hope that you will pursue that.



And finally, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the indulgence of the Chair, I have some additional questions that I will submit for the record which I would appreciate a written response to.

But, I do wish to have, on this occasion a pledge from you that you will make a good faith and determined effort to carry out the conference language, and in your appearance before this committee next year in support of the defense budget request, that the required report on the relation of force structure to foreign policy that will be undertaken and presented only after the closest consultation and agreement within our foreign policy bureaucracy.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I certainly will. I think that will be useful for the committee, but certainly useful within the Government.

Senator CULVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Rumsfeld.

RESPONSES BY DONALD RUMSFELD TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR
JOHN C. CULVER

Question 1. The Office of Management and Budget has just reported to Congress that to maintain current services, the Defense Department budget will have to jump to \$109 billion in fiscal year 1977. Can our economy tolerate such a jump in military spending? Shouldn't the Pentagon have to share in fiscal restraint?

Answer. As I stated in response to Senator Thurmond, the President feels the U.S. must limit the growth of Federal spending. He intends to do this and I intend to do my best to help in that vital task. I am not in a position at this time to state what the right budget for defense should be.

Question 2. Do you believe that, in circumstances where no nuclear weapons have been used, but the United States contemplates the first use of such weapons, the President should consult with designated Members of Congress? Wouldn't this be an appropriate domestic equivalent of the procedures now required to be followed in NATO regarding use of nuclear weapons?

Answer. In making a decision with such profound possible consequences for the nation's security and well-being, I think any President would want to consult key members of Congress. Realistically, any such consultation would depend on the circumstances of the crisis. The responsibility for the decision would necessarily and constitutionally remain with the President.

Question 3. In 1963 you reportedly tried to delete funding for the B-70 manned bomber. Now the Air Force wants to build another manned bomber, the B-1. Will you make careful review of this program and to alternatives to it such as non-penetrating aircraft with standoff long range missiles?

Answer. Manned bombers are an important element in our overall mix of strategic forces. I will make a careful review of the B-1 bomber program and any alternative programs if I am confirmed.

Question 4. Will you help the Congress in evaluating the Defense Department budget by providing life cycle cost estimates of major systems which have just entered production or will do so in the next two years?

Answer. It will be my policy to provide to the Congress all available information that will assist it in meeting its responsibility to evaluate the Defense Department budget. Some experts doubt, however, that we can provide accurate total life cycle costs for new weapon systems. They maintain that there is enough uncertainty in such numbers to make them subject to considerable misunderstanding. I will study this question and judge for myself, to see what can be done that would be both reasonable, and helpful.

Question 5. Mr. Rumsfeld, you are taking over responsibility for the largest department of Government at a late stage in the life cycle of an administration. Apart from your peacetime service as a naval aviator and a year plus of somewhat related experience as US Ambassador to NATO, your experience in Congress and in the Executive Branch has general lain in other areas of policy. Could you tell the Committee how you feel you can take charge of this vast de-



partment and master rapidly the complex budgetary, strategic, and political subject matters which confront any occupant of that office?

Answer. Any incoming Secretary of Defense has an enormous task facing him in coping with the many complex national defense issues. In Congress I served on the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, and its Subcommittees on Manned Space Flight and on Science, Research and Development, the Joint Economic Committee, and the Government Operations Committee and its Subcommittees on Military Operations and on Foreign Operations and Government Information. As Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization I was the United States' Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, to the Defense Planning Committee, and to the Nuclear Planning Group. For the past 13 months I have been Assistant to the President of the United States.

No experience can prepare one fully for a position such as Secretary of Defense. But my administrative, legislative, diplomatic, and defense background prepare me, at least, to begin the task. I will utilize, in addition, the abundant expert assistance that is available in the Department, in the Congress, and outside of the Government.

Question 6. If confirmed, you will take over the direction of a Department which has been shaken by the sudden and peremptory dismissal of Dr. Schlesinger. There are also a number of major vacancies in important policy posts—for example, the Assistant Secretary of International Security Affairs, Secretary of Air Force, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and General Counsel. Are you confident that you can rapidly recruit highly qualified persons to fill these gaps? Are you likely to replace other positions?

Answer. One of the great strengths of the United States is the vast reservoir of highly qualified and highly motivated people. A number of such people have already indicated their willingness to serve the President and the Department of Defense and I am confident that we will be able to fill the vacancies promptly. I have not, of course, considered the question of replacing people currently in senior DOD positions and I will not until after confirmation and after familiarizing myself with the capabilities and desires of the senior personnel.

Question 7. After your periods of service in the White House under both President Nixon and President Ford, could you give the Committee your attitude regarding the institutional role which you feel should be performed by the NSC. What kind of forum should it be? Should it be used for arguing out and debating positions or should it be largely a ratifying group?

Answer. I believe the NSC decision-making process must operate in a manner which is responsive to the needs of the President. Each President brings with him a somewhat different personal approach to decision-making, and the NSC mechanism must be flexible enough to respond to changing Presidential requirements. The NSC structure and procedures should provide for representation by interested government agencies and assure that all the issues surrounding a key decision are fully brought out and thoroughly examined. It should ensure that a maximum range of alternatives, with the advantages and disadvantages, are considered in arriving at a decision. Finally, on major issues, the process should permit key figures in the policy and decision-making process to weigh in at various levels through the NSC committees culminating, on major issues, with review by the NSC itself and Presidential decision.

Question 8. If you found your convictions to be at variance with those of the Secretary of State to the same degree as Dr. Schlesinger's were, would you expect to be fired? Would you resign? Would you submerge them? How should major policy differences be ventilated and resolved?

Answer. As I testified yesterday, I fully intend to present my views vigorously, both before the Congress and in the Executive Branch. The Secretary of State and I will have numerous opportunities to discuss issues personally and in the National Security Council, and I expect most differences to be resolved.

I know from my association with the President that he is not surprised or displeased to hear different points of view. That is normal on important issues. Policy differences can be raised, discussed, and resolved.

In the end, the President resolves remaining differences in accord with his judgment of what best serves our national interest.

Question 9. Do you believe that the United States should emphasize improvements in conventional capability rather than nuclear, especially in Europe? Will you give close scrutiny to programs which only add to our overkill and see if some can be eliminated?



Answer. I most certainly will give close scrutiny to both conventional and nuclear capabilities. With regard to emphasis between improvements in conventional capability rather than nuclear forces, we have to do both. The primary defense against conventional attack is the conventional capability of the United States and our allies. It seems clear to me that in the current age of at least rough strategic parity, we must have and maintain conventional forces that can help reduce the chances of conflict at all levels. This will not, of course, eliminate the need to maintain an adequate theater nuclear capability.

Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Rumsfeld. We have another vote on now, and the committee will stand in recess until 2:30.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the hearing recessed to reconvene at 2:30 p.m. this same day.]



NOMINATION OF DONALD RUMSFELD TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1975

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 2:30 p.m. in room 1114 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John C. Stennis (chairman).

Present: Senators Stennis (presiding), Symington, McIntyre, Byrd of Virginia, Tower, Goldwater, and Taft.

Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff director; W. Clark McFadden II, counsel; John T. Ticer, chief clerk; Phyllis A. Bacon, assistant chief clerk; Charles J. Conneely, Charles Cromwell, George H. Foster, Jr., John A. Goldsmith, Don L. Lynch, Robert O. Old, James C. Smith, Larry K. Smith, and Francis J. Sullivan, professional staff members; Robert Ujakovich, research assistant; Doris E. Connor, Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, clerical assistants; David A. Raymond, assistant to Senator Symington; Charles Stevenson, assistant to Senator Culver; and Bill Lind, assistant to Senator Taft.

The CHAIRMAN. We had a good hearing this morning. Mr. Secretary, there will be additional questions from members who have already asked some of their questions.

We will stay with it this afternoon the best we can. I understand we are not likely to have as many votes as we have had since 12:30.

The Chair wants to recognize Senator Byrd now. He was here this morning but we didn't get to him.

First the Secretary wants to be recognized for just a minute. All right, Mr. Rumsfeld.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

This morning I was asked a question concerning the Pershing missile. And as I recall, I characterized the President's position as publicly stated to the effect that he had serious reservations about that item.

I was asked about that after the hearing, and checked at the White House, I received a set of four or five different responses at various times that the President has given on that question. In reading them, I find that the characterization I gave to it is possibly not quite as accurate as I would like it to be.

(55)



Specifically, what he said was:

The Pershing missile request we—the United States—only promised to study. We made no commitment that we would make that weapon available. And in the process of study, we will have some time to see how the peace efforts, the Sinal peace agreement proceeds along with potential other agreements in that area. But there is no commitment by us, except to study, for the delivery of a Pershing missile to the Middle East.

After reading it, that strikes me as not being a “strong reservation,” but simply a statement on his part of its being part of a shopping list, and that he intends to give it thorough consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Anytime you think the matter should be taken up in closed session, you only have to indicate such, although we want to have it open as much as we can. If you so indicate, I will arrange it.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Rumsfeld, Secretary Schlesinger viewed détente with Russia and concessions to Russia with somewhat less enthusiasm than does Secretary Kissinger. Now, is your own view more in line with that of Secretary Schlesinger or Secretary Kissinger?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator Byrd, I have talked with Secretary Schlesinger about the subject over a period of time. I indicated earlier that I know of no policy differences that I have with Secretary Schlesinger. However, it is very difficult for one individual to characterize the views as fitting more with one person's or another. I have talked with him personally about it. I know what you are saying. You are talking in part about the public perception of his views, I think. And there is no question but that in recent days and weeks there has been the appearance of wide divergence of view between those two individuals.

My preference, rather than trying to slot myself as between the two of them, would be to refer to the remarks I have made earlier. I recognize the fundamental differences between our systems and our beliefs. I therefore naturally feel that caution, a great deal of care, a great deal of vigilance must be exercised with respect to our relationship.

Senator BYRD. You are speaking about Russia now?

Mr. RUMSFELD. That is right.

Senator BYRD. I was speaking of the fundamental difference between Secretary Schlesinger and Secretary Kissinger.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I'm aware of that. And my response would be to tell you what I think on the subject, because I think that if you ask the two of them what the fundamental difference they had was, you would find that it is probably different than the public perception.

Senator BYRD. I didn't see the program the other evening, but did the President give as a reason or the reason for the dismissal of Secretary Schlesinger the differences that the Secretary had with Mr. Kissinger and vice versa?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Absolutely not in the context that you are talking about. I specifically told the President that I knew of no major policy differences that I had with Secretary Schlesinger—

Senator BYRD. I am not speaking of you.

Mr. RUMSFELD. But my point is he said he knew that, and understood that. It is my recollection of his statements on television—and here instead of expressing my own opinions, I am interpreting what



the President and what Secretary Schlesinger and Secretary Kissinger's views on the world might be, which is really not my place—but my impression of the press conference was that the President indicated he did not have policy differences with Jim Schlesinger, and that basically it was a variety of things which he characterized in several ways, but it would not be differing views on détente, insofar as I understood his press conference.

Senator BYRD. Is it your view, then, that Secretary Schlesinger and Secretary Kissinger are in accord on their views of détente?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I think that they have certainly been in accord on occasion. And I think they certainly differed on occasion. With respect to the substance, certainly no American—no official of Government in this administration is going to recommend something with respect to the various negotiations that are taking place that would work adversely to the security interests of the United States of America.

Senator BYRD. Of course that is a question of judgment.

Mr. RUMSFELD. That is what I am just getting to. There is the substantive question. Then there are the tactics as to what is the best way to engage in a negotiation. And then there are the effects on the public perceivings of that relationship. I know Secretary Schlesinger and Secretary Kissinger have differed on the question of the tactics as to what should be done.

I also know—I shouldn't be speaking for the two Secretaries; I should be speaking for myself. For myself, the question of the public perception about the state of our relations is one that is troublesome. In my judgment far too many people in this country and in other free countries throughout the world have the impression that because we are able to engage in a multiplicity of relationships with the Soviet Union, that therefore the world is at peace and things will be good forever more. And, I think, that that is asking considerably too much. The relationship does require vigilance. Our capability does have a deterrent effect. It is important that we maintain that essential equivalence. And those who suggest that because we are able to trade or able to engage in SALT negotiations, or in MBFR negotiation with the Soviet Union, those who conclude that because of that we therefore should reduce our defense capability, reduce the deterrent, are flatly wrong.

The fact is that our capabilities have provided the stability in the world, and it is important not only for us, but for the rest of the world.

Senator BYRD. I think that we can support a strong national defense, which I do, without necessarily supporting détente, which I don't necessarily support in all of its aspects. I support the concept of a dialog between our country and China and our country and Russia.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Those are my views exactly.

Senator BYRD. And, I think, perhaps I was the first Senator to applaud President Nixon's trip to Peking, because I wanted to see a dialog opened with that nation. But when it comes to concessions, agreements which have been made with Russia, then my view is that the United States has come off second best. And my belief is that Secretary Schlesinger took a somewhat less enthusiastic line on making concessions to the Soviet Union than the Secretary of State has taken. If that is the case—and I think it is—that presented a balance within the Cabinet.



Mr. RUMSFELD. I can assure you that that balance will continue. There is no question but that it is critically important to this country that the President have a variety of views, that the views of the DOD and the defense and security interests of our country be fully heard and weighed in Presidential decisionmaking. That would be my intention.

Senator BYRD. In your judgment, Mr. Rumsfeld, what has the United States gained over the last 3 years in regard to détente?

Mr. RUMSFELD. It is difficult to say, unless one defines terms, as to what détente is. I don't think of détente as a state or circumstance or something that one can then enumerate a balance sheet underneath. I think of it simply as a decision on the part of our country to attempt, where possible, to avoid confrontation, and where possible, find areas where our interests might converge.

To the extent that they converge, and we can actually achieve something that is in our interest, fine, we do it. To the extent we cannot, we ought not to. It ought now to be a one-way street. There is no question about that. But in looking at the history of our relationships, or the history of the world, I don't think a person can say this confrontation was avoided because of eight other things that were taking place, or that this potential threat was averted because of three or four others. It is a complex maze of relationships. We have to be sensitive, that what we are doing substantively is in fact in our interest, and not against the security interests of this country. We have to do it tactically in a way that is in our best interests. And finally, we have to see that while we are doing it, we don't create so euphoric an attitude on the part of free people that they think that things are so good that we don't need that military capability. We do.

Now, there are those who say that the ABM Treaty was useful, and they would cite that. There are things that might have been averted during this period. There is no way that I can untie that knot and trace the line from a single benefit or conversely a single problem to the word "détente." But if by détente you mean the avoidance of confrontation were possible and the sensible, hard-nosed, seeking out of the areas where our interests might converge, but recognizing that they might not, then I think that the American people support that. And I do.

Senator BYRD. Are there two or three examples of advantages that we have obtained from détente that you could enumerate?

Mr. RUMSFELD. As I indicated, I think that one cannot say what would have happened in world relations absent an effort on our part to have less tense relationships with the Soviet Union and China. My sense is that the reason we were at the negotiating table is because we have some chips, because there is that military capability and that deterrent to adventuresomeness that might otherwise occur.

I think one makes a mistake to try to come up with a balance sheet of that nature. I think that each relationship ought to stand on its own. We ought not to engage in a mutual balanced force reduction agreement that is not in our interest, that is to say, one that does not result in equal or improved security at lower levels of forces.

We ought not to, in my judgment.

Now, if we were able to do that, would that be an advantage? Clearly in my mind that would be an advantage for the American people, for



Western Europe, and for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, if we could achieve it. The talks have been going on. There is a certain seriousness of purpose. And the sense is that we may in fact achieve some results there.

The CHAIRMAN. Your time is up. Do you want to ask another question?

Senator BYRD. I will reserve the question.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that all who are here now have had an opportunity to ask some questions.

I will be quite brief now. But I want to call your special attention to something you already know. You have touched on it in part. But it is most alarming to me that we have as high a percentage of the military dollar that we are now spending on personnel or personnel-related matters, leaving thereby a smaller and smaller percentage for weaponry, armor, and all the things that are generally classified as military hardware. Now, it is according to how you figure it, of course, but it is somewhere in the neighborhood of 28 percent, or 58 cents out of \$1 that is going into this personnel matter. I think if we continue to let that climb measurably more, we will get seriously out of balance there, and we will have a harder and harder time in getting the absolute necessities in the way of weapons, the cost of which is going up, and will continue to go up, no doubt as it becomes more and more involved in the contract.

Now, for the time being I am just calling that to your attention. I imagine you have some of the same concern, and you will come in contact with it more now than before.

First, are you concerned about this very question?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. And what are you going to try to do with it, I mean personally? For instance, you could have special study groups to start on it for you.

Mr. RUMSFELD. There is no question but that the United States is misserved if we allow a situation to develop where the pay and benefits for individuals who serve in the Armed Forces move to a percentage so that it in effect results in the drying up of funds needed for weapons and for the defense capability of this country. My personal view is that an individual who serves in the U.S. Armed Forces ought not to be penalized by virtue of that service. That is to say, he ought to be able to receive pay and benefits that are roughly commensurate to the outside. I think the American people ought to be willing to pay that, and I don't think an individual ought to be taxed for his willingness to serve. I don't think that compulsion ought to be used frivolously. To the extent it is needed, we ought to use it. But if we can achieve the manpower we need through proper pay and incentives, we should do that.

But the danger is that society might think we can have it both ways. We cannot. Either we pay the people what they are worth and in addition have the funds necessary for the weapons systems that are a fundamental part of our national capability, or we don't. But there is no free lunch. When the Congress made the decision and the country made the decision to move toward an all-volunteer force to the extent it proves feasible, inherent in that decision should have been a willingness to pay a reasonably competitive rate and not have pay costs dry up the



funds necessary for the weapons. And I am afraid what happened was, people thought they could have it both ways.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, one thing comes to my mind—and I have to defer to others somewhat on this particular point—but I feel very strongly for the more modern weapons. You can't have second-rate weaponry. But what concerns me is that we don't try hard enough to get along on fewer numbers of weapons. I think we should have the best, but as few as may be reasonably necessary, you can't tell exactly; for instance, planes, ships of a kind, tanks, and a number of things, you need good, hard-headed judgment on how many we need of these different items. We are beginning to have a great number, it seems to me. But if you are going to have a great variety, we should be compelled to try getting along on as few as possible. Some say we need 400 naval aircraft of a certain kind, others say, why that is ridiculous we need 800. I don't know where the line is, but you are going to have to make some hard recommendations.

Mr. Rumsfeld, you seem to have a real determination about you and a penetrating mind. I want to get you concerned about these matters. I don't know what special teams or what is necessary, but I think you will have to have a lot of responsible help in making those judgments. I hope you will do that.

We are talking about the Volunteer Army. I am not harping on that, but we must make it work. I have heard rumors lately about some sort of effort over there to organize within the service these men and women, and get them into an organization for the purpose of bargaining with you folks. I will tell you the way I feel. I think if a man joins the service, that is enough organization for him to belong to right there. He has cut himself out a good job, and he owes it everything he has. The serviceman is entitled to this good pay he is getting. If we are going to get all gummed up now on some kind of a loyalty to someone else or obligation to someone else or association, rather than the Army, Navy or whatever service he belongs to, that is where we can really begin a debacle or downfall for the military services, as I see it. I know you would be concerned about a matter like that. I call it to your attention now, and I hope you will look into it with a firm hand.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I appreciate your comments. It is a subject that I have not had a chance to look into. And I was not aware of the situation as you described it. I certainly will look into it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, thank you for your promise. I didn't expect you to be ready to answer a question like that.

Senator Goldwater.

Senator GOLDWATER. By the way, Mr. Chairman, if you want to go vote, you go ahead. I think we waste a lot of these people's time in running back and forth, and I would just as soon miss a vote and stay here to help things along.

The CHAIRMAN. We use a lot of pesticides on our cotton. I will go vote on that one. May I ask you to be in charge?

Senator GOLDWATER [presiding]. Mr. Rumsfeld, I want to get back to the point that Senator Byrd was trying to make and emphasize to you, that probably the most important concern among the Senators is your position on détente. I don't think there is any question about your ability to handle the job; your background is, I think, sufficient for you to take over. But unfortunately Secretary Kissinger has not



defined his definition of détente. And I have asked him to do this. I am going to see him again within the next day or two and I am going to ask him again, because the American people are very worried about this. They look on the Secretary of State's attempts, whether rightly or wrongly, as an effort to achieve a nice feeling between two potential enemies with us seemingly giving all that the Soviets want. Now, I happen to know your views on this. And I would suggest that when you are asked that question again, don't quibble about it. You don't believe in détente, as I understand your background, without some force to back up our position on what we want.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Absolutely, there is no question but that that capability is the underpinning of the security and stability we have seen in this world, the relative stability, since World War II.

Senator GOLDWATER. That is exactly what you ought to say, and don't stretch it out or elaborate on it, because that is what we want to hear.

Now there may be some Members of the Senate that want to hear it the other way around. I'm talking about the group who will probably have to confirm you.

It is very important that the President, you, and Kissinger, get this word "détente" as we understand it in the English language, cleared up. I think the way the Europeans have distorted the practice between themselves—and you know full well how that is—is the way that we should be practicing it. If I have something that you want and you have something I want, we can make a deal. But you are not going to get all of mine, and I am not going to get all of yours.

Mr. RUMSFELD. That's for sure.

Senator GOLDWATER. I hope the American people can understand that.

Do you have any reason to believe that changing the Secretary of Defense at this particular time will be interpreted by the Soviets as weakening our bargaining position at SALT II, thereby causing them to push for concessions not heretofore thought attainable?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I certainly think not. People generally behave on the basis of things that are important, quick impressions or perceptions that might be current for a moment seem not to worry people who are serious. It strikes me the Soviets are serious, and it strikes me that to the extent they are serious and to the extent that others have a serious interest in sensing what this administration's and this President's views on the world are, it is not terribly difficult for them to find it out. There is no question but what this President has set forth his views. It will not take long for people to have a sense of my views. I have tried to contribute to that by indicating not only that I do not know of any policy differences I have with Jim Schlesinger but that I told the President that before I agreed to accept this nomination.

Senator GOLDWATER. Did you feel that under you DOD would have a difference of position with the State Department on what a minimum acceptable SALT II agreement with the United States should be?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Do I think we could reach an agreement between Defense and State?

Senator GOLDWATER. No, do you think there is a minimum acceptable agreement that you can see now, if you have thought about this, as a given force.



Mr. RUMSFELD. I have thought about it, needless to say. I think there are so many variables in negotiations of this type, and not having been involved in negotiations, I would be reluctant to try to describe what it is. But there is no question but what the bottom line on this discussion is that that total package has to end up being in our interest. And to the extent that is possible, fine. To the extent it is not possible, we will keep on trying.

Senator GOLDWATER. But you would insist that any agreement would not undermine our national security interests?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Absolutely.

Senator GOLDWATER. What's your degree of concern over the fact that the Soviets have surpassed the United States in warhead yield capacity?

Mr. RUMSFELD. That question is one that is of concern. As I have indicated earlier, in terms of our defense capability, and the overall deterrent, one has to look at many parts on our side and on theirs, and there is no question but that they are ahead of us in some and we are ahead in some. Down the road that is certainly an area that the United States has to be attentive to.

Senator GOLDWATER. I have some other questions in that field, but I have only 5 minutes left.

Let me get on to another area.

When you were in the House you voted against the B-70, I believe.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I believe that is right.

Senator GOLDWATER. I think the final procurement—do you support the requirement for the B-1 bomber as a follow-on to the B-52 force?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I believe that somewhere here I have a note indicating what my logic was on that. I believe it was in an omnibus bill and there was an amendment concerning the RB-70. I don't have it right in front of me. My recollection is that it was a procedural concern without any bias against the bomber. But there is no question but that manned bombers are an element in the overall strategic capability.

I have not had an opportunity to immerse myself in the subject of the B-1. I read what the Secretary of Defense put forward to the committee in his posture statement this year. At first glance I find myself persuaded by his recommendations. But it is not something that I consider myself expert on at this point.

Senator GOLDWATER. But the B-1 production decision is scheduled in November of 1976. Assuming the aircraft meets all the required technical and performance requirements at that time, do you feel that you could approve the aircraft for production?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator, I would want to talk with the people in the Department of Defense who have been working on this, including the Joint Chiefs. There is no question but that the B-52 is elderly. And, as I indicated, I recognize the contribution that manned bombers make in the U.S. defense capability. But there are two or three very, very large issues of that nature that will be coming up. It would be wrong for me, without having an opportunity to be briefed in the Department of Defense, without having an opportunity to talk to the Chief, without having an opportunity to consult with others who are knowledgeable and interested in this subject, to just sort of unilaterally pronounce judgment. I would not respect myself for doing it and I would question whether you would respect me for doing it.



Senator GOLDWATER. I think you are right. But you cannot shoot me down for trying.

Mr. RUMSFELD. No, sir.

Senator GOLDWATER. One other question.

I am interested in your concept of how the Defense Department should be managed. Under Secretary McNamara, a large staff organization evolved, which then delved directly into the day-to-day management of the service programs, and also became the agency that set individual service budget targets and priorities. Now, as I recall it, the Laird-Packard concept was to return the day-to-day management function back to the individual services, but to use the OSD staff for review of major issues and priorities that the Defense Secretary had to decide.

Have you developed any management philosophy for running the Defense Department? And what role do you foresee for the individual services and for the OSD staff?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I certainly have developed what I consider to be a management philosophy in general over the years, having been involved with various organizations. I certainly would not want to suggest that I have developed a precise management approach for the Department of Defense.

I intend to immerse myself at the outset in the question of people. I think it is exceedingly important. And second, in the subject of areas of responsibility and organizational arrangements, I have not done that. I have, since the announcement of my nomination, been involved with getting through the transition out of the job I am in and in preparing for these hearings. I'm not in a position to announce any conclusions in that area.

Senator GOLDWATER. Thank you.

My time is up.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the B-70. I was a great backer—

Mr. RUMSFELD. Excuse me, Senator. Could I interrupt you for 1 second?

I have found the paper I was looking for, Senator Goldwater, on the RB-70. My understanding is that—and this was some time ago—I don't have the date that that particular amendment in the House that I voted against involved a proposal where the administration said they would not spend the money even if authorized by Congress. I could be wrong on that, but my recollection is that the administration announced that they did not want those funds, and would not spend them. My recollection is that as a result of that announcement that they would not spend it, it seemed not to make a heck of a lot of sense to vote for it.

Senator GOLDWATER. That is right. I don't think the administration said this, I think Mr. McNamara said it.

Senator SYMINGTON. In this connection, I used to be for the B-70 until the Air Force withdrew it and made it the RB-70 so that they could go out and look around and see what the missiles had done. And the price at that time was nothing compared to the B-1, but pretty high in my opinion. So I changed my position when it became the RB-70 as against the B-70.



But one more point. I hope you will look at the cost-effective aspect of this situation. You mentioned the B-52 being elderly. I think what we are looking for in the missile age is a launching platform for missiles, more than a plane itself which will penetrate to enemy targets. But that is just my personal opinion.

And I would like to get back to this question of détente. Three of my colleagues have discussed détente. To me détente means an effort to work out an arrangement that would prevent a nuclear war. And having four grandsons who are all at draft age. I don't see anything wrong in trying to work out an arrangement whereby you don't get into a nuclear war.

That is one concept of détente. Would you agree that we should make this effort?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I think that you are getting close to the problem. The problem is, it means different things to different people. And therefore it is very difficult to respond to something like that yes or no. I agree with what you say, I think that the word in a reasonably accurate context means simply that there will be a lessening of the tensions between the two countries for the purpose of trying to avoid a confrontation, which is another way of saying what you said, and to the extent possible, seeing if there are areas where you can improve your situation through negotiations, such as MBFR, which may or may not result in a conclusion. The danger is, other people think of détente as a historical record that they don't like, or they think of it in the context of the effect on people's minds, that lulls them into thinking the circumstances are different than they really are.

Senator SYMINGTON. I agree. And I have the fortune—or misfortune, depending upon how you look at it—of being in the last 16 or 17 years the only Member of the Senate who serves on both the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees. And may I say that in my opinion the Foreign Relations Committee is about as friendly to Secretary Kissinger as it is now obvious that the Armed Services Committee is to Secretary Schlesinger. I get mixed up on those “issingers,” but I think I got that one straight. But the point I wanted to make is that neither of them make the decisions in this matter, do they? The President of the United States is the one who makes the final decision as to what should or should not be done with respect to the Soviet Union.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Absolutely.

Senator SYMINGTON. And has he done anything up to this point that you think is wrong?

Mr. RUMSFELD. In the narrow context that you are talking about—

Senator SYMINGTON. I asked the question, and I will ask you again. You say the President of the United States decides if there is any possible discussion or difference of opinion between the Secretary of State and Defense, and we have gone into this détente thing, and we have kicked it around a bit, and properly so. But the President is the final decider. And I asked you, has he made any decisions up to this point that you think are wrong?

Mr. RUMSFELD. In my opinion the decisions the President has made in the past have been good ones. I did not want to answer your question yes, because I have views on many matters, and the President and I don't always agree.



Senator SYMINGTON. I certainly don't want you to agree.

The Hiroshima bomb was 13 kilotons, and according to Fred Ikle's new brochure, the Russians have dropped one of 58 million tons. And we have dropped a good many at over a million tons, and we are ready to drop a good many more at over that if we have to. But in this climate I don't see anything wrong from an ideological standpoint or any other standpoint in trying to work out some arrangement whereby we don't get into a nuclear war. You would agree with that, wouldn't you?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I think it is a very sensible thing on the part of our country when we engage in negotiations to try to avoid destabilization and to enhance stability.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am glad to hear you say that, Mr. Secretary. And I hope that in some way, without losing our honor or our dignity, we don't have to pass on to our children the growing confrontation between the two countries, because it means we have made a mess out of what we are trying to do over here, and no doubt they have, too.

A living statesman told me recently that 9 years ago one of the heads of the Soviet Union said:

There is nothing you can do to prevent us from destroying you if we want to, and there is nothing we can do to prevent you from destroying us if you want to.

And based on my experience on the joint committee, I certainly agree with that. So I hope we can work something out.

At times it seems that they are in better shape than we are, from the standpoint of their working people, et cetera, and at times it looks as though we are in better shape because of our agricultural potential as against theirs. But I do hope that we still have the idea that it does not become a sin or a terrible thing for the President to try to work out an agreement today with the Soviet, and no doubt tomorrow also with China, that prevents a nuclear war. And I am confident you agree with that.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I do.

I would add there, however, that there is a habit which seems to me has grown up in our country to think of provocation in the context of belligerency. It strikes me that there are various ways to be provocative. We could be provocative by being belligerent, as indeed you are suggesting we should not be. By the same token, we could be provocative by being weak. There is no question but that weakness on our part would be a provocation, and conceivably could entice others into adventures that they might otherwise avoid.

Senator SYMINGTON. What you are talking about is unilateral disarmament.

Mr. RUMSFELD. No, I am talking about miscalculations as to our capabilities and the deterrent.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think that we are miscalculating?

Mr. RUMSFELD. No. As I indicated earlier, I think we have a credible deterrent. I also indicated earlier that I am concerned about the trends.

Senator SYMINGTON. What do you mean by that?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I mean that along with the comments made by the chairman, that to the extent our defense budget goes to pay and benefits for individuals and we fail to see that our technological superiority continues and that our deterrent remains credible, we are making a



'66

very serious mistake. To the extent that we misassign priorities in a way that does in fact miscalculate the relative capability as between the United States and the Soviet Union, we are making a very serious mistake. I think one who concludes that they have that capability but would never use it, is making a calculation that I would not want to make. It could be used. And liberty is a very precious thing. Freedom is very precious thing. And that was of course very much a part of what you said concerning your grandchildren.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, I appreciate that. And I would make one observation. I spent a good many years in the Pentagon, and met a good many admirals and generals. And some of them are great statesmen, and some are walking bombs.

I hope as a civilian head that you will give more consideration to the statesmen than the fellows who say, I have been practicing this long enough, I want to play, because I don't think a lot of them that feel that way really realize what a full nuclear exchange would amount to if we ever run into it.

There is one thing this morning that worried me about your supporting the question of limited strategic war. And it wouldn't take me but a minute to explain why.

When this came out we wrote the Pentagon from the Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Arms Control and asked how many people would they estimate would be killed if we had a "limited strategic war" and by attacking their military targets after they attacked our military targets so we would not punish their cities, et cetera. And the word came back that there would be 800,000 deaths. And that obviously was absurd, based on the studies that we had and the estimates that we had from experts on the subject. And so we said, "Please go back and recheck your figures."

And so they came back with revised figures. Instead of 800,000 fatalities, in a limited strategic war, 22 million people would die in such a limited war, including 800,000 Canadians. Maybe they got that later figures mixed up somewhere, because it was the same figure as was originally given for the number of Americans who would die.

I have a base in my State, an ICBM base, practically on the outskirts of Kansas City. And a very small, minute error, the type for example, that frequently occurs in efforts to go to the Moon, could wipe out Kansas City. On any basis, if they attacked the ICBM base in my State, the estimate was it would kill about half the people in Missouri.

So I hope that when we get into this limited strategic war discussion, and knowing of your capacity to analyze these problems, I hope you will really look into it, because I think in the first place, if you kill about 22 million people, you are going to have a tough time finding enough undertakers to take care of them, even though you haven't gone after the population in what you might call an all-out way.

I am being sarcastic about it because I don't buy it, I never have. Nor for that matter have the Soviets. There are no plans that we know of, according to intelligence, that they have a concept of a limited nuclear war in the same way we do.

Have you made your mind up finally about the advisability of such a limited nuclear war concept. or did you tell us that you would look into it based on the figures that I have just given you?



Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator, I was the U.S. Ambassador to NATO at the time the Interdepartmental discussions were taking place on the subject of moving toward the nuclear retargeting strategy. At that time I was involved in extensive discussions with our 14 NATO allies on this subject.

Senator SYMINGTON. Excuse me. I am not talking about tactical nuclear war.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I am talking about the nuclear retargeting strategy.

Now, I would say once again today what I said earlier. I have not been dealing with these subjects in terms of the public over the period of 3 years. I have some confusion in my mind occasionally as to what is classified and what is not, so I will speak carefully, and I hope precisely, and not terribly fully. In considering the changes that were announced by the United States, and in studying them, and in discussing them and their logic and their problems, advantages and disadvantages, with our 14 allies over a period of some weeks, I did in fact satisfy myself that it was in the U.S. interests to take the steps with respect to targeting that were taken. I say that because I am satisfied that it enhances deterrents across the entire spectrum of risks. The goal is peace. The question is: How does one best maintain it? And as we were talking earlier, one way to achieve that is to try to calculate and develop a deterrent capability which has a maximum effectiveness. There is, I think—there had been, I should say, a soft spot in that deterrent, particularly when one recognizes the situation where Presidents have had very few options between massive destruction and conventional war.

It raised the question—that situations could raise the question in minds of decisionmakers elsewhere, as to whether or not they might be able to engage in an activity in Western Europe on a conventional basis, in that a President would thereby be faced with a decision of having to use strategic nuclear capability to stop it, and the likelihood that that conventional activity could conceivably escalate into nuclear conflict. I could see where planners could question that. So the nuclear retargeting announcements that were made a declaratory policy on the part of the United States, rather than increasing the risks of war, in fact enhanced the deterrent and therefore improved prospects for peace. I think that that case can be made.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. That is very interesting. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Tower.

Senator Tower. I want to commend Mr. Rumsfeld on the statement he has made about provocation. I think it is an extremely important statement. And I think it has to be made over and over again.

We can induce the Soviets and their friends into adventurous acts by virtue of our known weakness, and this is a very grave risk that we run. I think the Soviet objective is, build sufficient military might that it can accomplish its objectives through pressure, through leverage, through blackmail, if you please, without ever having to resort to the use of that military force. It is important that if our deterrent is credible, that we demonstrate a willingness to use it if necessary, which I think we did during the Yom Kippur war when there was some threat of Soviet movement, we called a worldwide alert, which



is precisely the response that we should make. And it served its purpose.

I remember something Eric Severeid once said, and I think he is very wise: "Goodness without power is impotent, and power itself is impotent without the willingness to use it if necessary." And I think that Mr. Rumsfeld has restated that concept in a very eloquent way, and it demonstrates in my views fitness to be the Secretary of Defense. And I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator McIntyre.

Senator MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to apologize to the Chairman for not being here this morning. Unfortunately the Banking Committee required my attention this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. We missed you. But we are glad that you can be here this afternoon.

Senator MCINTYRE. I have some brief questions to ask.

What lesson, Mr. Rumsfeld, did you learn in your position as Ambassador to NATO that you might recite at this time as an indication of future relationships with our NATO allies in the field of interoperability, standardization, and cooperative R. & D., cooperative research and development? Did you get a chance in that post to work on the problem of standardization, how can we learn and how can we do more in this field?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator, I have spent a good deal of time on this subject, and moved in the North Atlantic Council and Defense Planning Committee, and internally in the U.S. Government, where we are not particularly a model of standardization ourselves, let alone as between the United States and our allies in NATO.

I indicated earlier this morning that I learned a number of things. But if there is one big lesson, it is that it is very difficult to do. There are gigantic pressures against it. There is competition between services and competition between countries. The fact is that different countries sometimes feel they have various missions, and therefore need something special that suits their particular situation—which is certainly true in our country, in that all of our capabilities should not be designed, for example, for Western Europe. There is a great deal of resistance to it.

On the other hand, it strikes me that we have arrived at a point where there is such monumental pressure on the budgets of the NATO allies, including the United States, that we may in fact be at a point where we have a sufficient counterweight available to overcome those pressures against greater standardization from the individual military services and the individual nations and that greater strides might be made toward greater standardization and rationalization or interoperability. There is no question but that the capability of the United States and our NATO allies could be measurably enhanced and there could be considerably greater benefit for dollars spent.

The second thing I would say by way of a lesson is this: There are no homerun balls in standardization. They are all singles. Progress is not made in giant steps, it is made in one single item, forcing agreement that we in fact will have either common R. & D. or common pro-



curement, or whatever, so that this patchwork maze of individual approaches that presently exists begins to be reduced.

If someone is looking for a magic wand to wave over that problem, I have looked, and I don't believe there is one. I think we are going to have to tackle it item by item as we go along.

Senator McINTYRE. That is a good answer. You may be aware that we did make a breakthrough with the SHORAD and we are currently testing it. And that represents, as you say, only one item, but it is a good sign. And as you also indicate, the economies of the system may force our nose to a grindstone.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McIntyre.

Senator McINTYRE. Considering the major cutback to be imposed on the Defense Department budget this year, and the likelihood that the congressional attitude will be equally severe next year, do you have any thoughts, Mr. Rumsfeld, on how to reconcile this with the need to provide for an adequate defense program next year?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator, I have a lot of ideas. But they are preliminary. I have not, of course, been to the DOD and gone through a series of discussions with the civilian and military leadership there. I recognize the size of the problem you have posed. It is a serious one.

Senator McINTYRE. You referred to it when you mentioned a trend when you were answering Senator Symington.

Mr. RUMSFELD. That is right.

Senator McINTYRE. Maybe the question is premature. In the interest of time I will probably repeat the question if I get a chance in the posture hearings.

Now, I know that you have answered these questions. You have been around this. But I have just got to ask you this. What is your position regarding the need for a concurrent development of the family of high accuracy, high yield, counterforce weapons which I was unsuccessful in deleting from the defense budget for fiscal year 1976? I noticed in your answer, I thought, when Senator Symington was talking about nuclear wars, that two things came through: that you don't want to let anything out in the public domain that shouldn't be out, and second, you had some misgivings about your own keen knowledge of the various ramifications of this counterforce program that had been part and parcel of your predecessor's policy.

I get the impression that you are generally in favor of the higher accuracy and the counterforce and the flexible response sort of thing, but that you are reserving a final judgment, is that right?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Well, No. 1, I would not describe what we are doing or what anyone I know of intends to do as the development of a counterforce strategy, just as I would not describe anything that is being done as an effort to develop a first-strike capability. I look at it, in the context of the statements that have been made and the rationale attached to it, by Secretary Schlesinger and by others in the administration. What it is, it is an effort to develop additional options for this country between massive destruction in a strategic nuclear war, and a conventional conflict. As I indicated to Senator Symington, that does enhance the deterrent. I do not characterize it the way you have.



Senator McINTYRE. I'm going to leave the question. But I'm going to say, I hope that you will take a look at the MARK 12-A, and at what I would call the Minuteman IV. And I would hope that you would look at the LABRV program, the large advanced ballistic reentry vehicle which will give a very much bigger yield. And I hope you would look at the ultimate weapon, the terminal guided MARV. And I hope that you will look at the accuracy we possess today and the accuracy we seek to achieve with these new weapons that are going to cost the taxpayers billions of dollars which means that defense needs are going to have to give ground.

I hope you will go into some of these scenarios.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I assure you that I will.

Senator McINTYRE. And then when you come to the posture hearings, I will ask whether you believe in some of these scenarios? It is such an important area. As you know, it represents a departure from our defense posture and defense policy from the early 1970's and in 1974 it represented a marked departure. In 1971, if my years are not wrong, the committee turned the idea of higher accuracy down, and was sustained on the floor. So it is a very important question, and one that I am intensely interested in, and one that I will probably be objecting to next year.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Before anyone leaves, I want to dictate into the record here what transpired when we were off the record.

Senator Leahy has requested that he be permitted to submit questions for the record, and that he get those in not later than tomorrow.

The Chair hears no objection, so it will be agreed.

Senator Culver has submitted questions already, as has Senator Thurmond.*

[Senator Leahy's questions follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY TO MR. DONALD RUMSFELD

Question 1. What do you see as U.S. priorities in foreign commitments? Which would we support with U.S. forces? Which would we support with nuclear weapons?

Answer. I presume from your question that you are referring to foreign military commitments. There are two primary elements which determine the priority. First, the nature and extend of our interests and, second, the nature of the threat. In Europe and in South Korea we maintain nuclear capable forces to deter and to respond to aggression. We support our foreign military commitments in other parts of the world in varying ways, primarily through our security assistance programs, and by maintaining a capability to rapidly deploy forces to assist friends and allies to resist aggression should we decide to do so. As to how we might respond to specific circumstances, deterrence is served best by retaining some degree of ambiguity.

Question 2. Do you see any value in a formal Congressional review of U.S. commitments? Please explain.

Answer. I see no reason why the Congress should not review U.S. commitments as it deems necessary. The Congress does, of course, review commitments through treaty ratification, appropriations, and policy recommendations. Congressional consideration of programs concerning nations to which we have commitments constitutes a continuing review process, and provides an expression of Congressional will as to U.S. measures necessary to fulfill the commitments.

Question 3. What should be the extent of our commitment to Israel? U.S. Forces? Nuclear weapons?

Answer. The U.S. Government, under consecutive administrations from President Truman to President Ford, has committed itself to the survival and security

*See Senator Thurmond's questions, p. 14; see also Senator Culver's questions, p. 52.



of Israel. That commitment has been fulfilled through the provision of material and financial assistance rather than by U.S. military forces. I would expect that pattern to go forward in the future.

Question 4. What are our vital interests in South Korea? What would be the impact upon the U.S. if South Korea fell?

Answer. The chief interest of the U.S. in South Korea is related to the preservation of peace and stability on the peninsula and in that area of Asia. The interests of the major powers of Northeast Asia—the U.S., Japan, the USSR, and the PRC—intersect on the Korean peninsula and destabilization of the security situation there could have grave consequences. An attempt by the North to take over South Korea, as in 1950, would risk involving the major powers in a confrontation which could lead to expanded conflict.

If South Korea were abandoned and ultimately fell, the implications for Japan as well as for Asian and worldwide balance—political, and military—would be inimical to U.S. interests.

Question 5. As our forces are now stationed in South Korea, they would become involved during the very first stages of any conflict, whether started by North, South, or accident. It seems to me that such a deployment could involve the United States in a war without a conscious decision to do so. Could you explain the logic of that deployment?

Answer. I am informed that US forces are deployed in a reserve position behind the ROK forces, to defend the approaches to Seoul along the traditional invasion route from the North. US forces would not be immediately committed in a minor contingency situation necessarily. US forces are stationed in Korea in accord with our commitment under the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROK. They have been stationed in Korea since the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement ending hostilities in 1953.

Question 6. What are the basic objectives of US foreign policy? How does our defense policy relate to those objectives? How can we justify our support of authoritarian regimes such as South Korea, the Philippines, Spain, Chile, etc.?

Answer. My response to Senator Thurmond's first written question covers a portion of the question. Other aspects of the question are essentially of a foreign policy nature and would require discussion with the Department of State, particularly in view of the fact that the four nations named each represent somewhat different security and policy considerations.

Question 7. Why does the U.S. need a manned bomber force?

Answer. I support the need for a TRIAD of strategic forces with their mutually supporting capabilities which hedge against unexpected failure or ineffectiveness of any one element of the TRIAD. The manned bomber is, of course, an element in the TRIAD.

Question 8. How do massive arms sales to Persian Gulf countries serve U.S. interests?

Answer. We have a security assistance relationship with the Persian Gulf area that dates to 1943 and 1944 when the first U.S. missions went to Iran and Saudi Arabia to begin providing advisory and training assistance. Following the British withdrawal from the area in 1971, U.S. security policy has tried to maintain the ties and good relations we enjoyed with several of these nations and to encourage the area states, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia, to take the lead in assuring the security of the area. I am not at this point in a position to offer any elaboration as to the rationale for sales in this particular instance than has already been put forward by the Department.

Question 9. What initiatives can the U.S. take to prevent a naval arms race in the Indian Ocean?

Answer. This is a subject I would wish to study in the period ahead.

Question 10. What is the present status of the MBFR talks? When do you anticipate an agreement will be reached?

Answer. Round VII of the MBFR negotiations is now in session in Vienna. The parties have been involved in essentially an exploratory effort—during the 1973–1975 period. Both sides have laid out serious MBFR proposals and have engaged in probing discussions with a view toward gaining substantial understanding of each other's positions. These discussions have been generally free of polemics.

As President Ford said at Helsinki, the U.S. and the Allies are considering new initiatives. However, much will depend on the position taken by the East. The differences are the kind that experienced negotiators recognize as soluble, if there is a will to resolve them.



However, any attempt to specify a date for conclusion of an equitable agreement would be speculation.

Question 11. If an agreement cannot be reached in those talks (MBFR), what changes would you anticipate making in the NATO force structure?

Answer. As long as there is a chance of success in the MBFR talks, it would be unwise, and might even be harmful, to speak of what force changes might be made should the talks fail. While the talks are going on, Allied nations, including the United States, are continuing to make those force improvements that are necessary to maintain a deterrent to aggression in Europe.

Question 12. Do you feel that we now possess a credible conventional deterrent to a Warsaw Pact attack in Western Europe?

Answer. Yes, and I think the Warsaw Pact nations think so, too. But, to preserve and enhance the credibility of this deterrent, it will be necessary to take full account of the real improvements in the Pact's conventional capabilities and to take the necessary steps in our own Defense programs to ensure that an acceptable balance is maintained.

Question 13. If the Warsaw Pact were to initiate an attack on Western Europe, do you think that they would use nuclear weapons? Please explain. Are we prepared for a nuclear attack?

Answer. We cannot be certain about the manner in which the Warsaw Pact might initiate or carry out an attack. Given the current balance of forces between East and West, military aggression is not felt to be likely. Until recently many analysts have considered that Soviet doctrine envisaged an early use of nuclear weapons in a European conflict on a rather massive scale. On the other hand, the Soviets might be reluctant to initiate widespread nuclear aggression in Europe, thereby destroying much of what would presumably be the object of such aggression. It is possible, therefore, that war in Europe might be confined to the conventional level, at least for a substantial period. In the uncertainty of what the Pact nations might or might not do, two questions must be asked: considering all the different kinds of weapons they have and the ways they might be used, can we safely conclude that they could not be used against us or our allies?

Question 14. In the event of Warsaw Pact aggression in Western Europe, would you recommend the use of strategic nuclear weapons if both conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons failed to stop that aggression?

Answer. I prefer not to speculate about the circumstances in which it might be necessary to recommend employing strategic nuclear weapons. Our strategic nuclear arsenal is one part of the NATO triad of conventional, theater nuclear and strategic nuclear forces. NATO strategy contemplates taking only those steps necessary to repel aggression and safeguard the integrity of the North Atlantic Treaty area.

Question 15. Do you feel that our NATO allies are making a fair contribution to their defense? If U.S. forces were reduced, could our Allies increase their contribution?

Answer. There is always room for improvement, however, our NATO Allies face economic difficulties, as we do. Their level of effort, and ours, must grow stronger as the Warsaw Pact forces grow stronger. Europe as a whole has been increasing its defense expenditures in real terms marginally each year; it must continue to do so. Moreover, to make better use of available resources, to avoid waste, we must work to standardize NATO weapons and equipment and to rationalize NATO defense forces and tasks. If U.S. forces were reduced, the Allies would have to adopt crisis budget programs which would be difficult for them to accomplish under present economic conditions, as it would be for us. Moreover, any unilateral U.S. reductions would raise questions about the continued need for strong defenses, and would likely trigger a series of similar reductions by our Allies, with disastrous consequences for NATO defense.

Question 16. Which element of our strategic Triad do you feel is the strongest? Which element do you feel is the weakest? Please explain.

Answer. Each element of the Triad has its own particular strengths. They constitute a mutually reinforcing whole in which each part plays an indispensable role.

Question 17. Do you believe in the concept of limited nuclear war? If yes, would you describe to us a possible limited nuclear war scenario? How would such a war end? Wouldn't ending such a war require some degree of rationality on both sides?



Is such rationality possible while nuclear missiles are being hurled back and forth? How many people in the U.S. would be killed in the scenario which you have described?

Answer. It is essential that the U.S. have the capability to meet an attack at every level of conflict and that we be able to conduct military operations at the lowest possible level of violence consistent with achievement of our objectives. That is my general concept of our military needs for deterrence and detente, but I am not in a position at the moment to set forth specific battlefield scenarios.

Question 18. When will the U.S. have a counterforce capability? How much will that cost?

Answer. This question is of sufficient complexity that I would prefer to consult in depth the appropriate DOD officials before attempting to respond in detail.

Question 19. Why do we need a counterforce capability? Why is the "mutual assured destruction" strategy no longer valid?

Answer. On this matter I am in general agreement with the views as set forth to this Committee by Secretary Schlesinger. It is a subject I wish to study further in the period ahead and therefore will defer a comprehensive response until a later date.

Question 20. We now have approximately 7,500 tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe. Is it possible that some of these weapons could be removed? How many, and which ones, do you feel can be withdrawn in the next year? Two years? Three years?

Answer. I understand that there is a review of our requirements for tactical nuclear weapons in Europe currently being conducted. This is a technical and complex subject and I am reluctant to comment in detail without the benefit of a thorough analysis both of our stockpiles and our requirements. Any possible modifications which might at some point be called for, should be subject of full and complete consultation with our Allies.

Question 21. Mr. Rumsfeld in recent weeks there have been many accounts of improprieties on the part of some Defense Department officials. These have concerned specifically the acceptance of gifts, free trips, entertainment, etc., from Defense contractors. If you are confirmed as Secretary of Defense, would you be willing to require all Defense Department officials to publicly report any such contacts with Defense contractors? Could this be done by February 1, 1976?

Answer. Defense Department officials should not accept gifts, free trips, entertainment or gratuities from contractors. Relations between Defense Department officials and Defense contractors should be on a business basis. Defense officials must not only avoid improprieties such as the acceptance of gratuities, they must avoid actions which would give the appearance of impropriety. This is a matter which I would look into carefully as Secretary of Defense and take whatever steps are necessary.

Question 22. Will you rule out running for any elective office within the next twelve months?

Answer. As I indicated to Senator Jackson in response to his questions, I will donate my full energy to the Department of Defense, I said, and I repeat it here, I am not running for anything. My intention would be to go to the Department of Defense and to serve as effectively as I know how for as long as the President wishes me to.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Jackson wanted to ask further questions, and anyone else can, of course, who wishes to. It was agreed here by the six members present that assuming we finish the questions tomorrow, if we do, that we recommend that the committee take a vote with a view of reporting this matter to the Senate. That is especially true in view of the fact that next week will be the last week before the Thanksgiving recess of the Senate. Even though we have a capable Acting Secretary, I think if this gentleman is going to be confirmed, which I believe he will, we should put him on the job.

Senator Taft, that brings it to you.

Senator Taft, if you will yield just a moment, may I say that the dispatch with which I recommend that the committee act in no way implied that I had any concern about the Acting Secretary.



Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Chairman, during the question that Senator Culver asked me he made reference to some remarks that I had made, and it struck me that it might be useful to have a fuller text of that paragraph he quoted in the record. I would ask your permission to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. That is Senator Culver's questions this morning?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, I'm sure he would have no objection to that. If anyone does, I will hear him on it. But we will admit it to the record.*

All right, Senator Taft.

Senator TAFT. Mr. Rumsfeld, I came back this afternoon because I did not get to ask my questions this morning about the entire naval area, and my concern for our future naval capability. Do you have any general assessment of the current United States-Soviet naval balance?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I have, of course, read a good many articles, the posture statement this year on the subject, as well as some statements that you have made on the Senate floor concerning the subject. The first thing one would have to say is that no one can deny the impressive growth of the Soviet fleet. That is a fact of life.

The second fact I would state is that the U.S. naval capability also has some very impressive aspects.

Third, I would say that the overall maritime balance in the world is a fundamental question of importance to our country and to our allies.

We have seen a marked reduction in the total number of U.S. ships. And we have seen improvement in the quality of individual ships. We are seeing problems with the cost of strengthening our maritime forces. There is no question but that one of the tasks of the next Secretary of Defense and of this committee is to continuously address that question of what the balance is and what the trends are, and ask ourselves where the funds are to be found to see that that balance is not upset.

Senator TAFT. In that connection, do you think a major shifting of resources between the services may have to be undertaken to meet the Soviet naval challenge? Since I have come on this committee, one of the things that has concerned me most is that the Department of Defense concept that we adopted quite a number of years ago now has resulted in kind of a stand-off between the three branches. Each of them gets about a third of the budget or a little more, regardless of what the military requirements might actually be. This gives me great concern.

I am of the opinion that we are simply going to have to go to a more capital-intensive type of defense if we indeed are going to have an adequate defense at all within the budgetary limitations in which we find ourselves.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I cannot answer your question as to how one would solve the problem at this point. I recognize the nature of the problem. I see what the limiting factors are. I think it is something that, as I say, you and the committee and I and others would have to address in developing priorities, budgets and an allocation of resources in the period ahead.

*See Senator Culver's questions, p. 52.



I am not in a position to say that I would take this from that or move that there.

Senator TAFT. In relation to NATO, particularly, the emergence of the Soviet naval threat seems to be a new element not dealt with in NATO's original, or even in its present, structure. Do you see a possible need for realignment of the responsibilities within NATO, with the Europeans taking over more responsibility for providing land forces while the United States concentrates on meeting the naval threat to the trans-Atlantic reinforcement capability upon which all NATO depends?

Mr. RUMSFELD. The subject of rationalizing functions within NATO is one that was introduced 2 or 3 years ago. As with standardization, there is resistance on the part of the individual nations as to limiting their armed forces to one or two aspects of a traditional defense capability. On the other hand, there is some support for rationalization. How it would evolve after a period of consultation with our allies, I am not in a position to say at this point. But certainly it is a subject that is under discussion in NATO, as it should be.

Senator TAFT. Given the geographic differences between the United States and the Soviet Union, do you see a qualitative difference between the Soviet challenge to our land power, where they have always been superior in any case, and their new challenge to our ability to use the seas freely?

Mr. RUMSFELD. If one walks down the road toward an imbalance in terms of maritime capabilities, there is no question but that the adverse effects on the United States from the standpoint of the use of the seas would be substantial. There would be other effects that would also be substantial. There is no question but that the development of that capability on the part of the Soviet Union gives them a high degree of flexibility, and therefore the potential at least for considerable political influence in the world because of that capability.

My sense of this, I suppose, is no better or worse than others, but it is that there is a danger if the point you are making is not addressed by the United States. You could see countries tilting in the wrong direction if they see a trend that seems wrong to them continuing very long. The political implications are that the nature of various countries' roles in the world could begin to adjust. It is something that we ought not to overlook.

Senator TAFT. I certainly agree with you. And I wonder if you can see any way that the Soviet naval expansion can be explained in defensive terms, and if it cannot be so explained, whether or not it is consistent with the concept of detente?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I suppose that goes back to the question of how you define detente. It clearly is consistent if you properly define detente in a hardnosed way. They had not been a maritime nation. They have been, as you have suggested a continental nation. Again, it is a capability that the United States cannot ignore.

Senator TAFT. Just a final area, then. I know of course that you have not been able to spend a lot of time familiarizing yourself with details of the respective programs of the United States and of Soviet Russia. But in terms of what you have seen, do you believe that our projected naval program is adequate in terms of meeting the Soviet naval challenge? And as a part of the same question, I wonder if it is adequate



from not only a quantitative but a qualitative point of view, in relation for instance, to many of our naval concepts and our ships designs, which we seem to be frozen into today?

Can you comment on what you think our current response to the Soviet naval challenge is?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I would much prefer to tackle the subject over a period of time and try to offer a more informed answer than I could now.

Senator TART. As I said at the outset, in your current position it may be stretching it a bit far to ask you to make these judgments at this time. But these are current questions that ought to be addressed. And I would hope that next year when we get to review the entire defense situation and the manpower situation, and especially the R. & D. situation, that we can get some broader information in this whole area.

Thank you very much.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Byrd, it is back to you, sir.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Rumsfeld, I think that I understand your position on the question of missile accuracy. But I will ask it again. As I understand it, you do favor researching and development for the purpose of improving the accuracy of our missile systems?

Mr. RUMSFELD. The short answer is yes, I do favor it, as of this point, to the extent I have knowledge. The knowledge I have suggests to me that it is desirable for the United States to continue to improve missile accuracy. The reason I say that is that it strikes me that it does enhance deterrents and it does move into that area of being able to reduce collateral damage.

I would close by saying, however, that I recognize that this is a subject of great complexity. The announcements that have been made with respect to our overall strategy in targeting options are reasonably recent. I recognize that as SALT evolves it conceivably, depending on how the areas that ultimately are agreed upon are designed, it might leave areas that for one reason were not dealt with in SALT, that we then ought to address, and other areas that were dealt with within SALT that we might then wish to address in a different way. I'm reluctant to sound finally conclusive in some of these areas, Senator.

Senator BYRD. I can understand that. But I thought I understood your position better before I asked the question than I did after I heard the answer.

Mr. RUMSFELD. The answer is yes, I support the position taken by the Secretary of Defense in his February 5 proposal and recommendations to the Congress, and the steps that the United States is taking with respect to missile accuracy.

Senator BYRD. It seems to me that if we are going to have missiles—and I think in this nuclear age we have to have them—that it is certainly logical that we should have as much technological knowhow as possible to make those missiles accurate. Would you concur in that view?



Mr. RUMSFELD. With the same caveat I made before, yes, I do concur in that.

Senator BYRD. In your judgment does Russia represent a threat to world peace?

Mr. RUMSFELD. It strikes me that any country that has developed and that continues to develop that capability has to be looked at by other nations as a country that conceivably could use that capability. That would be my first point.

The second point I would make is that one who looks at our country and our Constitution and the things we believe in and hold dear, and then looks at the beliefs and convictions of the Soviets and their system and their approach to life, sees that they are fundamentally different. It is not a matter of simply shrugging one's shoulders and saying that they believe in this and we believe in that. It is fundamentally different. Those fundamental differences are something that are likely to remain. I think that the American people, who believe in and cherish their freedom, must in fact agree, or they would not have in the past and would not now be willing to support the kind of defense and deterrents that I believe are absolutely necessary in view of the nature of the world.

It is important that we continue it as we have in the past.

Senator BYRD. Your answer to my question, then, is that you do regard Russia as a threat to world peace?

Mr. RUMSFELD. There is no question but that that capability that exists is a threat. We described it as a threat in force planning. The first question as to what we need to do, is what is the threat? And the threat exists.

Senator BYRD. And that is why we are spending, to use round figures, \$90 billion, that is the major reason that we are spending \$90 billion for defense purposes?

Mr. RUMSFELD. That is correct. And were there not a counterweight to that capability there is no question but that our situation would be different. By the same token, given the capability that exists, I have trouble believing that there are very many people who believe that absent the counterweight that we provide, the world would be as stable as it has been. There is no question but that our conduct, which as I indicated at the outset, is in a very fundamental way determined by that capability and the friends clearly is the stabilizing force in this world. We ought to be very careful about conducting ourselves in a way that could destabilize the world.

Senator BYRD. I thank you, Mr. Rumsfeld.

In a few days I assume we will be calling you, Mr. Secretary. I shall be glad to support your nomination.

I do want to say—and I put this not as a question but just as an observation—that it seems to me that it is extremely important that the Defense Department be kept entirely out of the political arena. We are coming into a very important political year. While I don't like to see good men disqualified for higher positions—I think we need more good men in Government—I would hope that we don't have more turnover in this Department, with someone going in in December and possibly leaving in June. I don't believe that is in the country's best interests. But I don't put that as a question; I just state that as an observation.



Thank you, Mr. Rumsfeld.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Thank you very much.

The **CHAIRMAN.** Senator Tower, did you have anything else? I have just a few questions here.

Senator **TOWER.** I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The **CHAIRMAN.** Do you want to make any comment?

Senator **TOWER.** No comment right now. Thank you.

The **CHAIRMAN.** All right.

Let me say this, gentlemen. I had a great deal of confidence in Mr. Schlesinger. It goes without saying that I had nothing to do with the change. I knew nothing about it. That was outside of my jurisdiction. I had a great deal of confidence in him. I was impressed with his deep, penetrating ability in what seemed to be a desire to give everything, the best he had that was within his line of duty. I had reason to have a lot of confidence in him because of things that he told me that he felt I should know. I am referring back many months ago. Such experiences give you confidence in a man. I wanted to say that publicly. I told Secretary Schlesinger I was going to write him a handwritten note. We are not especially close friends or anything like that, but I will remember him as one of the outstanding men that I have known in the Pentagon. I am not making comparisons with you, Mr. Rumsfeld. I think you have a fine capability. It is highly important in such a responsible and very difficult office for which you have been nominated. If you are confirmed, I certainly wish you well in it.

I want to mention what you said when you were asked about Russia being a threat to world peace. You gave a very good answer, I thought, that anyone that had built up the capability that they have, and we have, is subject to being thought of as capable of using it and might use it. The point I want to emphasize is that we have got to keep trying even harder before the other nations of the world to let them know that in spite of all this capability and the military strength that we are nonaggressors, we don't want anything anyone else has, and we are not making any plans along that line. I don't expect that to be fully accepted by everybody in the world, but it will be accepted by some.

We must keep that clear before the people, because we are subject to question on it, based on what we have built up in military strength. The companion thought there is, thought, that beyond question the matter of sufficiency of our military strength must never be doubted, that it is sufficient to protect ourselves from any enemy or combination of enemies must not be left in doubt.

They are companion thoughts. Our people in America think things through a lot, many of them do, but they don't always think that one through, and that is the reason I am bringing it up now.

So, for my part, as a citizen and as a member of this committee, I want you to hold those things in mind, not just our massive strength piled on top of strength just to be overarmed, but we must never make the mistake of leaving any doubt about being adequately armed, and never let up on the idea of making it clear that we are not aggressors. We are not doing this with any design on anyone or any territory.

Is there anything further you want to say?

Mr. RUMSFELD. No, sir, Mr. Chairman.



Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, before you close, I have just one statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. I would like to associate myself with the remarks the chairman made in regard to Secretary Schlesinger. I think he made an outstanding Secretary of Defense. And I regret that he no longer will be in that position. But in saying that I do not in anyway downgrade the high qualities of the nominee.

The CHAIRMAN. I wasn't comparing Mr. Schlesinger with anyone either. I was first attracted to him when he handled the budget for the Atomic Energy Committee, and was the main witness. I next knew him as the Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Senator BYRD. If the chairman would yield at that point, I first knew him when I was requested to introduce him to the Atomic Energy Commission when he was nominated to be chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. And the reason that I got involved in it is that Mr. Schlesinger was then living in Virginia, and had previously been for several years at the University of Virginia as a professor. And then I had the opportunity to present him to this committee when he was nominated for Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and then again to this committee when he was nominated for the position of Secretary of Defense.

I thank the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

All right, Mr. Rumsfeld. Do you have anything further to say?

Mr. RUMSFELD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you for your attendance here.

I don't see any reason, gentlemen, why we cannot vote on this nomination tomorrow if it is agreeable to the membership. We will plan to do that unless there is some reason to the contrary. Based on what truth has come out so far, I don't have any doubt about the vote, that it will be favorable to the nominee.

Senator BYRD. We might as well put Mr. Rumsfeld to work and let him earn his salary.

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess now until 10 a.m. tomorrow morning. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, November 13, 1975.]



**NOMINATION OF DONALD RUMSFELD TO BE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1975

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room 1114 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John C. Stennis (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Stennis, Jackson, McIntyre, Byrd, of Virginia; Nunn, Hart of Colorado, Leahy, Thurmond, Tower, Scott, of Virginia; Taft, and Bartlett.

Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff director; W. Clark McFadden II, counsel; John T. Ticer, chief clerk; Phyllis A. Bacon, assistant chief clerk; Charles J. Conneely, Charles Cromwell, George H. Foster, Jr., John A. Goldsmith, Edward B. Kenney, Don L. Lynch, Francis J. Sullivan, professional staff members; Roberta Ujakovich, research assistant; Doris E. Connor, clerical assistant; and David A. Raymond, assistant to Senator Symington.

The CHAIRMAN. Our committee will please come to order.

I think, as a compliment to the nominee, that we had a good, solid line of questioning as I have ever heard for a nominee to this important position. That reflects the interest of the membership and the interest of the Congress and the people as a whole. We will continue today until every member of the committee has had a full opportunity to ask all the questions that they wish.

Those who have asked permission to insert questions in the record will be granted that request. But that implies that all insertions will come in promptly and be answered as soon as possible.

STATEMENT OF DONALD RUMSFELD—Resumed

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rumsfeld, you said you had an insertion you wanted to make.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I do, Mr. Chairman.

Yesterday during the questioning by Senator Culver, the Senator made reference to testimony that I had provided to the House Armed Services Committee. I believe that was in Brussels at NATO Headquarters on March 4, 1974.

I have subsequently familiarized myself with the statement I made. In contact with Senator Culver's office he suggested that it would be from his standpoint perfectly all right if I inserted the statement in the record.

(81)



I don't recall the specific way that Senator Culver phrased the question. But the general context of his question came during a discussion of détente. His quote of me seemed to indicate that my statement related to détente. As I read the record, my response related more to peace. I would like to read the comment I made during a discussion on troop levels in Europe. What I said was as follows in part: "In the past the numbers"—referring to levels of troops in Europe—"have changed substantially. We are locked in, what we would be locked into is a desire to maintain a sufficient deterrent—that is, to avoid injecting instability into what appears to be, and has been, and what we want to continue to be a stable situation. We want to avoid injecting an instability into this. One of the ways to inject an instability during the period of mutual balance force reduction talks would be to have a unilateral reduction. Does avoiding that mean we are harming or hampering U.S. foreign policy? On the contrary, it means we are succeeding. If our goal is to improve relationships with the Soviet Union by the various negotiations, the only way you can describe what has been going on is by success. One should say, hosanna, hosanna, we have wanted peace, and we have had it. We have wanted an adequate deterrent and we have had it.

"At the same time we have achieved that adequate deterrent, we wanted to create an atmosphere where we could begin to talk in MBFR and SALT. We wanted to do this at this point in history so that we could act in our interest to begin reductions."

That is the sense of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for that contribution.

The Chair wants to recognize Senator Jackson, and to commend him for his part—and I know it was substantial—in getting down to an agreement by the conferees in reference to an energy bill that I look forward to getting into and getting on the floor.

I want to mention, too, that Senator Thurmond was represented here yestreday with his questions, and he just couldn't be in attendance as he had to be in South Carolina. However, he is back this morning. He is very faithful about attending our committee sessions.

Senator Jackson, by prearrangement, we agreed when you couldn't come away from that conference yesterday afternoon that you would be recognized when we convened. And right afterward I will recognize the Senator from South Carolina, who did not have a chance to be here yesterday.

Senator Jackson.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I will be brief this morning. I regret that I could not be here all day yesterday and had to leave. We were in continuous session until almost 9 o'clock last night when we signed off to a final conference report on energy. This was the fifth week, and it involved one-fourth of the Senate as conferees, 25 Senators on one side, and 7 on the House. And they do vote separately, we do not try to outvote the House.

Being Chairman on the Senate side, I had to stay through all of it, and that is the reason I could not be here yesterday afternoon.

Mr. Chairman, out of order I would like to submit at this time a committee resolution with reference to the outgoing Secretary of Defense that reads as follows, I will ask that it be placed in the record and voted upon at the appropriate time.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.



Senator JACKSON [reading]. Resolved: That the Committee on Armed Services commends Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger for his excellence in office, his intellectual honesty and personal integrity, and for his courage and independence. The Committee believes that our country and the free world owe a great debt of gratitude to Secretary Schlesinger for his untiring effort to improve the efficiency of our armed forces, the cohesiveness of our alliances, the wisdom of our strategic policies and doctrine, and for his determination to convey to the American people the truth as he saw it and the sense of the future he so deeply believed they must understand.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We will have it here on the table for the information of the members here. And a lot of sentiment yesterday was expressed by the committee members in appreciation of the services of the former Secretary. But we will come back to that later. Now we will recognize you for questions.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Rumsfeld, your predecessors, Mr. Laird and Mr. Schlesinger were not present at crucial meetings, including summit meetings, at which decisions and agreements relating to SALT were made. As Secretary of Defense, would you insist on being present, along with Secretary Kissinger, at summit and other high level negotiating sessions involving SALT and other matters relevant to the Department of Defense?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator Jackson, I would like to respond to that in this way. When one thinks of those negotiations, I suppose they could be categorized in three ways: One, the ongoing negotiations in Geneva, which I understood was part of your question?

Senator JACKSON. That is right.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Each of the elements of Government are represented. A second would be those meetings that would involve the President of the United States.

A third category would be meetings that do not take place in Geneva, and do not involve the President of the United States. There have been some meetings, as you know, that fit that category.

This question has been raised to me. I have discussed it with the President in recent days. And he is very much in agreement that it would be appropriate to have a representative of the Department of Defense leaving open the question of the level, depending on the circumstances, attend the category of meetings that I described in the third class. It seems to me that at Presidential level meetings, head of government level meetings, the heads of government pretty much determine who is going to be physically there. That is understandable. My response to you is, I am sensitive to the point you are raising. I have discussed it with the President. I think that there probably are ways to improve the representation of the Department of Defense. And without thinking that I could, at this time, prescribe exactly how it would be in each instance, I do feel it is desirable to have such representation.

Senator JACKSON. You feel it is desirable?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. I am glad to hear you say it. I am asking this for what I believe is the country's interest to try to elevate the proper and traditional role of the Secretary of Defense. I wouldn't suggest it as an arbitrary matter just to have precedence. But I am basing it on history. And Grechko was everywhere in Moscow, at the 1972 Conference, at the summit. Mel Laird never left Washington. And mistakes were made. Subsequently changes were made of great sig-



nificance. Some of them we didn't find out until 2 years later, so that when Mel Laird was up testifying he didn't even know about them. You know about that. I am talking now about the exchange of letters between Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Dobrynin with reference to the G-class submarines, and the exchange of letters between President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev in which Mr. Nixon assured Mr. Brezhnev that we would not construct more than 41 submarines, although we were permitted, as you recall, under the SALT Interim Agreement, to do so. Things happen at the summit, no matter what is done in the earlier negotiating process where representatives of the Department of Defense participate in that process, I feel very strongly that certainly you, along with your technical advisors—should be present and available. And that did not happen at Vladivostok, and it did not happen in Moscow. And I just think that you can help the President in making sure of his final decisions. There is no substitute for that.

Mr. RUMSFELD. If I could amplify a bit, Senator.

Without in any way qualifying what was said earlier, the nature of life is that things happen over a period of time, in a variety of different ways, sometimes orally, and sometimes in writing, as you suggested. And I don't know that it is possible, and in my management experience I would suggest it has not been possible, to design procedural arrangements or formula that guarantee the healthy kind of exchange and the assurance of a balance of viewpoints that really is the essence of what you are going toward in your question. In the broader sense, it takes a real desire and sensitivity on the part of the participants involved to try to achieve that. I would say that in my discussions with the President, and in my observation of Presidential decisionmaking, quite apart from SALT, there is no question but that this President is interested in having that occur. He has indicated on television his interest in adjusting his organizational arrangements and procedural arrangements in a way so that he feels that that is occurring. And that has met with approval by all the participants. So I guess I am really going beyond—I think it takes a certain mind set, a frame of mind in approach, as well as certain procedural arrangements.

Senator JACKSON. All of this really gets down to the style of the President, you can't formalize, that is what you are saying?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes sir.

Senator JACKSON. But the logic is overwhelming, it seems to me, that when you are at the summit dealing with strategic arms, or perhaps an aspect of MBFR, you should be present. You have a great responsibility to carry out, an awesome one. And I think it would be tragic if you were not available at crucial meetings and especially summit meetings. You don't have to be into every aspect and detail of the negotiations and discussions, but you should be present so that when they are focusing on last minute changes the President can have you at his side. The history of the summits is that what happens in the last 48 hours may fundamentally shape the agreement. And I am trying to elevate this Office of Secretary of Defense to its proper role. And it ought to be at least as significant a role as the Secretary of State on these matters. Don't you feel that way?



Mr. RUMSFELD. I think I would describe it slightly differently. When one looks at Presidential decisionmaking in this area, it is quite proper, as you suggest, that the buck stops with the President. It is his responsibility for those final decisions. How he arranges that process really is in many respects a personal matter. He does need a negotiator, and there is no question but what the Secretary of Defense is not that individual. I fully agree with you that a President needs to have in a full and timely way the advice of counsel that would flow from the Department of Defense on a subject of this kind. And I believe that the efforts should be to arrange it so that the President is in a position, when he makes those judgments, to, in fact, have his negotiator or his personal representative in the person of the Secretary of State before him, and, in addition that he has that knowledge, competence, representation, and perspective in viewpoint that would come from the Department of Defense.

Senator JACKSON. At the 1972 summit meeting, Mr. Grechko was everywhere. And as you know, he was elevated from his military role to also Defense Minister. All I am trying to emphasize is that I think you should be there. And you use all of your persuasive influence—the rumors are that you have considerable influence with the President—to have him understand what your contribution can be and how important it is on these last minute decisions? When they get right down to it at a summit meeting, things fall all over the lot, and they happen. And I point out to you again that the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Chief Negotiator, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were unaware of agreements that had been made—and entered into at that summit meeting.

Senator THURMOND. Senator Jackson, the Judiciary Committee meets at 10:30 on the New York Bankruptcy law. I wonder if you could give me a half a minute?

Senator JACKSON. All right, I will defer.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman yield to the gentleman from South Carolina?

Senator JACKSON. I yield.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Senator Johnson.

Mr. Rumsfeld, I had to be in South Carolina yesterday, and I left some questions to be asked for the record. And I guess you are doing that?

Mr. RUMSFELD. They are being prepared.*

Senator THURMOND. I just want to say that I was a strong supporter of Dr. Schlesinger. I thought he was an excellent Secretary of Defense, and I have said that publicly, and I have said it to the President. But, it was the President's decision and he made that decision, and he has nominated you. You have a fine record in the Congress, as Ambassador to NATO, and other positions, and also as Assistant to the President, to be more accurate from a practical standpoint. And in view of your fine record that you do have serving the public, and in view of your wide knowledge of defense matters and security questions, it would be my pleasure to support you.

I have this other meeting, and so I will have to go. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator Thurmond. Do you have any extra questions?

*See p. 14.



Senator THURMOND. I don't have any additional questions.

The CHAIRMAN. We have your questions in the record from yesterday. We are glad that you could come this morning. And we will be glad to have you come back when you can.

All right, Senator Jackson.

Senator JACKSON. I think Mr. Rumsfeld had something he wanted to add.

Mr. RUMSFELD. There is one other thought. I am sensitive to the importance of this. I don't have the detailed knowledge of the negotiating background of previous SALT discussions. But one other comment might be useful. One of the things the President indicated in a recent press conference, if I am not mistaken, was that he wanted to see that there was a continuous interaction between the two Departments and the President. It is my understanding that he does plan to meet three, four, or five times a week with both or one of those two Cabinet officers. I mention this because as you know from conference committees, Senator Jackson, at the last minute things can shift. And I think—

Senator JACKSON. People get anxious and they set themselves a deadline. And that is the one thing we can't have in these critical East-West negotiations. And I was delighted, and I commend President Ford, for knocking down that nonsense about a deadline, that we must have a SALT II agreement by such and such a date. Setting a deadline just plays right into the hands of the adversary. I was pleased, and I commend the President on this. You tell him that I said so. I want to see a little bipartisanship here.

Mr. RUMSFELD. One of the best ways to see that there is a mutual sensitivity as to the other perspectives, views, and approaches is a continuous interchange. I think that will be enhanced by the arrangements that the President has proposed. I am not going to sit here and suggest that procedures are going to solve problems. They will not. But the President is taking steps in this area, I know Secretary Kissinger agrees, and certainly I agree.

Senator JACKSON. We don't have to formalize these things. The machinery is available to the President. And how he uses it is up to him. It depends on his style. The National Security Council is not new. It started in George Washington's time, I assume, when he called in the Secretary of War and the Secretary of State and said, gentlemen, what should our policy be? Well, there was your first National Security Council, not formalized. I think there is a danger in too much formalization.

And that leads me to a question here which you brought me your comments that the President would bring you in with the Secretary of State. An option paper—that is one of the new code words here for the latest bureaucratic windmill—may be fine. But there is a vast difference between submitting an option paper and expressing convictions as the Secretary of Defense. I would want to see a paper followed up with personal articulation in front of the President with the Secretary of State present. I think that is of critical importance. Just sending over, you know, papers, papers is not what I am talking about. It is more important—the President's time is limited—that you as Secretary of Defense have the opportunity, especially when the Secretary of State is present, to argue and to



articulate the main points—do I make myself clear? You know that in the bureaucratic process there are scads of option papers and briefs, and so on. But that is not a substitute for your presence as the responsible Secretary of Defense. I think the President has great respect for you. It is not that a President should follow one line or the other.

I just believe that in the long run the good ideas win over the bad ideas. And I think you have that ability or I wouldn't be pushing you on this. Because the ball game can be lost in the paper process. It is your presence that counts—along with the Secretary of State—not in all cases—before the President. And you are a key element of the national security process. The Secretary of State plays an important role. But when you get into strategic weapons, you should know more about it, and your people, then does the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense are advisers to the President. And what advice he gets is going to determine, I think, whether wise decisions are made.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I certainly agree that in exceedingly important matters, such as the one you are talking about, it is useful to have both the written word, so that one can be reasonably sure that a subject has been rigorously analyzed, but also the spoken word, to sort through the complexities of those issues. Both complement each other.

Senator JACKSON. And then you can follow up your discussion with a confirming paper, because we all like to have a piece of paper that we can mull over. But there is no substitute for advocacy in the presence of the President. That was true in George Washington's time and has been the case right down to the present. And this is the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State—and in some instances, of course, depending upon what the issue is, the head of the CIA when there is a specific problem about which he is knowledgeable.

Now, in this same area, trying to find out what is going on, for more than 6 months I have been asking Secretary Kissinger to appear before my Arms Control Subcommittee to testify about Soviet compliance with the SALT I agreements. He has refused to testify. Will you assure the committee that you will make yourself available to testify whenever issues within your area of responsibility arise? I am sure I know the answer.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes. That question was posed to me by the chairman yesterday morning, and we discussed that. And I indicated that I of course would be available, and I couldn't envisage situations where I would not be, and I would envisage—

Senator JACKSON. If you were not you would give a good reason.

Mr. RUMSFELD. That is right. I would also hope to be able to assist in seeing that the proper Defense Department witnesses are available in specific areas.

Senator JACKSON. Let me just say that the Secretary of Defense has testified, and the head of the CIA has testified on issues of Soviet compliance with the SALT I agreements. And it does involve some pretty rough problems for the Secretary of State. But no matter how rough they are I expect Cabinet officers to be present when requested by the responsible committees.

I have had my differences with Secretary Kissinger, but I respect the office. And I want of course to see that the hearing is fair. But



we have some unresolved issues on SALT I. And there are some very strong differing views between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. Some of it has appeared in the press, regarding what went on in SALT I.

The chickens are coming home to roost. I've been through these problems before. We have had a Secretary of State coming up to testify, and the Secretary of Defense coming up to testify, and the chief negotiator and the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testify, saying that all the documents relevant to SALT I have been presented to the Congress, and you find out later that they did tell the truth, but they were never told that there were others. You would agree that that is not a full disclosure to the Congress?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator, I like to try to stick to things that I know I know.

Senator JACKSON. Well, will you look that one up and report back?

Mr. RUMSFELD. And I find in this area that there are some things that I am told and some things I may think I know. But I want you to know that I have not met with the U.S. representatives on the standing Consultative Committee, and I have not talked to Alex since I have been nominated for this job, and I have not had a chance to talk to the CIA about alleged violations. This is one of the areas where I know I don't know, and I want you to know that.

Senator JACKSON. I am just talking about forthrightness and a full disclosure to the Congress when an agreement comes up which we have to approve, and we are assured that these are all the documents, these are all the understandings. You have got to be careful when asking Dr. Kissinger certain questions. If you ask him, are there understandings, he will say that there are no commitments. And of course that is not responsive.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I see your point.

Senator JACKSON. I don't want to be unfair to them. The witnesses I mentioned told the truth. But they were not given the facts. And these were relevant matters, because it did affect the understandings in SALT I.

Now, this secrecy business is an obsession, to the extent that you don't even inform your own Cabinet people. What I am telling you is the truth, because I have the sworn testimony of Dr. Kissinger. And I will be glad to let you see the transcript, so that you understand what happened. And I don't want to see such a situation repeated. And the Secretary of Defense, Mel Laird, was just mistreated, I mean the matter was withheld from him. I think it is outrageous. The same thing with Bill Rogers and the other witnesses.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Let me put it this way. Without suggesting any knowledge on my part of the circumstances you are describing, because I lack knowledge—

Senator JACKSON. I will get you that information and let us have your comments.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I will comment on procedures right now. As far as the future situation, I have every impression from the President that I will be fully involved.

No. 2, I can assure you and this committee that I will be very precise in saying what I say, and that the extent of my knowledge will be known to you, that is to say, I will not—



Senator JACKSON. I knew the extent of their knowledge. They gave everything they knew. But material was withheld. How are you going to handle that?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Well, I have every reason to believe, as I indicated, that the President will have me fully involved.

Senator JACKSON. I want you to know what has happened in the past. That is important to know, isn't it?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I will interest myself in that.

Senator JACKSON. I will make it available, you can read it, and it is sworn testimony, and it is there. And I would like to have your comments on it. And I would like to have that reported back, Mr. Rumsfeld, to the committee.

Mr. RUMSFELD. That would take a considerable amount of time, I think.

Senator JACKSON. It wouldn't take long. We will make the transcript available, and you can read it.

Mr. RUMSFELD. You are not suggesting that I would want to talk to the individuals involved?

Senator JACKSON. Oh, no, we have got the sworn testimony, it is an admission; Dr. Kissinger admits that those documents were withheld. If you want to go around you can interview him.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I can comment on that right now. To the extent that someone indicated there were important matters that they weren't aware of, I can assure you I feel the Secretary of Defense should be aware of such matters.

Senator JACKSON. It misled not only the Secretary of Defense but it misled the Congress of the United States, that is my point here.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I see your point. In a hypothetical situation, to the extent an individual testified before your committee, assuming he has knowledge, when in fact he lacks knowledge, you are quite right, that leaves the committee with a misimpression.

Senator JACKSON. Well, I think we can sum it all up by saying that there is a lesson to be learned from this, and that is that you will get—and I am sure you will—the assurances that whatever is brought up here, that this is all that is involved, and there have been no other agreements, understandings, or commitments. Because you see, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is unavailable to us, we couldn't ask him these questions. And you will do that?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me see that the Chair understands what the situation is. Do I understand, gentlemen, that you have concluded your discussion on that subject without involving any more action by Mr. Rumsfeld?

Senator JACKSON. This doesn't have to be in connection with the nomination. I would just like to have him read the transcript and see it, and I would like to have his comments—as he would view it as Secretary of Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand, then, that this is beyond the hearing, that it is not necessary to get that into the hearings?

Senator JACKSON. It is not a condition precedent to action by the committee. He has indicated his views. But I would like to have his comments on this. And I think he should know about it.



The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Do you understand, Mr. Rumsfeld, that you are to look over this testimony and indicate back to us such responses as you may have?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But we will not have to hold the record open for it?

Senator JACKSON. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, yes, we will proceed now and give the others a chance to ask questions.

First, Senator McIntyre was here and wanted to insert questions for the record from Senator Muskie to be answered.*

We will have to get the questions, because we apparently are getting down to the end of the hearing.

Gentlemen, I believe Senator Bartlett came in next.

Have you had a chance to ask any questions, Senator Bartlett?

Senator BARTLETT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think under the circumstances we should give Senator Bartlett an opportunity, and then Senator Nunn would be next, followed by Senator Hart. We will hear Senator Bartlett now. For the time being, let's conform as near as we can to the 10-minute rule.

Senator BARTLETT. Mr. Rumsfeld, Secretary Schlesinger made statements recently in support of South Korea. Do you endorse those statements, and could you elaborate your feelings about the American support of South Korea?

Mr. RUMSFELD. In the interest of precision, I am always a little reluctant to endorse things in the blind. And so let me narrow it a bit.

I have read Secretary Schlesinger's statements, that were in the February posture statement, concerning South Korea; I am familiar with them. I do agree with them. What other statements he may have made could have been anything. I would assume so, but without reading it, I wouldn't want to say.

Senator BARTLETT. Could you give your own appraisal?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I have no disagreement whatsoever with the situation as he stated it in the February 5 posture statement concerning the circumstances there and concerning the U.S. role there.

Senator BARTLETT. Mr. Rumsfeld, do you favor Japan increasing its tactical military forces and strength in order to assume the greater role—the greater share of military balance of power in Southeast Asia?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator, I was involved with Japan as one of the cofounders, in a sense, of the Japanese-American Parliamentary Union some 10 years ago. I have not in the last 3 years been very deeply involved with Japan. The question you ask certainly is an appropriate question for a sitting Secretary of Defense. But it also has foreign policy implications. I have not familiarized myself with Secretary Schlesinger's recent discussions with the appropriate Japanese officials. I don't know the status of those discussions.

I have personal views, but I would be reluctant to put them forth in this setting, in view of the foreign policy implications.

Senator BARTLETT. Mr. Rumsfeld, the Senate Appropriations Committee will be bringing up a bill before the Senate, perhaps today, or in the next day or so, with \$90.78 billion in appropriations, including

* See Senator Muskie's question, p. 104.



R. & D. operations and manpower. Do you consider this amount adequate to meet the defense needs of this Nation?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator, yesterday I indicated my views on that subject by saying that I had read and agree with the letter that Secretary Schlesinger sent to Senator McClellan. I don't have that with me, and I forget the date of it. But you are familiar with the letter, of course. In view of my involvement in this hearing, I have not been able to follow in detail the progress of the conference and the work of the Senate on that bill. And I therefore would like to stick with what I indicated, that as I recall, it was a \$2.55 billion request over that preliminary action, which Secretary Schlesinger indicated he felt was necessary and desirable. That would be my view.

Senator BARTLETT. Mr. Rumsfeld, what is your view on the American presence in the Indian Ocean?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator, that is a part of the world that I have not been involved with. And I am aware of the debate that has taken place over at least the last 2 years. I have read the various proposed responses that have been prepared for me by individuals from various branches of Government. Just to be perfectly honest. I am inclined in this instance to immerse myself in the subject at some point soon and make my own judgments, but I have not done so.

Senator BARTLETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Rumsfeld.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Nunn is next. We are glad you could be here this morning, Senator.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

First, Mr. Rumsfeld, I want to echo what Senator Jackson said. I have a great deal of concern about the Defense Department not having been kept informed on many crucial negotiations in the last several years. I won't repeat what he said, but I did have considerable discussions with Secretary Kissinger in a closed session about the recently concluded Middle East agreements, and the Defense Department could not even find out what had taken place until he got back home with the agreement in his pocket. And I think that is a very, very bad way to conduct foreign policy, because the Defense Department does have, I think, a role to play, particularly when you are discussing weapons systems and a shopping list relating to foreign military sales. So without asking you a question, I would just like to join Senator Jackson in hoping that you will be very vigorous in making certain that the role of the Defense Department is properly presented in these kinds of deliberations. Is that your view?

Mr. RUMSFELD. As I indicated to the Senator, it is not only my view, but as I understand it, it is the President's view, that he would like a close working relationship between himself and between those departments so that the various interests and perspectives and views—and there are inevitably going to be differences—are in fact brought before him in an orderly and timely manner.

Senator NUNN. Pursuing Senator Bartlett's question on South Korea, in this year's authorization report this committee requested that the Department of Defense prepare a study and have it presented to this committee by December 3, 1975. I assume that study is



taking place now. But in that study would be an examination of our post-Vietnam posture in the Pacific, including Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, and other locations, and also more particularly in South Korea. The mandated language in this particular authorization report states—and I read this to you because I think it is something that needs your personal attention—

Therefore, as part of the overall Pacific basin study the committee requested the Department of Defense to do an in-depth study of our military posture in Korea and alternatives to the current posture. Among the alternatives that should be examined one would be that, (A) improves United States and South Korean tactical air capabilities, (B) provides military assistance to the South Korean Armed Forces, mainly ammunition and parts, and (C) enhances the South Korean production base so that it can provide more of its own military capabilities, and (D) examined various U.S. ground force levels in Korea.

I think our committee took that language very seriously, and I would hope that you would be able to give this report, which is due very shortly, your own personal attention after you have been confirmed, which I am sure you will.

MR. RUMSFELD. I will do so, Senator.

Senator NUNN. One other question—and this is more of a theoretical issue, but I think it has great practical significance—as to whether the role of the Secretary of Defense vis-a-vis the services in terms of program review is one of helping to shape the programs that come up to your level of decisionmaking, or whether you are the final judge of those programs, but you have no role in shaping them. And by that I mean procurement decisions and all the other very important decisions, including the weapons system. Do you consider your role as Secretary of Defense to be the final judge, or do you intend to play an active role as the decisions work their way through the services?

MR. RUMSFELD. That is indeed a philosophical question. It strikes me that in practice in life one who has responsibility for final decisions inevitably, if he wishes to have any product at all, becomes involved along the way. The alternative would be to sit back in your chair and wait until things that are unacceptable to you come forward, and reject them and reject them and reject them. It strikes me that the very concept of the Department of Defense and civilian control, and the final responsibility for making recommendations to the President, inherently requires a degree of involvement along the way. I don't know how it could be otherwise.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Rumsfeld. I certainly intend to support your nomination. But at this point I don't have any further questions.

Senator JACKSON [presiding]. Senator Hart.

Senator HART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Rumsfeld, as I am sure you and all the rest of us are aware, there has been a lot of controversy recently about relationships between officials, civilian and military, in the Pentagon, as far as contractors with the Government. I am sure if I would ask the general question of your feeling about this there would be sin and corruption. Let me try to be specific as possible about your feeling on the matter. Would you present as Secretary of Defense to institute a thorough investigation, review of the gratuities that any officials in the Pentagon may



have received from the Defense contractors and take appropriate steps depending on the results of that investigation?

Mr. RUMSFELD. You come at that backwards. Obviously at the conclusion of any investigation where there is indication that something is awry, I would indeed take appropriate steps. As to whether or not the situation exists or will exist at that point after I am confirmed, if I am, so that such an investigation is desirable, that I would have to determine then. I don't know the situation over there. If one is needed, obviously I would see that one is begun. My estimate would be that they are unquestionably doing it now, to the extent that problems have come up. My assumption would be, I would say, although without knowledge, that the Department of Defense very likely is looking into that already. If so, it would be a matter of determining what it is that they are doing, to what extent there is reason to believe something is wrong. To the extent that I am not satisfied with that I would change it. To the extent I am, I would urge it on and draw conclusions at the completion of an investigation.

Senator HART. I am sure you have read considerable about the newspaper accounts in this area.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I find in managing something it is very difficult to try to manage it off of what you read in the newspapers.

Senator HART. I understand. But for many of us that is one of the best sources of information we have.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Sure.

Senator HART. There are reports from some of these sources that there are practices that have been going back for a number of years, apparently without a thorough investigation going on in the Department. I am trying to get at what your attitude is about what I would think would be too close a relationship between officials in your future Department and the people they do business with theoretically at arm's length.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Well, my attitude in a broad sense—and I guess that is ultimately where you would have to combat it—is that everywhere I have ever worked, whether it is in my personal office as a Congressman, the Cost of Living Council, or the White House, I have at the outset reviewed the arrangements and procedures involving possible wrongdoing or perception of wrongdoing and tried to do two things: One, to see that the procedures and rules and arrangements were reasonably sensible; and, second, try to establish a process whereby the individuals involved were periodically reminded. When human beings are involved things can go wrong. You can have the best rules in the world and you can't guarantee that someone won't do something that they ought not to do. So it takes vigilance.

I have never made promises of 100 percent achievement on these things, because one is always disappointed if something does happen. All I can say is that I share your interest in the area. I think it is particularly important for those of us involved in government, at all levels, and in all three branches of the Government, to recognize that our success and the success of this country depends upon the confidence of the American people. We, as individuals and collectively, have to do our utmost to see that we merit that confidence, and that we sustain it over a period of time.



Senator HART. A large part of the American people I represent think there is much too close a relationship between the Pentagon and the people they do business with, particularly concerning the amount of dollars involved, recognizing the frailty of human nature, would be prepared to institute certain rules that would require, let's say, officials in your Department to report publicly the contact they have had with lobbyists for Defense contractors.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I would want to study it. I know that there has been experimentation with that approach in some State governments in some regulatory agencies. I have discussed this with various people from the standpoint of various elements of the Federal Government in recent months. I can certainly say that to the extent that they are not already in being, I would institute what I felt to be appropriate rules.

Senator HART. That is, appropriate in—

Mr. RUMSFELD. Beauty is in the eye of the beholder. In the last analysis it comes down to matters of judgment as to whether someone would describe something as strict or not. I think my background and the record suggests that I am interested in this area and attentive to it. I would be foolhardy to suggest that I am sufficiently acquainted with the Department of Defense and the problems that may or may not exist there so that I could in the blanket statement say I would do this and this. I can't do it.

Senator HART. I am talking about human nature. I think we are all sufficiently familiar with human nature to know what strict rules are. That is why laws are passed, and that is why we try to define areas. I think it is an area that doesn't need to be fuzzy or judgmental, I think it can be crystal clear, black and white. I think it can be this way on the subject of conflict of interest in dealing with Defense contractors. I don't think it is a question of recent stories in the newspapers. I believe it is a question of a pattern of conduct over the years. I think it included leaving the Department and going to work for some of these contractors and some of these businesses. And I think it is a question of not strict enforcement of the conflict-of-interest laws that are in the books. And I think it is an area that, frankly, a lot of us in the Congress and in positions of Administration ought to be a little more outraged about and concerned about and say, this is one of the problems that we are going to have to deal with when we take over the Department.

Let me ask you a related question.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator, I don't want your last comment to suggest that I have in any way suggested that this is not an important matter. I know it is. I recognize it. I guess if we differ on this it is in our respective impressions as to the ease of developing rules that solve these problems. I have tried to do it in the past. I find that it is difficult, that it is not simple, that it is not black and white. Were it as simple as some suggest, I would submit that we would not be having these problems today at any level of government, in any agency. We have them. And we have to worry about them. And we have to do things to correct them. And I intend to. But I can't spell it out for you right now.

Senator HART. But you would agree that the attitude at the top is that there is going to be arm's length dealing on matters that in-



volve expenditure of public funds, that that attitude is going to have a great deal to do with performance of people below?

Mr. RUMSFELD. There is no question but that the tone, the set at the top, and the vigilance that is established there does in fact contribute or fail to contribute to what actually occurs.

Senator HART. That is what I am talking about.

I also discovered, after assuming office, that there was a law on the books that has never been, to my judgment, enforced, that prevents lobbying by people in the administration or the use of public funds or persuasion of votes. As far as I am able to tell, there has never been a prosecution under that law. As I read the law, it is fairly strict. It says, you can't use any public money. I assume that means your own time, I assume that means your stationery, your telephone, or your car, to influence the way we vote on this. Yet I know that your predecessor and many of his subordinates are on the phone almost daily with members of this committee and Members of the Congress urging us to vote one way or another. Now, that law either means what it says or it should be taken from the books. It is that kind of a failure to enforce that I think has caused a great deal of this kind of failure that disturbs the public confidence. What is your feeling on the issue of actually lobbying the Congress to get what you want.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I am familiar with the law. In the past, there have been not, to my knowledge, suits filed. There have been statements by Members of Congress on the floor of the Congress alleging that the conduct on the part of a certain executive official, in the judgment of that individual, did not conform to that statute. I have thought about it a good deal over a period of years, and I quite agree with you, that laws in general either ought to be enforced or changed, so that they are realistic.

This committee is about to vote on my confirmation at some point. I am here at the taxpayers' expense—

Senator HART. At the request of the committee.

Mr. RUMSFELD. That is right. But needless to say, my effort here is not to dissuade you from voting for me, but one would hope that it is to encourage it. That happens with testimony, it happens with phone calls, it happens with the stationery, it happens in a hundred different ways every day. To try to draw the line between informing, responding—and to use the word that you took, I presume, from the statute, or some description, lobbying—and saying one is lawful and one is unlawful, is just an incredible complex problem.

Senator HART. It is not when you look at the question from the standpoint of who initiated it. If one of the members of this committee calls you up and says, Mr. Secretary, how strongly do you feel about passing this appropriation, we feel extremely strongly, we think the defense of the Nation is involved and we certainly hope you pass it, I don't think it is lobbying. If you pick up the phone and say, we have to have this money or the security of the country is going down the drain, I think that is lobbying.

Mr. RUMSFELD. And your suggestion would be that an official in the executive branch, because of this law, who felt deeply that it was important to the country that the Congress be made aware of the facts surrounding an issue they were about to act on, should not pick



up the phone and make an individual or individuals aware of his sense of these facts, that that would be a violation of law? I think not.

Senator HART. I think if you haven't had a chance to present your views to the committee or the Congress, yes, I think there is a serious problem there.

Mr. RUMSFELD. There is a very serious problem.

Senator HART. But, in the limited time I have been on the Hill, I don't think any Secretary of Defense has been deprived of the opportunity to present his views to the members of this committee or the Congress.

Mr. RUMSFELD. It goes to the question that Senator Jackson and I were talking about earlier. Frequently it is a matter of providing it in a timely way. And of the 535 Members of the Congress who have to act on each matter involving, for example, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice or whatever, very few of those Members have the opportunity to come in and be intimately acquainted with each aspect to each bill that comes before them.

Senator HART. That is their responsibility.

Mr. RUMSFELD. That is a judgment you are making. I am not sure I agree. I think that it also falls to an official in the executive branch who has a degree of responsibility to see that Members of the Congress who have a statutory responsibility for acting on these things do in fact have available to them the information he feels is important with respect to those matters. And that might involve the sending of a letter saying, here is the situation as I see it—

Senator HART. Does it involve picking up the phone when the bill is on the floor and saying, I want your vote on this?

Mr. RUMSFELD. As a former Member of Congress, my impression of that is that the correction may not be so much in the law as it is in a natural set of correcting mechanisms that exist. If a person does that very often, in the wrong way, he will dissuade people from voting for views that he feels are sensible, rather than encouraging it. I am not a lawyer. I am not in a position to say that that would or would not violate the law. But I agree with you, that law is there, and it is a tremendous problem for people in the executive branch, because it is not self-executing or clear. It doesn't say you can do this and you can't do that. It is blurred, gray, fuzzy, difficult. And in my various capacities in Government, I have on a number of occasions cautioned people who work for me about it and tried to see that the phraseology in letters or calls was a certain way. I have seen instances in Government where people sensitive to that may have recognized that one factor in it might be who's the initiator, and as such called a friend in the Congress and said, look, ask me to send you this, you ought to know it. Now, that is circumvention.

Senator HART. It sure is.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I don't know the answer. It is a problem.

Senator HART. I am over my time. But I just want to say that I think there is elaborate opportunity for the Defense Department or any other agency of the Government to present its views and make the fact available to the Members of the Congress. I think every Member of the Congress is intelligent enough, and if you then don't understand the facts or want additional information, to contact that agency and find it out. I deplore any member of any agency calling up



a Member of the Congress when a bill is on the floor, urging their support for it. I think it is a violation of law.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RUMSFELD. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Briefly, I hope.

Mr. RUMSFELD. What would you say to the idea of a department head calling up a Member of Congress and asking him if he would like to be briefed on something?

Senator HART. I think that is fine.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I see.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me comment just a moment on this. My view is somewhat different from that of the Senator from Colorado. Over the years, I think that the Secretary of Defense or someone speaking for him ought to have the freedom of calling a Senator and telling him how he feels about a matter. If he feels strong enough to call him, I think he is within his right and duties to do that. Now, yesterday we were all complimentary of Mr. Schlesinger. And one of the reasons I was complimentary of him was, he seemed to be so circumspect about what he said to me as chairman of the committee as to whether or not he had a hardnose for a certain item. When he said that, I gave a lot of weight to what he said. It was up to me to judge what he said the best I could, to go against it or with it. However, I judged him. And I called him up on some things. They don't call me much, and I don't call them a lot, but I don't think we should shut them off.

I just feel compelled to say that because that is based on my experience.

I emphasize that he was very circumspect, and that was one thing I appreciated about Mr. Schlesinger. I called him and told him the thing was down to making a choice between two ships, we will say, one had to go out of the bill if the other one stayed? Mr. Schlesinger was totally blunt with me in what he said. I just happened to recall that. It came up this year.

The Senator will remember those two ships. We left one out of the conference bill, and the Senate turned the other one down, too.

I thank the Senator. But I thought I should say that for the record.

Senator HART. With all due respect, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate what the Senator has said, but my view based on my own experience is that this is just too much lobby.

The CHAIRMAN. I get your point.

Senator Tower, any questions?

Senator TOWER. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That brings us to Senator Byrd from Virginia.

But I promised to let the Senator from Washington go on for a few more questions.

Senator JACKSON. I can finish up with two questions.

May I say on the lobbying issue, it was 24 hours a day almost on the energy bill. I never had so many calls from the Department in all my life, or their staff. I think the statute ought to be totally reviewed, because it is either workable or it isn't. And what is lobbying and what isn't I think needs to be defined.

Now, there are good lobbyists and there are bad lobbyists. I never worry about lobbyists. If you are not smart enough right here to be able to tell who is telling the truth or who isn't, you shouldn't be here.



That is my own personal view. But I think some of what Senator Hart is getting at does go over the line, and I treat it accordingly. I think something needs to be done about it, and I welcome him bringing it into this discussion. Because it is incredible what is going on up here on some of the bills we have. They interfere with your work and you can't get anything done. On the energy bill, for instance—it has happened in all administrations, but now we have open conferences. May I just say that when one from the Department is setting in on the conference and calls their downtown office and reports what somebody is doing, you can't get to the next section of the bill before you have got a view on it. It is a kind of a bureaucratic insecurity, I think, that takes place. I haven't hired a psychiatrist to get it diagnosed. I am getting off my subject. But it does get to the point where it interferes with the legislative process.

Senator NUNN. There is a lobbying bill pending, there are several bills pending in, I believe, the Government Operations Committee. This statute, I think, should be reviewed as part of that overall.

Senator JACKSON. I agree with you and I agree with Senator Gary Hart. It ought to be enforced or revised, because somebody can just bring it up on a technicality.

Senator NUNN. If they enforced it now you might as well put a chain-link fence around Washington, D.C., and put everybody in jail.

The CHAIRMAN. My remarks related to the men who are holding responsible positions and have responsibility on these matters like we do. I wasn't referring to the industrial people and so forth.

Senator SCOTT. If the chairman will yield, I would just like to comment on this colloquy that has been going on. Certainly I think the answer by the witness is that a little tact should be utilized in contacting the members. I would welcome suggestions from the Department of Defense, but I recall one instance where a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an attempt to influence my decision, indicated that I didn't understand the problem because I was going to vote differently from the way that he wanted me to vote. I don't want any more calls like that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator Jackson.

Senator JACKSON. I have two more questions here that I want to ask.

Many of us in Congress believe that we ought to press the Soviets to reduce strategic arms on both sides. I have made two proposals for mutual reductions that would lead in this direction. My most recent proposal outlined last April was that both countries should refrain from modernizing or replacing about a third of their strategic delivery systems. These weapons, about 800 on each side, could then be phased out. Secretary Kissinger has consistently opposed such an approach. My question to you is this. As Secretary of Defense, will you make a fresh and independent appraisal of this proposal and report back to the Armed Services Committee your findings?

Mr. RUMSFELD. I certainly will, Senator Jackson.

Senator JACKSON. I appreciate having that judgment. Unless we move in the direction of mutual reductions of strategic arms we have got serious problems. And I appreciate your comments.

This next question relates to your written answers on SALT, which I reviewed. I am of course interested in the decisionmaking process as



it relates to SALT and other delicate negotiations. So my question to you is this. Did Secretary Kissinger in any sense clear the answers you have provided to the committee?

Mr. RUMSFELD. No; he did not.

Senator JACKSON. He did not. Were these answers drafted in the Department of Defense and then reviewed by the State Department or the NSC?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Maybe rather than answering a certain question I can tell you how they were handled.

You supplied me those questions in your office. I took them back to my office and sat down and thought about them and made some preliminary notes as to the responses. I asked someone on my staff to contact the appropriate civilian individual in the Department of Defense to come over to my office. He came over to my office. We had a discussion on each question. And he then drafted some of his thoughts to respond to the questions, and left them with me.

I then took his suggestions and my own notes and talked to a military official from the Department of Defense about them. I then had them reviewed by an individual who is outside of the Government at the present time, and received his suggestions.

I then prepared final drafts of the responses. I then showed them to the National Security Council for their information and gave them a copy of them.

Senator JACKSON. They did not revise them?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Not to my recollection—maybe a word or two, but I doubt it.

Senator JACKSON. But no change of substance?

Mr. RUMSFELD. No.

Senator JACKSON. So it was all done within the Department of Defense, except as to the outside consultation?

Mr. RUMSFELD. No sir, that is not fair to the Department of Defense. To the extent anybody deserves any credit or blame it is Rumsfeld.

Senator JACKSON. Well, you are almost there, so—

Mr. RUMSFELD. For these answers. The proposed answers from the DOD that were in the question and answer blocks are different from those answers. I asked the Department for any thoughts that they had for questions that might be queried of me in these hearings. They sent over things, and some related in part. These were answers I developed.

Senator JACKSON. So the substance of it is Rumsfeld plus the input from people within Defense plus the outsider that you referred to; is that it, one, two, three?

Mr. RUMSFELD. That is correct.

Senator JACKSON. And then you did—

Mr. RUMSFELD. I showed it to Brent Scocroft, who has the responsibility for national security affairs in the White House. If he made any suggestions, they were minor.

Senator JACKSON. They were minor?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. That is all I want to know. I just want to be sure that the Department of Defense was involved in this, and that your answers were not finally determined by someone outside of the Department.



That is all, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to thank Mr. Rumsfeld for his responses. And of course he knows that none of the questions I have asked are based on any personality matter or differences as individuals, but only in the interest of really trying to maintain the solid foundations of a true bipartisan effort on which we as Republicans or Democrats over here can continue to build. It is a process that really had its genesis in Arthur Vandenberg's effort in the postwar period. Not that we don't disagree on matters. We can do that. But we laid down certain fundamental rules which I think can endure, and which the country expects of us, whether we are Republicans or Democrats. And it is out of that philosophy and conviction that I have asked these questions, and will continue to ask them. Because I think you and I as politicians will agree that there are times when the best politics is no politics.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrd, we about used up most of your time but if you have any questions that need to be asked, go ahead.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't believe I have any additional questions.

In regards to lobbying activity, I must say that I never had any problem with lobbyists. I think each Member of Congress can take care of that himself. I have no difficulty in saying no. And I have no objection to anyone calling me and presenting their views who want to do so. But I will make my own decision. What I do dislike and react against is the policy of the Defense Department in coming in at the last minute with amendments to add additional funds to the appropriations bill or the authorization bill. And that is an old custom. Probably the Department of Defense makes some headway in getting additional money that way. However, I think it is a bad practice. And as a matter of policy, I vote against all such proposals as that. I think if they are important to the national defense that they can be presented when the budget is presented, and then be presented at a reasonable time and not brought in at the last minute. I would hope that the Defense Department would reexamine its custom of coming in at the last minute and trying to slip in a few hundred million dollars here or \$50 million there or some such figure.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to heartily agree with the Senator from Virginia that the budget process is sound, and that is the way to present things to the Congress. I hope you will agree to that. There may be emergencies, but I hope that they are few and far between with you just as a general policy.

Senator Scott.

Senator SCOTT. Mr. Chairman. My comments will be very brief.

Mr. Rumsfeld, of course I am inclined to vote in favor of your confirmation and I believe the committee is also.

I would hesitate to ask in question form a number of matters that are in my mind. But you having been Ambassador to NATO, and I have spoken with you and I know your deep feelings with regard to the security of Western Europe. I would assume that regardless of your feeling on NATO and the security of Western Europe that your decisions would always be what is best for the United States of America regardless of Western Europe. As I say, I hesitate to put that in the



form of a question. I believe that would be true. Would you confirm that?

Mr. RUMSFELD. There is no question but that is correct. Our interests begin with the United States of America.

Senator SCOTT. And then spread out from there. And this would also be true with Israel or any other nation of the world.

Mr. RUMSFELD. That is correct. And it is also true on the part of any other nation of the world, that their interest begins with themselves.

Senator SCOTT. I thank you, Mr. Rumsfeld.

And that is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator TOWER. I have a brief comment, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. And then I am going to recognize Senator Leahy.

Senator TOWER. May I say that the paramount reason for the American presence in Western Europe is because we perceive it to be in our national interest to be there, and it is not for any altruistic reason that we are there or in the Mediterranean or anywhere else, because we perceive it to be in our own interest.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Absolutely. And the same thing is true of other allies. That is what makes the alliance strong and healthy. It is in the interest of all the participants.

Senator SCOTT. If the Senator will yield, might have been a slip of the tongue, but yesterday I heard the witness say that NATO was for the protection of Western Europe. It is my understanding that the NATO Treaty relates to North America as well as Western Europe. And that was not included in the statement that the distinguished witness made. And I have no doubt as to where his loyalty is.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Surely. The NATO Treaty is important for the defense of the United States as well as Western Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Leahy.

Senator LEAHY. Mr. Chairman, on that matter I know I have sent a number of written questions to Mr. Rumsfeld, and I assume some other members of the committee have. While I have some feel of what is going to happen on this particular nomination, I personally would like to see the answers to my written questions prior to the time Mr. Rumsfeld is voted on.

In answering those questions, Mr. Rumsfeld, the one that I feel very concerned about is the question which I asked to your concept of a limited nuclear war, something that we discussed yesterday. I get very concerned when I see coming from the Pentagon or anywhere else the great scenario of limited nuclear war, especially the NATO Pact versus the Warsaw Pact. At times there seems to be almost a feeling that after we have gone through whatever forces we have over there, that we will start tossing tactical warheads across the borders, and somehow the people will make the determination that this is only a tactical nuclear war and we will keep it limited. But I am not so sure how we signal that intention, or just how we signal our reaction when they toss back only a nice limited one on their side, and we toss one, and back and forth. After all, we only wipe out Czechoslovakia or they wipe out Chicago, so it is a limited exercise. I am very concerned about that. I cannot conceive of a situation where we start off using so-called



tactical nuclear weapons without escalating to the strategic nuclear weapons. There is such mammoth overkill potential between our two countries that I wonder if our children will exist at the same age as you and I are now. So I am particularly concerned about those questions.

There is one other question. We talked about the question of lobbying here today. Some members of your staff are aware of the fact that throughout the summer my office has been working on the number in the Defense Department involved in lobbying. The indication is now that the amount of money being spent is far in excess of what the budget indicates. The problem is the definition of what is or what is not lobbying. I proposed language in the new appropriations bill yesterday which would more clearly define that.

On the other hand, we have heard of improprieties involved in lobbying for the Defense Department, the goose hunting in Maryland, and so forth. Will there be regulations with you as Secretary of Defense whereby Pentagon officials will have to list gifts, contacts, free trips, and so forth, from defense contractors?

Mr. RUMSFELD. Senator, that question came up earlier with Senator Hart. And we had a philosophical discussion about it. I indicated to him that I would certainly review what procedures there are, that I am sensitive to the proposals that you are referring to. I have looked at them with respect to where they have been instituted elsewhere in Federal, State, and local government. I don't have any conclusions at this time, except to say that I am very anxious to see that that Department, and indeed all of the Government, operate in a way that merits and receives the confidence of the American people.

Senator LEAHY. The thing that bothers me is that I think the American people would have a lot more confidence in all areas of the Government if there was total disclosure of lobbying activities. I require everybody in my office to make a record when any lobbyist from any source approaches us. I think this is good. We should refuse all gifts. I am not raising the flag for us. I think all people in the Government should do so. But the most important thing is to make it public and let the public know exactly what is there.

If the public thinks it is fine for Defense officials to be spending millions and millions of dollars of the taxpayers money to go out and do something with Northrop, that is fine. They will say so. But they should know exactly what is going on. Or, if they think it is fine for Members of Congress to take junkets on corporate planes or whatever, or Defense Department officials, fine. But let's make that plain. And that covers all branches of Government.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Over the years, as a general rule, I have tended to feel that we would probably have more success by trying to correct problems through disclosure, as you are suggesting, than we will through trying to set specific statutory prohibitions. I find that the latter tend to lend themselves to circumvention, whereas disclosure does, in fact, leave for others the ability to make those judgments. So, as a general principle, that tends to be my view.

Senator LEAHY. One last think. I was in Vermont last night, my home State. I have been somewhat critical of our involvement in the Indian Ocean, and the enlargement of our presence there. And I had some written questions about that. But one thing I noticed was a story in all our local papers about how "Pentagon officials" or "senior



Pentagon officials" or "unnamed Pentagon officials" warned of the huge buildup in Somalia and how endangered we are because of the Congress not recognizing the terrible threat to our national security in the Indian Ocean and so forth. I had some difficulty in determining just what the threat is to our national security there. But be that as it may, it seems that every time the Congress makes a cut in the defense budget, or every time that we take action counter to the Pentagon line, almost immediately thereafter there are the stories that come out in the paper from high unnamed sources. I have no objection to stories coming out but put a name on them, and get away from the anonymous comment rule. I feel that names should be put on sources of information as it comes out.

Mr. RUMSFELD. You are trying to remake America.

I am being facetious. The way of life in this town is for unnamed sources to give it out, I find.

Senator LEAHY. Of course it is. And it means that they can hide behind it. One of the problems of our Government is that it is so irresponsible that you can't point your finger at anybody who has made a statement. That is what irks me.

Mr. RUMSFELD. It is. It is frustrating to hear incorrect stories and not know where they come from nor the individual who started them.

Senator LEAHY. I agree. When a story comes out of the Pentagon I would be happy to have a name on it as a source. We may be generating some of the more substantive issues that you raised today.

Mr. RUMSFELD. The problem with what your suggestion is it seems to me is that to achieve what you suggesting—if I am not mistaken, one former Secretary of Defense tried to achieve it, and it was called muzzling in the Pentagon when there was an effort to try to have the office of the Secretary of Defense manage the relationship so that they would do it in a certain way.

Senator LEAHY. I am saying just the opposite. I am saying that all these sources encouraged them to come out, even the dissenting views.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I see. Encourage them to say something in the press but ask that their names be included.

Senator LEAHY. I realize that that is not going to work. I realize that some of the tips that have come out have been very good for this country. But it seems that these things always come out just as soon as we make a vote contrary to the Pentagon's desires. You can't tell people not to do it, of course not. I am not going to infringe on anybody's first amendment rights. But let's make it more open. If the Pentagon wants to get into that kind of a dialog via the press, let it be done openly.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I see. I would not want to pretend that I know the solution to that problem. I know that when I was Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, every time a budget item would come over from the Office of Management and Budget on a confidential basis individuals who wanted to affect a certain program favorably or adversely would immediately get that out anonymously in the newspapers, so that the proponents or opponents of that would be activated to get engaged in the process.

Senator LEAHY. I don't mean to labor this, Mr. Chairman, because that is really a very minor point. My real concern is very much in hearing the responses on the question of nuclear war. And I realize



that some of that may be of a classified nature. But I am far more concerned about that than who starts the scare stories. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator; thank you very much.

Senator Taft.

Senator TAFT. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, we have first the request from Senator McIntyre of our committee for Senator Muskie to be permitted to submit questions to Mr. Rumsfeld for answers for the record. I judge there is no objection. He did not have them in writing a minute ago and I held it up.

Is there objection?

The Chair hears no objection. Therefore it will be permitted. And I call those to your attention, Mr. Rumsfeld, for an answer real soon.

[Questions referred to follow:]

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MUSKIE

Question. During June of this year, I became concerned with reports developing out of Secretary Schlesinger's negotiations with the Belgian defense officials for sale of the F-16 fighter aircraft that a trade-off has been made under which the Department of Defense would give favorable consideration to a Belgian manufactured machine gun for use as the Army's new tank mounted machine gun.

I was particularly disturbed because the Maremount Corporation of Saco, Maine was the leading contender for meeting the Army's needs in this regard with their M-60-E2 machine gun. Award of this contract to Fabrique Nationale would result in the termination of the M-60 line at Maremount when the present contract expires in July of 1976. This will not only exacerbate unacceptably high local and national unemployment levels but also risk dependence on a sole source foreign supplier for an important weapons system. The adverse economic consequences would be felt not only in Maine but also in areas such as New Hampshire and Pennsylvania where important subcontracting work is performed.

Maremount Corporation is the single largest employer in the Saco area and approximately two-thirds of their 1,200 employees are involved in defense work.

After repeated inquiries from the Maine Congressional delegation, we received assurance from Secretary Schlesinger that no commitment has been made to purchase the Belgian weapon and that a decision on this contract would be made on the basis of the merits of the respective weapons after extensive testing.

That testing is now being conducted at Fort Carson, Colorado and Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland and is being reviewed by the General Accounting Office for fairness and accuracy. The tests should be completed within the next few weeks.

I would appreciate your personal assurances as we review your nomination as Secretary of Defense that you will give no special consideration to the Belgian competitor for this contract—Fabrique Nationale, and that the final decision on this procurement will be based on the merits and relative costs of the competing weapons including total life cycle costs, with due consideration to the importance of maintaining a domestic supplier of this weapons system.

Answer. It is and will be the U.S. goal to obtain the best weapon for the American soldier. A decision on a contract for the M-60 tank machine gun will be made on the basis of the merits of the respective weapons after extensive testing, their relative costs, and with a recognition of the broadly supported goal of increased standardization with NATO.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, are there any other questions now for Mr. Rumsfeld?

I have just one or two points I want to make.

Mr. Rumsfeld, I have in preparation a letter originally to be directed to Mr. Schlesinger, but it will be directed to you now, just a general overall proposition of whether or not the public funds, appropriated funds are being used in connection with paying expenses and entertain-



ment for lobbying purposes, or for whatever purposes in that general field. I was shocked to have "reliable sources out of the Pentagon"—he is a bearded old man, he brings in a good deal of mischief, but sometimes he is right—but anyway, they said on reliable sources that public funds, appropriated money, went to pay this. Now, the committee is all concerned about that. We will get that letter on over there to you. And it will get there about the time you get there, maybe. And I hope you will see that it is given proper attention.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I will indeed.

There is one thing that I just note that I failed to do. Senator Jackson gave me some questions in writing to respond to. We have been discussing them in here, but I have never submitted them for the record. His questions and the answers have not been submitted for the record. They have been discussed generally, but they have not been submitted.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to submitted questions here?

And you say you have some of the answers ready?

Mr. RUMSFELD. The answers are ready.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection they will be admitted to the record.

(See page 27.)

The CHAIRMAN. I want to make one more point here.

I have referred to matters given your personal attention. I think you would like to have sometimes over there, talented men that you can call to give you special in-depth reports on these matters. I don't think you can do it all yourself. But more particularly I wanted to direct your attention to the problem of procurement, particularly those expensive weapons. And I have been harping on this ever since I have been chairman. It is primarily a speculative function, because after all the Congress doesn't let the contract. But I think you ought to put more of your best talent, those in the military uniform, on this problem of procurement. And I found out that it is not a road to promotion—it is not considered a road to promotion at least. And there is a disposition for that reason maybe to sidestep it. But I am back to that old subject of some of our money being taken for personnel and so little left to weaponry, which is going up all the time, and will continue to go up, the weapons in that matter of procurement. And you will thereby have a chance to get more for your dollars as an increasing priority and importance. And you have a lot of highly competent men, I believe, in uniform. And if you could see fit to try to consider and put in effect an innovation along that line, I believe it is one of the best things that you can do. I really don't think that Congress, although it could do something more than we are doing, perhaps, I don't believe that Congress, being a legislative body, can be effective as the Executive in that field of letting contracts.

Would you respond to that? Because I think it is a fundamental problem you have.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I agree fully, Mr. Chairman, that it is an exceedingly important problem, not only because of the importance of those weapon systems, but also, as you suggest, because of the importance of seeing that the taxpayers' dollars are spent in the most effective way. I will ascertain what the arrangements are at the present time in the Department. The point about the possibility of a disincentive for able military people to enter the procurement area because of a possible lack of promotion opportunity is an important one. If that is the case,



that is worth looking into. Certainly the other suggestion about involving good people in that process, I certainly would agree with.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope you follow up on that.

I asked Mr. Packard to get into that phase of it, and he showed some interest in it. But, of course, he had so many things, and he didn't stay too long.

Do you have anything else now you wish to say? You haven't been put on the griddle, but you have had a lot of questions thrown at you. They have been difficult and in depth. And I thought you showed a fine knowledge of this subject matter. And I will give you 6 months more, and at the end of 6 months if you are confirmed you will have a lot of additional knowledge on this subject.

Is there anything you want to say? I thought a man should be able to come to bat on his own after such a long examination.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Chairman, I think I will pass. I thank you very much for your courtesies. It has been a pleasure to be here.

The CHAIRMAN. After all, I invited you to say something, but I think you are rather wise just to let it rest.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon the hearing was concluded.)

LATER COMMITTEE ACTION

The Armed Services Committee met in open session at 3 p.m. on Thursday, November 13, 1975, and voted to favorably report the nomination of Donald Rumsfeld to be Secretary of Defense. The vote was 16 in favor, none opposed, with all members being recorded.

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